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STRUCTURAL BIAS AND THE NEED FOR
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
JULIAN VELASCO*
One of the fundamental debates in corporate law pits the authority of
the board of directors to make business decisions without judicial
interference against the accountability of directors to shareholders for
their decisions. The business judgment rule attests to the value ascribed to
authority by providing only limited judicial review for claims of breach of
the duty of care, while the entire fairness test demonstrates the value
ascribed to accountability by providing far more exacting scrutiny for
claims of breach of the duty of loyalty. In cases involving structural bias,
however, neither doctrine is appropriate. Whenever the interests of
directors are in conflict with those of shareholders, there is a justifiable
concern that directors will pursue their own interests instead of those of
shareholders. The interposition of "disinterested" directors is helpful but
inadequate because no directors are truly disinterested; at the very least,
all directors are inherently interested in issues of accountability. In
certain situations involving structural bias, the courts have developed
intermediate standards of review for breach of fiduciary duty, but these
standards are inadequate. This article proposes and defends a standard
that draws upon the insights of both the business judgment rule and the
entire fairness test. The proposed standard calls for a moderate review of
the merits of directors' decisions in cases involving structural bias. A
review of the substantive merit of directors' decisions is necessary to
guard against possible abuse by conflicted directors (whether conscious
or unconscious), but such review must be limited in order to afford
directors sufficient latitude for the exercise of business judgment. Only
such an approach can provide the appropriate balance between
directorial authority and accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental debates in corporate law pits the authority of
boards of directors to make business decisions without judicial
interference against the accountability of directors to shareholders for their
decisions.' These competing values are reflected in the courts' treatment
of directors' fiduciary duties: 2 the business judgment rule attests to the
value ascribed to authority by providing only limited judicial review for
claims of breach of the duty of care, while the entire fairness test
demonstrates the value ascribed to accountability by providing far more
exacting scrutiny for claims of breach of the duty of loyalty.3
Unfortunately, there are many situations in which the competition between
these two values yields no obvious victor. In such situations, neither
standard of review provides an adequate judicial response to claims of
breach of fiduciary duty.
Courts have attempted to respond to such situations in a variety of
ways, but have not developed a comprehensive approach to the problem.
1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REv. 83, 84 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine]; see also STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 242, 207-08 (2002) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW].
2. Delaware courts generally speak of a "triad of fiduciary. duties: good faith, loyalty, [and] due
care." Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995) (citation omitted). Not
everyone agrees that good faith is on an equal footing with care and loyalty. See, e.g., In re Gaylord
Container Corp. S'holders. Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (arguing good faith is
subsidiary requirement of duty of loyalty). At best, the duty of good faith is the least well developed of
the three. For an interesting argument that the duty of good faith is an emerging body of law, see
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 456 (2004).
3. In Delaware, the two standards have been joined by innovations that are-or, at least,
originally were-fairly unorthodox. All claims of breach of fiduciary duty initially are protected by the
presumption of the business judgment rule. If a plaintiff can establish a breach of fiduciary duty,
whether the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, then the entire fairness test is invoked. See Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
This intermingling of the standards has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., William T. Allen,
et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 874-78 (2001); Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus.
LAW. 625 passim (2000). However, the effect of these developments is not as great as might be
thought. Because the burden of proof for overcoming the business judgment rule's presumption is
much greater in cases involving the duty of care than those involving the duty of loyalty, it is still true,
as a general matter, that duty of care cases are reviewed under the business judgment rule (because the
burden of proof cannot be overcome in most cases) and that duty of loyalty cases are reviewed under
the entire fairness test (because the burden of proof can be overcome in many cases). In any event,
these complications do not necessarily interfere with the operation of an intermediate standard of
review. Instead, an intermediate standard merely would have to be positioned properly between the
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (characterizing intermediate standard of review as threshold inquiry,
"before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred").
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As a result, the development of the corporate law on fiduciary duties has
been chaotic. Intermediate standards of review have multiplied, but
without much effect. The business judgment rule has been exalted over the
entire fairness test, and accountability has been sacrificed in the name of
directorial authority. Whether or not this state of affairs has caused or
otherwise contributed to the recent corporate scandals, it has left
shareholders under-protected from the abuses of their fiduciaries.
To restore order in this area of law, courts must recognize and address
the central problem: structural bias. The term "structural bias" generally
refers to the prejudice that members of the board of directors may have in
favor of one another and of management. 4 It is said to be the result of the
"common cultural bond" and "natural empathy and collegiality" shared by
most directors,5 the "economic[] or psychological[] dependen[cy] upon or
tie[s] to the corporation's executives, particularly its chief executive,"6 and
the "process of director selection and socialization, which incumbent
management dominates.",7 Because of structural bias, directors may--or,
at least, may be tempted to--act in the interests of each other and of
management rather than in the interests of shareholders. Structural bias is
not an issue with respect to most business decisions. However, it is an
inescapable problem whenever directors stand to benefit at the expense of
shareholders. This is true even if the conflict of interest does not rise to the
level of self-dealing, 8 such as when a colleague has a financial conflict but
does not take part in the decision making, or when the benefit is
4. For other definitions of structural bias, see Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-51 (Del.
2004) ("[The) 'structural bias' argument ... presupposes that the professional and social relationships
that naturally develop among members of a board impede independent decisionmaking."); Miller v.
Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983) ("[Tihe 'structural bias'
approach ... suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that the members of independent committees are
free from personal, financial or moral influences which flow from the directors who appoint them.");
James D. Cox & Donald E. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Context of Termination of
Derivative Suits by Independent Committees, 61 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1983) (describing
structural bias as "predisposition toward the defendant because the members who serve on the special
litigation committee have a common cultural bond with the defendants on whom they are passing
judgment"); and Mark A. Underberg, Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against
Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 601 n.14 (1980) (describing structural bias as "inherent prejudice
... resulting from the composition and character of the board of directors [and management]").
5. James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A
Critique ofZapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962.
6. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 145
(1976).
7. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation
and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 283 (1981).
8. A fortiori, it is true when there is self-dealing. However, the remedy in such situations is the
entire fairness test. I
[VOL. 82:821
STRUCTURAL BIAS
considered too intangible, indirect, or speculative to compromise
directors' impartiality. Derivative litigation and hostile takeovers are two
common examples. In such situations, there is a legitimate concern that
directors may take actions that promote their own interests and those of
management rather than the interests of shareholders. Although such
concerns, without more, may not warrant the application of a standard as
severe as the entire fairness test, they do undermine confidence in the
applicability of a standard as deferential as the business judgment rule. In
cases where neither standard is appropriate, the solution is an effective
intermediate standard of review.
The courts have developed a number of inconsistent standards 9 when
an appropriate theoretical framework would have revealed the possibility
and benefits of a common approach. A good intermediate standard of
review should be derived from the two extreme standards it seeks to
mediate. Both the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test
reflect the corporate law wisdom of the ages, so the intermediate standard
must draw on the strength of their fundamental insights. However, neither
basic standard is adequate to deal with structural bias, so the intermediate
standard must overcome their shortcomings.
This Article will propose an intermediate standard of review for cases
involving structural bias that will do just that.' 0 Because of the directors'
conflicts of interest, the appropriate standard must allow courts to look
into the substance of directors' decisions; however, because of the need for
the exercise of business judgment, it must afford directors significant
latitude. The proposed standard calls for an inquiry into the substantive
reasonableness of directors' decisions: those that are unreasonable should
be considered a breach of fiduciary duty while those that fall within a
range of reasonableness should be upheld. This standard is neither wholly
unfamiliar nor a mere restatement of an existing standard. A review for
substantive reasonableness is the best way to bridge the gap between the
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test in situations that call for
the application of neither extreme standard.
Part I lays a foundation by exploring the business judgment rule and
the entire fairness test. It describes the two standards, considers the
justifications commonly given for each, and examines their relative
9. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994)
(disinterested shareholder approval of transaction with controlling shareholder); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (takeover defense); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981) (derivative litigation); see also infra Part fI.B.
10. For another example of a similar endeavor, see Allen et al., supra note 3.
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weaknesses. It argues that the: two. doctrines provide complementary
insights that are equally fundamental to corporate law: that, as a general
matter, the interests of shareholders and directors are aligned such that
directors can be trusted and need not be policed very closely, but that,
when their interests conflict, directors cannot be trusted and must be
subject to careful judicial scrutiny. Thus, the two standards represent
opposite sides of the same coin. They are the twin pillars of enforcement
of fiduciary duties in corporate law that provide balance between the
competing values of authority and accountability.
Part II examines how courts have dealt with the issue of structural bias.
It begins by examining cases in which courts have resisted the theory.
Rather than accepting structural bias as a conflict of interest inherent in
certain situations, courts often have demanded proof of actual bias in
directors' decisions. Part II then turns to cases that have been more
accepting of the theory of structural bias, if not the title. It demonstrates
that courts have responded in an ad hoc manner, and argues that a common
solution would be a better approach.
Part III takes a closer look at structural bias. It argues that conflicts of
interest are more problematic than currently recognized under the duty of
loyalty. It proposes three paradigms for understanding structural bias: first,
an implicit conspiracy among directors to benefit themselves; second, the
effect of relationships which cause friends and colleagues to favor each
other over strangers; and third, a psychological phenomenon-ingroup
bias-that causes members of the board of directors to show favoritism
towards other members of the same group. Although such conflicts may
not rise to the level of self-dealing, they do undermine confidence in
directors' decisions. Thus, although none of these paradigms may make a
strong case for the application of the entire fairness test, all three militate
against the application of the business judgment rule.
Part IV proposes a new intermediate standard of review for cases
involving structural bias. It begins by arguing that the appropriate
approach would strike a balance between the deference of the business
judgment rule and the rigor of the entire fairness test, and that a moderate
review of the substance of directors' decisions best bridges that gap. It
then proposes a new standard: review for substantive reasonableness.
After delineating the contours of the proposed standard and distinguishing
it from existing standards that sound similar, it addresses certain practical
concerns that may be raised against it.
826 [VOL. 82:821
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Finally, Part V attempts to apply the new standard to some basic
situations in order to demonstrate its impact. It begins by addressing two
situations commonly accepted as involving structural bias: hostile
takeovers and derivative litigation. It then addresses an additional situation
in which structural bias is a problem: executive compensation decisions.
Finally, it considers the applicability of director exculpation statutes to
situations involving structural bias. The goal of Part V is to demonstrate
that the proposed standard is not nearly as radical as it may seem at first.
I. THE BASIC STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The twin pillars of enforcement of fiduciary duties in corporate law are
the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. These two core
doctrines stand in stark contrast to each other because of the radically
divergent level of judicial scrutiny they provide. The leniency of the
business judgment rule embodies the principle of directorial authority,
while the strictness of the entire fairness test embodies the principle of
directorial accountability. Despite the tension between them, the two are
actually highly complementary doctrines. Each provides insights that are
central to modern corporate law.
Often, it is assumed that the business judgment rule is the lone
foundation of corporate law." This is as unfortunate as it is wrong. The
entire fairness test is no less fundamental or essential. 2 The two standards
"are, so to speak, of equal dignity,"' 3 and neither has a claim to primacy
over the other. The deference of the business judgment rule is justifiable
only because of, and also makes possible, the rigor of the entire fairness
test. The legitimacy of either depends upon the other. Thus, an appropriate
understanding of both standards-including their insights as well as their
limitations-is indispensable to the proper formulation of an intermediate
standard of review capable of dealing with the issue of structural bias.
11. See, e.g., Allen et a]., supra note 3, at 867 (arguing that Delaware courts "link all the
disparate review standards together by using the business judgment rule as the medium"); Johnson,
supra note 3, at 625 (arguing that "Delaware courts both wrongly formulate the business judgment rule
and unsoundly make it the centerpiece of corporate fiduciary analysis").
12. This is true even under the reorganization of corporate law doctrine effected by Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). See supra
note 3. The business judgment rule may presume compliance with fiduciary duties, but the entire
fairness test is the result of a rebuttal of that presumption.
13. Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (setting forth the "equal dignities
rule" of form over substance in corporate law).
2004]
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A. Business Judgment Rule
Despite its history and pedigree, 14 the business judgment rule cannot be
reduced easily to a written formula.15 According to the Delaware courts, it
is "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
16
This description is inadequate at best. Although the business judgment rule
can be said to provide "a powerful presumption" in favor of directors,17 it
does much more. It is better understood as either a standard of review or a
policy of non-review.
1 8
14. See 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 7 (1998) ("For over a century and a half, the business judgment rule has been
the primary means by which courts have reviewed decisions by corporate directors concerning
ordinary day-to-day business matters."); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278 (2000)
("The business judgment rule traces its roots back around 170 years.") (footnote omitted); S. Samuel
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93 (1979) ("[Tlhe business
judgment rule [has been] a common law principle of corporate governance that has been part of
corporate law for at least 150 years."); Johnson, supra note 3, at 639 ("Although the phrase 'business
judgment rule' apparently was not used by the Delaware Chancery Court until 1959, the phrase
'business judgment'-and the concept of the rule itself-had been in use for several decades.")
(footnotes omitted).
15. See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 279.
A difficulty with the business judgment rule occurs, however, when courts and writers go
beyond the general concept of judicial restraint and attempt to inject specific content into the
rule. Immediately, a lack of consensus emerges as to exactly what the business judgment rule
really is. An example of this difficulty occurred during the drafting of the 1984 revision of the
Model Business Corporation Act. The drafters of the 1984 revision initially thought it would
be a good idea to include the rule as part of the Act. This process broke down, however, when
the drafters could not reach a consensus on a formulation of the rule. As one of the
participants explained, "we are saying that there is a business judgment rule, that we know
what it is and when it should be applied, but we can't define it."
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, Comment to § 4.01(c) cmt. a (1994)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] ("Confusion with respect to the business
judgment rule has been created by the numerous varying formulations of the rule and the fact that
courts have often stated the rule incompletely or with elliptical shorthand references."); BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 242 ("[Iln many ways, [the business judgment rule] remains
poorly misunderstood. In part, this is because the doctrine is neither straightforward nor even, in some
respects, well developed."); cf Johnson, supra note 3, at 625 ("Delaware courts both wrongly
formulate the business judgment rule and unsoundly make it the centerpiece of corporate fiduciary
analysis.").
16. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
17. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). But see R. Franklin Balotti
& James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1353 (1993) ("The
presumption of the business judgment rule is not a presumption in the ordinary evidentiary sense of
allocating the burden of proof.").
18. See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 243 ("Two basic conceptions of the
business judgment rule compete in the case law. One treats the rule as a standard of review .... The
[VOL. 82:821
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Many alternative formulations of the business judgment rule have been
proposed.19 The varying formulations reflect the reality that the business
judgment rule consists of two separate components: one dealing with
process and one dealing with substance.20 The process component requires
that breaches of the fiduciary duty of care not be reviewed under a
negligence standard, but something much less demanding; in Delaware,
the standard is gross negligence. 21 Thus, it could be said that the business
judgment rule "presumption" is strong enough that evidence of ordinary
negligence is insufficient to rebut it. The substance component, on the
other hand, requires that the merit of a business decision not be reviewed
at all, except in the most extreme circumstances. Courts will not hold
directors liable for decisions that are objectively unwise, unreasonable, or
other treats the rule as an abstention doctrine that creates a presumption against judicial review of duty
of care claims."). For the view that the business judgment rule serves as a standard of review, see, for
example, MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.31 official cmt., at 8-193 (2002); 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036, at 35; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 440-42
(1993). For the view that the business judgment rule serves as a policy of non-review, see, for
example, Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, passim; Allen et al., supra note 3, at 870
("[T]he 'business judgment rule' is not, functionally speaking, a standard of review at all. Rather, it is
an expression of a policy of non-review of a board of directors' decision .... ); Johnson, supra note 3,
at 625 ("The business judgment rule ... is better understood as a narrow-gauged policy of non-review
...."). See also 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, § 4.01, Comment to
§ 4.01(c) cmt. a ("Although courts have not expressed it this way, the business judgment rule has
offered a safe harbor for directors or officers who make honest, informed business decisions that they
rationally believe are in the best interests of their corporations.").
19. See, e.g., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, § 4.01(c); 2 MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31, official cmt., at 8-197 (2002) ("In basic principle, a board of directors enjoys
a presumption of sound business judgment and its decisions will not be disturbed (by a court
substituting its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment) if they can be attributed to
any rational business purpose.") (citation omitted). For additional formulations, see 1 WILLIAM E.
KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 2.01, at 2-1 to -5
(7th ed. 2003).
20. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 302 (1994) ("There are a number of variations on this process-
versus-substance theme. All have in common, however, the notion that the business judgment rule
calls for less judicial scrutiny of the merits of the directors' decision than of the process the directors
used in arriving at the determination.").
21. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) ("We think the concept of gross
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board
of directors was an informed one."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[U]nder the
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence."). But see
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (1940) ("[D]irectors are liable for negligence in the
performance of their duties. Not being insurers, directors are not liable for errors of judgment or for
mistakes while acting with reasonable skill and prudence.").
Although Delaware courts purport to apply a gross negligence standard, many have argued that
courts sometimes apply a pure negligence standard. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 3, at 872-74.
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even stupid 22 -unless, perhaps, a decision can be shown to be utterly
irrational or amounting to waste. 3 Thus, it could be said that the business
judgment rule "presumption" is nearly irrebuttable with respect to
substance. For this reason, it is fair to say that the business judgment rule
focuses primarily on the directors' decision-making process.24
However defined, the business judgment rule universally is
acknowledged to demonstrate great deference to directors' business
decisions and to provide a strong shield from liability for those decisions.
The business judgment rule affords corporate directors unique protection
from civil liability for the consequences of their actions. This special
treatment demands justification.
The justifications for the business judgment rule are well-known. They
26
often are said to begin with the statutory language. Section 141(a) of the
Delaware General Corporate Law, for example, provides that "[t]he
business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors .... Thus, it is the board of
directors that should be making business decisions, not the shareholders
who would challenge their decisions, and certainly not the courts who
would evaluate them.28
22. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("As for ... 'substantive due care,' we
should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh
or quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due
care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.") (footnote omitted); In re Caremark Int'l
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[Wlhether a ... decision [is]
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational,'
provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was
either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance the corporate interests.").
23. See Eisner, 746 A.2d at 264 ("Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.
Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision
is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.") (footnotes
omitted).
24. Some would have the business judgment rule focus entirely on process. See. e.g., Allen et al.,
supra note 3, at 890-93; Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 99; Johnson, supra note 3,
at 632-33.
25. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Whereas an automobile driver who
makes a mistake in judgment ... injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in
damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment ... will rarely, if ever, be found liable
for damages suffered by the corporation.").
26. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("Under Delaware law, the
business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del C. § 141(a), that
the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.").
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
28. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 ("The business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.") (citation
omitted); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) ("[B]y definition the
responsibility for business judgments must rest with the corporate directors; their individual
[VOL. 82:821
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A second rationale for the business judgment rule is based on the fact
that business decisions are inherently risky. Directors often have to make
important decisions with imperfect information. The quality of the
decision cannot necessarily be determined by the result that follows.
Second-guessing is especially dangerous under such circumstances.
29
Courts, in particular, are said to be ill-equipped to make, or even to
review, business decisions.3 ° Some even argue that courts are "radically
incompetent" in this regard.31
In addition, imposing liability on directors for poor business decisions
would be counterproductive in several respects. It might discourage people
from serving as directors because the potential liability would far exceed
the compensation that would be received for such service.32 It also might
discourage directors from engaging in risky behavior, even when it would
be in the interests of shareholders to do so.
33
capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that responsibility.").
29. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. The Joy court stated:
(C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate
corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The entrepreneur's function is to
encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may
seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge.
Id. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); see also id. at 619-23.
30. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) ("'Courts are ill-fitted to attempt to
weigh the "adequacy" of consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate
degrees of business risk."') (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)); Cuker
v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Pa. 1997) ("[The business judgment] doctrine prevents courts
from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decision-making, a task they are ill-equipped to
perform.") (citation omitted); Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994)
("Courts recognize that managers have both better information and better incentives than they .... Not
only do businessmen know more about business than judges do, but competition ... provides
sufficient punishment for businessmen who commit more than their share of business mistakes.")
(citation omitted); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990)
("Judges are not business experts and therefore should not substitute their judgment for the judgment
of the directors.") (citation omitted); Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000 ("[T]he business judgment
doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and
infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments.").
31. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 119-20 (quoting Eric A. Posner, A Theory
of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000)).
32. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. II. 1989), aff'd,
897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It would be considerably more difficult to recruit directors to serve on
corporate boards if their business decisions were subject to substantive scrutiny. The business
judgment rule encourages competent individuals to become directors who otherwise might decline for
fear of personal liability.").
33. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("If
those in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for losses ... based upon what
... persons of ordinary or average judgment ... regard as 'prudent[,]' 'sensible[,J' or even 'rational,'
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Furthermore, imposing liability on directors for bad decisions would
run counter to a standard rationale for the imposition of liability: the
spreading of costs. Rather than taking a large loss that befalls one or a few
individuals and imposing a fractional cost on the public generally, director
liability would take small losses from a large number of shareholders and
impose huge aggregate liability on a small group of directors.34
Finally, shareholders can be said to have assumed the risk of bad
business decisions in several respects. First, shareholders voluntarily
invest in risky assets: rather than invest in risk-free assets, such as U.S.
government bonds, they invest in equity securities in order to achieve a
higher rate of return.35 It would be inappropriate for shareholders to
complain that things did not turn out as hoped. In addition, shareholders
have the ability to reduce their risk through diversification-an
opportunity not generally available in other circumstances. 36  Thus,
litigation concerning the management of a business is not as critical as
other types of litigation. Moreover, shareholders elect directors to manage
the corporation on their behalf. In doing so, they should be deemed to
such persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize less risky investment projects.");
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[D]irectors will tend to
deviate from this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to undertake a
risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto
claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss."); Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 ("[Blecause
potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders
that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions.").
34. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WiS. L. REV. 573,
575.
In most cases, liability for negligence operates to shift the loss from a single human victim
and spread it, by means of insurance and doctrines such as respondeat superior, across a
larger, more diversified group. At least in the case of larger, publicly held corporations,
directors' liability has just the opposite effect .... Imposing liability on the directors serves to
re-concentrate [a] loss on a small handful of individuals.
Id. Of course, to the extent that directors and officers insurance is available, this negative impact is
reduced.
35. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 ("[S]hareholders to a very real degree voluntarily undertake the risk
of bad business judgment. Investors need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array of
opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers."); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at
1052 ("Shareholders don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse.
Shareholders' investment interests ... will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly
assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are
above the firm's cost of capital.").
36. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 ("Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their
holdings. ... Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need not bend
over backwards to give special protections to shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk
by not diversifying."); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 ("Shareholders can diversify the risks of their
corporate investments.").
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accept the judgment of those directors-and to assume the risk of bad
decisions made by those directors.37
Of course, it can be argued that none of the reasons given truly justifies
the existence of the business judgment rule because most, if not all, are
applicable in many other contexts as well:
38
Can anyone seriously argue that surgeons in the operating room,
lawyers in the midst of a heated trial, or accountants up against a
closing deadline are not also called upon to make snap judgments in
response to circumstances that may be difficult to recreate [sic] in a
courtroom years later? Nonetheless, our legal system is quite
comfortable relying on the device of litigation to review, invariably
with the benefit of hindsight, the quality of these professionals'
performances and to assess damages, often in the millions of
dollars, when those performances are found wanting. Why should
directors be any different?
39
There is significant merit to the argument.
However, there does seem to be something qualitatively different in the
business context. In most other situations, people generally would prefer
to avoid risk, while in the business context, investors often are eager to
accept more risk in order to increase their expected rate of return.4
n
Moreover, in most other situations, people are seeking to avoid a loss or
even bodily harm, while in the business context, investors generally are
investing their surplus funds in the anticipation of profit.4t Thus, the
37. See In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch.
1996) ("If the shareholders thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a
director produces in the good faith exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have
elected other directors."); Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 ("Since shareholders can and do select among
investments partly on the basis of management, the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain
voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions.").
38. See generally Gevurtz, supra note 20, at 304-21. Cf Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani,
Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV.
587, 590 (1994) (concluding that "there are indeed justifiable reasons for courts to treat business
decisions differently than medical decisions").
39. Davis, supra note 34, at 581.
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. It is true that tort plaintiffs often accept risk
voluntarily. For example, medical patients are made to understand that surgery necessarily involves
risk. However, there is a categorical difference between a patient and an investor. A patient generally
is required to undergo surgery. Although some surgery is elective, it is rarely optional in the sense that
an investment decision is optional: the investor, unlike the patient, has a risk-free investment
alternative. Moreover, a patient would prefer to reduce the risk associated with any given surgery to
the fullest extent possible. An investor, on the other hand, may be willing to accept any amount of risk
as long as the expected return is commensurate.
41. The doctrine of limited liability ensures that an investor can decide freely how much to put at
risk with any investment decision. The same is not true in many other circumstances, such as surgery,
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arguments based on risk (and assumption of risk) are more substantial in
the business context than in other situations.
The key insight that drives the business judgment rule is this: as a
general matter, directors can be trusted and need not be policed very
closely. By and large, the interests of the directors and the shareholders are
aligned: they both want the business to prosper. Disagreements, for the
most part, are about the best way of achieving that goal. It is likely that
litigation on substantive decisions, and even on duty of care issues, would
be about matters on which reasonable people would disagree. In light of
the principles discussed above, there is no good reason to waste scarce
judicial resources on such disputes. This is especially true given that
neither judges nor shareholders are likely to be capable of making better
decisions than the professionals charged with running the business. It is
only when there are conflicts of interest that the courts need to get
involved.
B. Entire Fairness Test
If the key insight of the business judgment rule is that directors
generally can be trusted, the key insight of the entire fairness test is that
this is not always so.43 Although the interests of directors usually are
where a person's life can be at risk.
42. See Allen et al., supra note 3, at 875 ("[A] board that is not conflicted is motivated to achieve
the highest price the market will permit. Because in those circumstances the board's interests and the
interests of the shareholders are aligned, there is no reason for courts to engage in a substantive review
of the board's decision."); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110, 117 (1965) ("Generally speaking, managers' incentives and interests coincide with
those of their shareholders in every particular except one: they have no incentive, as managers, to buy
management services for the company at the lowest possible price.").
Agency theory suggests that any agent may be tempted to act in her own interests rather than
those of the principal. In corporate law, this is generally understood to apply to officers, who may
prefer their own interests to those of shareholders. Thus, officers would prefer greater compensation
and job security, and less pressure and accountability, than shareholders would want them to have.
Under agency theory, the role of directors is to monitor officers. One of their most important functions
is to implement executive compensation packages that re-align the interests of officers and
shareholders. However, directors themselves are not immune to the agency problem, making perfect
resolution impossible. See generally Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Ownership, Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305.(1976); see also
GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 229-41.
Nevertheless, corporate law generally assumes that directors can be trusted. Various justifications
can be given for this, ranging from the discipline of market forces to directors' integrity. In any event,
the problem is not so much the law's willingness to assume that, absent conflicts of interest, directors
are willing and able to act in the interests of shareholders. Rather, the problem is identifying conflicts
that could upset this assumption. This issue is confronted infra Part Ill.
43. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 443 n.9 (Del. 1996) ("The premise of the entire
fairness test is that the business judgment rule is inapplicable where self-interest may have colored
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aligned with those of the shareholders, there are times when their interests
conflict. In those situations, the deference afforded to directors by the
business judgment rule is wholly inappropriate.44 Thus, when a plaintiff
can establish a cognizable duty of loyalty issue, the protections of the
business judgment rule are lost, and the directors' actions are reviewed
under the entire fairness test.
The entire fairness test is far more demanding than the business
judgment rule.45 It requires the directors to prove that the transaction in
question was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.46 Like
directors' actions."); see also Allen et al., supra note 3, at 874-75 ("Claimed breaches of the duty of
loyalty ... [are] reviewed under a far more exacting standard---entire fairness. . . . Where ... a
majority of the board is conflicted . .. it cannot be presumed that the board will be motivated to
achieve the highest transaction price the market will permit.").
44. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Whatever its merit, however, the
business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its existence. Thus, it does not
apply in cases, e.g., in which the corporate decision ... is tainted by a conflict of interest ...."); AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. 1986) ("This unwillingness
to assess the merits (or fairness) of business decisions of necessity ends when a transaction is one
involving a predominately interested board ... In that setting there is no alternative to a judicial
evaluation ... other than the unacceptable one of leaving shareholders unprotected."); Gottlieb v.
Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952) ("Human nature being what it is, the law, in its
wisdom, does not presume that directors will be competent judges of the fair treatment of their
company where fairness must be at their own personal expense."); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Del. 1939) ("The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that
there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest."); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l,
Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Del. Ch. 1968) ("[W]hen the persons, be they stockholders or directors,
who control the making of a transaction and the fixing of its terms, are on both sides, then the
presumption and deference to sound business judgment are no longer present."); see also 2 MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60 Subchapter F, introductory cmt., at 8-372 (2002) ("The law regulates interest-
conflict transactions because experience shows that people do often yield to the temptation to advance
their self-interests and, if they do, other people may be injured. That contingent fear is sufficient
reason to warrant caution and to apply special standards and procedures to interest-conflict
transactions."); Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 122-23 ("Despite the limitations of
judicial review, rational shareholders would prefer judicial intervention with respect to board decisions
... tainted ['by considerations other than shareholder wealth, as where the directors engage in self-
dealing or seek to defraud the shareholders']. The affirmative case for disregarding honest errors
simply does not apply to intentional misconduct.") (footnotes omitted).
45. "Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and
the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial
review frequently is determinative of the outcome ... " AC Acquisitions Corp., 519 A.2d 103, 111
(Del. Ch. 1986). But see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
46. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) ("Their dealings with the corporation are
subjected to rigorous scrutiny and.., the burden is on the director ... not only to prove the good faith
of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those
interested therein."); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9
(Del. 1994) ("Where actual self-interest is present and affects a majority of the directors approving a
transaction, a court will apply ... exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction is entirely fair
to the stockholders."); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375-76 (Del. 1993) ("[T]he defendants
are on both sides of the transaction. For that reason, . . . the entire fairness test applies ....
Accordingly, defendants have the burden of showing the entire fairness of those transactions.");
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the business judgment rule, the entire fairness test has both a procedural
and a substantive component. The Delaware Supreme Court has described
the entire fairness test as follows:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and stockholders
were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic
and financial considerations of the proposed [transaction], including
all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects,
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company's stock. . . .However, the test for fairness is not a
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and fair price. All aspects of
the issue must be examined as a whole, since the question is one of
entire faimess.
47
Nevertheless, the court recognized that "in a non-fraudulent transaction
... price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other
features, ' 48 thereby making substantive review an essential part of the
entire fairness test.
The deference that is the hallmark of the business judgment rule is
entirely absent under the entire fairness test.49 Not only do directors bear
the burden of proof, but they must justify both their decision making
process and the substance of their decisions. The business judgment rule
and the entire fairness test could not be much more divergent. This
difference also demands justification.
The duty of loyalty always has been taken very seriously by the courts.
Whether or not their actions always have been correspondingly tough,5 °
courts have used the strongest language in describing and defending the
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("When directors of a Delaware corporation
are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the
most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain."); Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 570 (Del.
Ch. 2000) ("Under [the entire fairness test], where the controlling shareholder and the directors stand
on both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden to demonstrate that the transaction was entirely
fair to the corporation and the minority stockholders, both as to process and price.").
47. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376 ("The entire fairness analysis essentially requires 'judicial
scrutiny.' In business judgment rule cases, an essential element is the fact that there has been a
business decision made by a disinterested and independent corporate decisionmaker. When there is no
independent corporate decisionmaker, the court may become the objective arbiter.") (citations
omitted).
50. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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duty of loyalty. They speak of "the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, "the most scrupulous observance of [one's] duty,' 52 and "the
utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness. 53 It should
not be surprising, then, that there should be a heightened standard of
review in corporate law for breaches of the duty of loyalty.
When their interests conflict, directors cannot be trusted to pursue the
interests of shareholders over their own.54 Even assuming directors would
not be dishonest by consciously favoring their own interests, their bias
may make them unable to pursue shareholder interests as zealously as the
shareholders deserve.5 This would seem to be cause to prohibit, to the
fullest extent possible, conflict of interest situations such as transactions
between the company and its directors. In fact, the law originally followed
such an approach. 6 However, because such transactions are not always
contrary to the interests of the shareholders, there was reason to find a way
to permit beneficial transactions. Among the means selected was the entire
fairness test, under which transactions would be permitted if the directors
could prove that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its
shareholders. 7
51. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (addressing fiduciary duty of loyalty
among partners).
52. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
53. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
54. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952) ("Human nature being
what it is, the law, in its wisdom, does not presume that directors will be competent judges of the fair
treatment of their company where fairness must be at their own personal expense."); GEVURTZ, supra
note 14, at 325 ("[T]he fundamental problem with conflict-of-interest transactions is that we do not
trust individuals with a personal financial stake at odds with the corporation's to put the corporation's
interest ahead of their own.").
55. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) ("A director's interest may be shown
by demonstrating a potential personal benefit or detriment to the director as a result of the decision. 'In
such circumstances, a director cannot be expected to exercise his or her independent business
judgment without being influenced by the ... personal consequences resulting from the decision."')
(quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993)); Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (stating that entire
fairness test is "derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives"); W. States
Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 135 P. 496, 500 (1913) ("It matters not that the officer is entirely free from
any intent to injure the corporation in the slightest degree, acting in fact in the highest good faith
throughout, or that his actions really advantage the corporation.").
56. "In 1880, it could have been stated with confidence that in the United States the general rule
was that any contract between a director and his corporation was voidable at the instance of the
corporation or its shareholders, without regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction." Harold
Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BuS. LAW. 35, 36
(1966); cf Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the
Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 655 (1992).
57. Another option would be to submit the matter to disinterested directors and/or shareholders.
See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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Courts are not well-suited to making business decisions; that is the job
of directors.58 However, conflicted directors are not well-suited to making
business decisions in the interests of shareholders, either.59 Moreover, it is
difficult to have confidence that conflicted directors can overcome their
substantive bias by any procedural means because the arm's length
bargaining process cannot effectively be re-created when directors are on
both sides of the transaction. 60 Thus, the supervision of the courts often is
the only available alternative.61
Finally, it bears emphasis that the courts are not exactly imposing their
own business judgment under the entire fairness test. Rather, they simply
are demanding strong justification for a given transaction.62 That exercise
is within the core competence of the courts.
C. Shortcomings
Occupying, as they do, the two extreme positions in corporate law,
both the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test suffer from
significant shortcomings. Although each has its proper role, neither should
be employed too broadly or without caution. Excessive use of either
standard could lead to disastrous results.
The main shortcoming of the entire fairness test is that it is too strict.63
There could be plenty of transactions or other business decisions that
would be, in fact, entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders but
with respect to which the directors would be unable to carry their burden
of proof. For the reasons discussed with respect to the business judgment
rule, the substance of business decisions is often difficult to defend.
58. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
60. Cf Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1930) ("The essence of the test [of intrinsic
fairness] is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's
length bargain."); see also infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing delegation of decision
making to committees of disinterested directors).
61. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)
("(W]hen a transaction is one involving a predominately interested board with a financial interest in
the transaction adverse to the corporation ... there is no alternative to a judicial evaluation of the
fairness of the terms of the transaction other than the unacceptable one of leaving shareholders
unprotected."); GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 322 ("The various rationales for the business judgment
rule ... largely disappear when dealing with conflict-of-interest transactions. The idea that directors
... are more likely to reach a better business decision than the courts presupposes a situation in which
we can trust the directors to act in the best interest of the corporation."); see also supra note 44 and
accompanying text. But see infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; cf infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. But see infra note 137 and accompanying
text.
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Second-guessing is not the best way to assess the merits of a business
decision. While it may be necessary to do so at times, it would be
inappropriate to expand the application of the entire fairness test too
broadly.
Moreover, if the entire fairness test were employed too frequently, it
would consume a great deal of judicial resources.64 It also would subject a
great number of business decisions to a form of review-i.e., judicial-
that is acknowledged to be highly imperfect. 65 Thus, prudence dictates that
the entire fairness test ought not to be over-extended.
However, the business judgment rule is imperfect as well. Its main
shortcoming is the exact opposite of the entire fairness test's: it is too
lenient. In theory, at least, only grossly negligent conduct and wholly
irrational decisions would fail to pass muster.66 Surely there have been,
throughout the years, countless negligent business decisions and
substantively unreasonable transactions that have been upheld under the
business judgment rule. That is the price to be paid for deference. 67
Of course, such deference is subject to abuse. If directors are confident
that their decisions are subject to review only under the business judgment
rule, it could be expected to affect their behavior. They may decide,
consciously or otherwise, to shirk their responsibilities by behaving
negligently. Although shirking would have to avoid gross negligence in
order to escape liability, this provides little comfort to shareholders. Worse
yet, directors may find ways to divert corporate assets to their personal
benefit (again, consciously or otherwise). Especially in large public
corporations, directors would need to redirect only a small, perhaps even
insignificant, amount of assets from each shareholder to themselves in
64. Going to trial to determine the fairness of a transaction necessarily consumes significantly
greater resources than dismissing a case because of the business judgment rule:
As our Supreme Court has recognized, a determination that entire fairness is the appropriate
standard of review 'is often of critical importance.' That conclusion normally will preclude
dismissal of a complaint on a ... motion to dismiss. . .. [T]he requirement of an entire
fairness review may also preclude the entry of a final judgment even after discovery on a
motion for summary judgment ....
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (citation omitted). Of course, the courts
recognize that judicial economy cannot be the ultimate value in these matters. See Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) ("[I]f we failed to balance all the interests involved, we
would in the name of practicality and judicial economy foreclose a judicial decision on the merits.").
65. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
67. "Establishing the proper mix of deference and accountability thus emerges as the central
problem in applying the business judgment rule to particular situations." Bainbridge, Abstention
Doctrine, supra note 1, at 109.
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order to amass huge fortunes. 68 The outer limit for substantive
overreaching-irrationality or waste-is virtually unworthy of mention.69
Thus, the deferential nature of the business judgment rule easily could lead
to an increase in negligent and bubstantively unreasonable business
decisions. If the business judgment rule were employed too often, it would
leave shareholders under-protected. While not all directors would succumb
to the temptation, it would be inappropriate to assume that directors are
any less frail than others.7° Thus, prudence dictates that the business
judgment rule also ought not to be overextended.
The obvious conclusion is that an all-or-nothing approach, employing
either the entire fairness test or the business judgment rule, is inadequate
to deal with all situations. The development of one or more intermediate
standards of review was inevitable.
II. STRUCTURAL BIAS IN THE COURTS
Because the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test occupy
the extreme ends of the spectrum in terms of judicial review, there are
situations in which neither standard can be considered appropriate. Cases
involving structural bias are the leading examples. When directors have a
conflict of interest that does not rise to the level of self-dealing, the
deference of the business judgment rule seems as inadequate as the rigor
of the entire fairness test seems excessive.
The issue of structural bias has not escaped the notice of the courts.
Their response, howeVer, has not been entirely consistent. Some courts
have been more accepting than others.71 Delaware courts have vacillated
on the issue. On the one hand, they clearly have expressed hesitancy when
addressing the issue of structural bias explicitly. On the other hand, the
development of intermediate standards of review for breach of fiduciary
68. See supra note 42 (discussing agency theory); see also Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine,
supra note 1, at 107-09 (discussing trade-off between authority and accountability).
69. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000) (upholding severance package
worth over $140 million after an unsuccessful fifteen months as president, albeit as "a close case").
70. See supra notes 44, 54-55 and accompanying text.
71. Compare Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983)
("We believe that the potential for structural bias on the part of a litigation committee appointed by
directors who are parties to derivative actions is sufficiently great and sufficiently difficult of precise
proof in an individual case to require the adoption of a prophylactic rule."), with Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-03 (N.Y. 1979) (applying business judgment rule to decisions of disinterested
and independent special litigation committee). See also Houle v. Lowe, 556 N.E.2d 51, 54-59 (Mass.
1990) (discussing different courts' approaches to derivative litigation in light of structural bias).
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duty has been largely a response to concerns about structural bias,
although not explicitly so.
This Part will explore the courts' response to structural bias. It will
begin with a discussion of the cases in which the courts have resisted the
concept of structural bias and then turn to cases in which they have
embraced it. This review will lay the groundwork for the subsequent
discussion of the true nature of structural bias and why the courts'
response has been inadequate.
A. Judicial Skepticism
Clearly, the courts are not overly concerned with the threat of structural
bias. This is obvious from the most common method of dealing with
conflicts of interest. Rather than rely heavily on the entire fairness test,
courts seek to eliminate the conflict altogether. One way is to have the
interested directors recuse themselves from the decision-making process
and to have the matter decided by disinterested directors; another way is to
have the board's decision conditioned upon the approval of disinterested
shareholders. In theory, at least, there would be an unconflicted decision
maker, obviating the need for judicial scrutiny and justifying deference.72
This logic is the basis for various state statutes that permit interested
transactions that are approved by fully-informed, disinterested directors or
shareholders.73 Relying on these statutes, directors generally direct
decisions involving conflicts of interest to disinterested directors or
shareholders, and courts generally review those decisions under the
business judgment rule.74
72. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) ("The key to upholding an interested
transaction is the approval of some neutral decision-making body.... [A] transaction will be sheltered
from shareholder challenge if approved by either a committee of independent directors, the
shareholders, or the courts.").
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2002).
74. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993) ("[A]pproval of an
interested transaction by either a fully-informed disinterested board of directors, or the disinterested
shareholders, provides business judgment protection.") (citations omitted); Marciano v. Nakash, 535
A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("[A]pproval by fully-informed disinterested directors ... or
disinterested stockholders ... permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial
review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction.").
But see Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997) ("[ELven
if a board's action falls within the safe harbor of section 144, the board is not entitled to receive the
protection of the business judgment rule. Compliance ... merely shifts the burden to the plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the transaction was unfair.") (unpublished opinion). Cf infra notes 412-17 and
accompanying text.
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If structural bias were a serious concern, disinterested director approval
would not be sufficient to invoke the business judgment rule. Shareholder
approval might be a different story,75 but the courts would not be so
trusting of directors sitting in judgment over each other or management.
Disinterested directors may not have a financial interest in the transaction
in question, but they may nevertheless be conflicted with respect to the
decision itself, if only because of its effect on a colleague. The concept of
structural bias suggests that too much deference is inappropriate because
of such conflict.
The courts' hesitancy with respect to structural bias is not limited to
such general considerations. The Delaware Supreme Court first addressed
the issue of structural bias explicitly in the case of Aronson v. Lewis.76 The
case involved a derivative action and the issue was how a plaintiff could
establish demand futility.77 The court announced a two-part test:
[I]n determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the
proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the
particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1)
the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise
of business judgment.78
In the course of the discussion, the court had the occasion to address
the issue of structural bias briefly in a footnote:
Critics will charge that we are ignoring the structural bias common
to corporate boards throughout America, as well as the other unseen
socialization processes cutting against independent discussion and
decisionmaking in the boardroom. The difficulty with structural bias
in a demand futile case is simply one of establishing it in the
complaint .... We are satisfied that discretionary review by the
Court of Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts pointing to
75. But see infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
76. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
77. A derivative action is "a suit asserted by a shareholder on the corporation's behalf against a
third party (usu[ally] a corporate officer) because of the corporation's failure to take some action
against the third party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004). Before shareholders can
initiate a derivative action, they must make a demand that the board of directors take such action.
However, demand will be excused if making such demand would be futile because of directorial
interest. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. See generally infra notes 348-69 and accompanying text.
78. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (emphasis added).
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bias on a particular board will be sufficient for determining demand
futility. 79
By demanding that the plaintiff establish a strong case of bias, the court
clearly rejected the notion that structural bias is an inherent aspect of
director relations.
In its most recent discussion of structural bias, the Delaware Supreme
Court reaffirmed and elaborated upon the Aronson approach. In Beam v.
Stewart,80  shareholders of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.
brought a derivative action against the corporation as well as its founder,
officers and directors alleging, among other things, breaches of fiduciary
duty by Martha Stewart herself. The issue before the court was whether
demand was futile in light of the directors' personal relationships with her
and her control over the company.81 The court concluded that demand was
not futile because a majority of the directors were disinterested and
independent.
82
In the course of its opinion, the Stewart court considered the concept of
structural bias under the rubric of "personal friendship. 83 The court
acknowledged that friendships could disrupt the independence of an
otherwise disinterested director.84 However, it was convinced that this
would be a very rare situation: "'Not all friendships, or even most of them,
rise to this level .... ,,,85 On this point the court was clear: "Allegations of
mere personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing
alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director's
independence.,86 Instead, the plaintiff would be required to establish that
the relationship in question was "of a bias-producing nature":
87
79. Id. at 815 n.8.
80. 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
81. "Stewart was, at all relevant times, [the company]'s chairman and chief executive. She
controls over 94% of the shareholder vote." Id. at 1044 n.3.
82. Id. at 1057.
83. See id. at 1050-52. Friendship is only one possible understanding of structural bias. See infra
Part 1l.B.
84. See Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1050 ("A variety of motivations, including friendship, may
influence the demand futility inquiry."); id. ("'[Slome professional or personal friendships, which may
border on or even exceed familial loyalty and closeness, may raise a reasonable doubt whether a
director can appropriately consider demand."') (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 979 (Del. Ch.
2003); id. at 1052 ("[Plersonal friendship is [not] always irrelevant to the independence calculus.").
85. Id. at 1050 (citation omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also id. at 1051 ("The difficulty with structural bias in a demand futile case is simply
one of establishing it in the complaint.... We are satisfied that discretionary review by the Court of
Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts pointing to bias on a particular board will be sufficient
for determining demand futility.") (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984)).
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The Court of Chancery... must review the complaint on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether it states with particularity facts
indicating that a relationship ... is so close that the director's
independence may reasonably be doubted. This doubt might arise
either because of financial ties, familial affinity, a particularly close
or intimate personal or business affinity or because of evidence that
in the past the relationship caused the director to act non-
independently vis i vis an interested director. ... Mere allegations
that they move in the same business and social circles, or a
characterization that they are close friends, is not enough to negate
independence for demand excusal purposes.
The facts of the case demonstrate that the quantum of proof required by
the court is quite high:
Allegations that Stewart and the other directors moved in the same
social circles, attended the same weddings, developed business
relationships before joining the board, and described each other as
"friends," even when coupled with Stewart's 94% voting power, are
insufficient, without more, to rebut the presumption of
independence .... Whether they arise before board membership or
later as a result of collegial relationships among the board of
directors, such affinities-standing alone-will not render presuit
demand futile.89
The burden is especially onerous given that the plaintiff is required to
make its case on the pleadings, with particularized allegations, and without
the benefit of discovery. 90
The underlying concern is not wholly unreasonable: if structural bias
were accepted as a conflict of interest, it could alter radically the balance
between authority and accountability.9' Because of the nature of
relationships among directors,92 many issues that are deemed to involve
88. Stewart, 845 A.2dat 1051-52.
89. Id. at 1051.
90. See infra notes 350-51, 359-69 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAw. 503 (1989).
[T]he structural bias argument has no logical terminus.... If familiarity breeds acquiescence
in litigation matters, will it not do so in other contexts as well? If so, does this not suggest a
wholesale abandonment of the business judgment rule in favor of judicial review of every
board approval of a management proposal that turns out badly?
Id. at 534-35 (footnote omitted).
92. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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the duty of care might be considered to involve the duty of loyalty. If so,
the entire fairness test would swamp the business judgment rule. However,
recognition of structural bias as a conflict of interest need not lead to the
conclusion that there is a breach of the duty of loyalty requiring the
invocation of the entire fairness test.93 There are other possibilities.
To be sure, the Delaware Supreme Court has not rejected the concept
of structural bias outright. However, the cases discussed thus far do not
provide a ringing endorsement. By requiring specific proof, the court
undermined the concept of structural bias, which suggests that bias is
inherent in such relationships. It would seem that the Delaware courts are
not particularly sympathetic to claims of structural bias. However, the
foregoing discussion does not paint a complete picture. There are many
situations in which they do endorse the concept of structural bias more
fully, although not necessarily under that label.
B. Endorsement Via Intermediate Standards of Review
Despite the reservations by the Delaware Supreme Court in cases such
as Aronson and Stewart, the concept of structural bias has achieved
considerable judicial acceptance in a number of circumstances. In fact, this
section will demonstrate that structural bias is the primary reason for the
development of various intermediate standards of review.
"[T]he emergence of these intermediate standards of review has been
one of the major recent developments in corporate law.",94 It is not a
surprising development, given the extreme divergence between the
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. However, it was less
predictable that intermediate standards would multiply rather than
coalesce. When confronted with circumstances that required it, the courts
developed intermediate standards of review for the specific situations
before them. The individual intermediate standards were surely better than
either basic alternative but were not particularly apt. Had the courts been
willing to recognize that the various standards address the same general
concern-structural bias-they might have been able to develop a
comprehensive theory of review.
93. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
94. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 467.
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1. Hostile Takeovers
One obvious endorsement of the concept of structural bias can be
found in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.95 In that case, Mesa
Petroleum Company made a two-tier, front-loaded tender offer for the
shares of Unocal: 96 it offered $54 per share in cash to acquire a majority of
the shares, after which point it would squeeze out the remaining
shareholders for subordinated securities with a face value, but not a market
value, of $54.97 "[S]uch offers are a classic coercive measure designed to
stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is
inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the
transaction. ' '98 The Unocal board responded in kind. Its defense was a
selective self-tender in which the company would exchange 49% of its
shares for senior debt securities worth $72 per share, but the offer was not
open to Mesa Petroleum. 99 This effectively would cause Mesa Petroleum
to pay the higher amount on the back end of its transaction in order to
proceed. "[T]he board stated that its objective was either to defeat the
inadequate Mesa offer or, should the offer still succeed, provide the
[remaining] stockholders, who would otherwise be forced to accept 'junk
bonds', with [additional consideration]."' 00  Mesa challenged the
discriminatory nature of the defensive measure, but Unocal prevailed.
The Delaware Supreme Court noted that directors must be free to
respond to hostile takeover offers in the interests of shareholders.'O
However, the court also recognized that, in circumstances involving the
threat of a hostile takeover, there is an "omnipresent specter that a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests [i.e., entrenchment], rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders [i.e., maximizing
shareholder wealth]." °2 This "omnipresent specter" is nothing more than
an articulation of structural bias. Although the court did not see the case as
95. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
96. "[A] two-tier, front-loaded tender offer is a tender offer for a majority of a company's shares
with the explicit or implicit promise of a subsequent merger in which the minority shareholders will be
eliminated for inferior consideration." Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27
J. CORP. L. 381, 386 n.27 (2002).
97. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
98. Id. at 956.
99. See id. at 950.
100. Id. at 956.
101. "When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine whether
the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is
no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to
the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment." Id. at 954.
102. Id.
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involving self-dealing, it understood that directors were conflicted. This is
the essential claim of structural bias.
In response, the court recognized "an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
judgment rule may be conferred."'10 3 The threshold inquiry established by
the court was a new intermediate standard of review in the form of a
bipartite test. First, "directors must show that they had reasonable grounds
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed
.... ,,104 Second, the defensive measures "must be reasonable in relation
to the threat posed."' 05 This seemed to be a reasonable attempt to balance
the competing concerns with an intermediate standard of review.
Unfortunately, there was not much depth to the enhanced scrutiny. As
the Delaware Supreme Court noted, directors can "satisfy [the first prong]
'by showing good faith and reasonable investigation .... "' 106 With respect
to the second prong, the court would subsequently clarify that "'courts will
not substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but will
determine if the directors' decision was, on balance, within a range of
reasonableness.' 10 7 These elaborations make the enhanced scrutiny
standard sound strikingly similar to the business judgment rule.10 8
In fact, as the court would later explain, there is "a direct correlation
between findings of proportionality or disproportionality and the judicial
determination of whether a defensive response was draconian because it
was either coercive or preclusive ... ,,109 In other words, a defensive
response is likely to be considered unreasonable only if it is either
coercive or preclusive. 1 With such limitations on judicial review, the
enhanced scrutiny standard cannot serve the primary function of an
intermediate standard of review: to bridge the gap between the business
judgment rule and the entire fairness test."'
103. Id.
104. Id. at955.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)).
107. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del. 1994)).
108. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 385-90, 416-22 (2002); id. at 390 n.58 ("Directors thus are
afforded substantially the benefits of the business judgment rule before it can be determined that they
are entitled to its protection .... ").
109. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387.
110. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 419.
111. The "enhanced scrutiny" that is applied to takeover defenses extends beyond Unocal. It
arguably consists of three different standards of review, the applicability of which depends upon the
particular circumstances. Unocal set forth the basic aspect of "enhanced scrutiny." The second aspect
is derived from Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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There, the court recognized that there may come a point in a takeover battle when it is clear that the
company will be sold. See id. at 182 (discussing inevitability of "the break-up of the company"); see
also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) (clarifying that "sale
of corporate control" is a triggering factor); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994) (listing both "change in corporate control" and "break-up of the corporate
entity"). At that point, "[tihe duty of the board... change[s] from the preservation of [the company] as
a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit."
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. If Revlon duties apply, directors must "seek the best value reasonably
available to the stockholders." QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 48. Conduct that favors a white knight over
a hostile bidder is suspect. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
The Revlon decision can be seen either as an entirely new test or merely as a specific application
of Unocal. Revlon generally does not allow directors to employ defensive measures to resist a hostile
bidder: directors' responsibility is narrowly prescribed and their discretion is limited. See Revlon, 506
A.2d at 182 ("The whole question of defensive measures bec[o]me[s] moot. The directors' role
change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for
the stockholders at a sale of the company."). This is in sharp contrast to Unocal. On the other hand, it
can be argued that Revlon flows logically from Unocal. Once a sale of control is inevitable, perhaps
the only course of conduct that could be considered "reasonable" under Unocal would be to seek the
best value reasonably available to stockholders. Cf Allen et al., supra note 3, at 895 ("Except for
requiring the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the directors' action against the singular objective
of current value maximization, the Revlon standard differs little from the Unocal standard in practical
application."). This seems to have been the Revlon court's view. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182
(characterizing Revlon duties as "significantly altered ... responsibilities under the Unocal
standards").
A third aspect of "enhanced scrutiny" applies to actions taken "for the primary purpose of
thwarting the exercise of a shareholder vote." Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660
(Del. Ch. 1988). In Blasius, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that such action by a board of
directors would be upheld "only if it was supported by a compelling justification." Chesapeake Corp.
v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 319 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citing Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660-63). This holding was
later endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992).
Although the Blasius court rejected a per se rule against such actions, see Blasius, 564 A.2d at
660-61, the standard is nevertheless "quite onerous." Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del.
1996). The reason given for the demanding standard was "the central importance of the franchise to
the scheme of corporate governance." Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. According to the Blasius court, other
forms of takeover defense generally "involve the exercise of the corporation's power over its property,
or with respect to its rights or obligations," id. at 660-judgments which are appropriately made by the
board of directors. Decisions as to the composition of the board of directors, on the other hand, are the
prerogative of the shareholders. See id. Thus, director interference in shareholder democracy is
arguably illegitimate.
As with Revlon, the Blasius test can be seen either as an entirely new test or merely as an
application of Unocal. Clearly, a "compelling justification" standard is far more demanding than a
"reasonableness" standard. In fact, while the Unocal standard has been characterized as providing little
more protection than the business judgment rule, the Blasius standard probably exceeds the rigor of the
entire fairness test. On the other hand, it can be argued that Blasius also flows logically from Unocal
because intentional interference with shareholder voting rights is unreasonable under most
circumstances. See Allen et al., supra note 3, at 884-90 ("[T]he post-Blasius experience has shown
that the Unocal/Unitrin analytical framework is fully adequate to capture the voting franchise concerns
that animated Blasius, so long as the court applies Unocal 'with a gimlet eye out for inequitably
motivated electoral manipulations or for subjectively well-intentioned board action that has preclusive
or coercive effects."') (quoting Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 323). In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court's
interpretation of Blasius is not far off. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3 ("A board's unilateral decision to
adopt a defensive measure touching 'upon issues of control' that purposefully disenfranchises its
shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a 'compelling
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2. Derivative Litigation
A second obvious endorsement of the concept of structural bias can be
found in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.'12 That case involved a derivative
action in which demand had been excused as futile because all of the
directors were defendants in the case. However, the board subsequently
established a "Special Investigation Committee," composed of two newly-
appointed directors, to consider whether the case should be dismissed. The
committee concluded that it should, and the Delaware Supreme Court had
to decide whether the motion to dismiss should be granted. The court held
that "an independent committee possesses the corporate power to seek the
termination of a derivative suit. '' 113 However, the court also believed that
"there [was] sufficient risk in the realities of [the] situation ... to justify
caution."1 14 The court described those "realities" as follows:
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow
directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and
committee members. The question naturally arises whether a "there
but for the grace of God go I" empathy might not play a role. And
the further question arises whether inquiry as to independence, good
faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against
abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse. 
115
The "realities" of Zapata are not very different from the "omnipresent
specter" of Unocal; it is simply another articulation of structural bias. It is
an empathy and bias on the part of all directors rooted in their relationship
as colleagues. Despite the lack of self-dealing--because the newly-
justification."'). The court's most recent discussion of Blasius, however, is more nuanced. Compare
MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1129 (Del. 2003) (noting "the substantial degree
of congruence between the rationale that led to the Blasius 'compelling justification' enhanced
standard of judicial review and the logical extension of that rationale within the context of the Unocal
enhanced standard of judicial review"), with id. at 1130 (noting that Blasius standard can be applied
"either independently, in the absence of a hostile contest for control, or within the Unocal standard of
review when the board's action is taken as a defensive measure").
Thus, "enhanced scrutiny" could be characterized as a single test, based on Unocal. On the other
hand, it seems as a practical matter to consist of three separate tests: one of general applicability in
situations involving takeover defenses, and two additional tests for specific circumstances. Either way,
"enhanced scrutiny" demonstrates that the courts realize that management cannot necessarily be
trusted to act in the shareholders' interests even in the absence of self-dealing.
112. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
113. Id.at785.
114. Id.at 787.
115. Id.
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appointed directors were not defendants-the court was unwilling to say
that the disinterested directors were truly unconflicted. Thus, the court felt
that the directors' decision required closer scrutiny.
The response of the Delaware Supreme Court was to reserve the right
to reject the committee's decision altogether if the circumstances
warrant. 16 The court set forth a two-part test for reviewing the decision of
an independent committee of directors to dismiss a derivative lawsuit.
"First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of
the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions. . . The
corporation should have the burden of pro[of]." 17 Second, "[t]he Court
should determine, applying its own independent business judgment,
whether the motion should be granted."' '
18
This second step is an odd one. According to the Delaware Supreme
Court, "[t]he second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate
actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to
satisfy its spirit . . .. ,,9 This is a perfectly reasonable concern. However,
the method adopted by the court is theoretically and doctrinally suspect.
Recognition of courts' incompetence to make business decisions is one of
the foundations of the business judgment rule. 120 Yet the Delaware
Supreme Court-perhaps the ultimate judicial oracle on corporate law
matters--decided to give lower courts the discretion to apply their own
business judgment over and above that of the directors who already would
have been determined to be independent.' 2' This decision has been widely
criticized, 122 and many courts have refused to follow its lead. 1
23
116. Id. at 788. The court seemed to understand the implications of its solution but felt that it was
justified by the circumstances: "We recognize the danger of judicial overreaching but the alternatives
seem to us to be outweighed by the fresh view of a judicial outsider. Moreover, if we failed to balance
all the interests involved, we would in the name of practicality and judicial economy foreclose a
judicial decision on the merits." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 789.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
121. Although the courts may consider the directors to be independent under their standards, the
directors may not be truly independent. See infra Part Ill.
122. See, e.g., Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder
Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 BUS. LAW. 27, 62-63 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U. L. REV. 913, 937-41 (1982); Charles Mark Holt, Alford v. Shaw: North Carolina Adopts a
Prophylactic Rule to Prevent Termination of Shareholders' Derivative Suits Through Special
Litigation Committees, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1228, 1245-47 (1986); Kriston D. Quails, Note, Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado: Delaware's Judicial Business Judgment Rule-A Ship Without a Rudder?, 19 CAL. W.
L. REV. 189, 209-10 (1983).
123. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 P.2d 629, 637 (Colo. 1999); Miller v. Register
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In addition, one must struggle to find a principled way to limit the
rationale for the second step of the Zapata test to derivative litigation. If
the possibility of "subconscious abuse" stems from the fact that "directors
are passing judgment on fellow directors," 124 then the principle should
apply much more broadly. If independent directors cannot be trusted with
respect to derivative litigation, they probably should not be trusted with
respect to other conflict situations, either. 125 There is no good reason to
have a special rule for derivative litigation: whenever directors sit in
judgment over other directors, "the realities of [the] situation ... justify
caution." 126 This is the essential claim of structural bias.
Zapata is thus quite similar to Unocal. In each case, directors needed
leeway to act in the interests of shareholders but could not be trusted
completely to do so. The root of the problem is structural bias, and it
demands a comprehensive solution. There is no good reason to have one
special rule for hostile takeovers and another special rule for derivative
litigation.
3. Disinterested Approval
A somewhat more tenuous endorsement of the concept of structural
bias can be found in a third category of intermediate standard of review.
That standard is a shift in the burden of proof on the issue of fairness,
whereby the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the decision or
transaction in question is unfair.'27 In Delaware, this intermediate standard
& Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59
(Mass. 1990); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03 (N.Y. 1979); Alford v. Shaw, 358
S.E.2d 323, 326 (N.C. 1987); Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); see also
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 (2002) (adopting business judgment rule approach).
"The fact that there have been no reported major trials to apply the Zapata approach raises
questions as to whether courts or litigants ever will be serious about obtaining an independent judicial
evaluation of the corporation's interest." GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 434.
124. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787.
125. It could be argued that all corporate decisions suffer under this logic because outside
directors are always sitting in judgment on the inside directors. See supra note 91. The force of this
argument is strengthened by the fact that most challenges to director misbehavior must be channeled
through a derivative action.
However, the argument is a non-sequitur. All human judgment is imperfect, but in most
circumstances the directors' judgments are the best available, In situations where both inside and
outside directors are honestly pursuing the interests of shareholders, structural bias is not a problem
and directors' judgments can be trusted. In conflict situations, on the other hand, directors may
perceive themselves as pitted against shareholders and thus cannot be trusted. A special rule for
conflict situations does not undermine the application of the business judgment rule generally.
126. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787.
127. A mere shift in the burden of proof may not seem like an intermediate standard of review
because the underlying issue of fairness does not change. However, there is a significant practical
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applies when the interested party is a controlling shareholder rather than
merely one or more directors. 128 In California, however, the principle
applies to interested directors as well. 2 9 Although not clearly expressed in
such terms, the underlying concern must be that even independent
directors cannot be trusted to act in the interest of shareholders. Again,
that is the essential claim of structural bias.
The test itself-that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
unfairness of the transaction or decision-is not a bad one. It does a better
job in bridging the gap between the business judgment rule and the entire
fairness test than any of the previous standards. However, as a general test
for structural bias, it probably tilts too greatly toward accountability over
directorial authority. After all, fairness is supposed to be a demanding
standard.' 30 If so, then shifting the burden of proof, while significant,
would not go far enough in relaxing the standard.'
3 1
Admittedly, it is difficult to argue that the court's overall handling of
cases involving disinterested director or shareholder approval amounts to
an endorsement of the concept of structural bias. After all, the general rule
difference, from the directors' point of view, between having to prove that a transaction is entirely fair
on the one hand and having to avoid a characterization of unfairness on the other. If a standard of
review is a "test a court [applies] when it reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose
liability or grant injunctive relief," Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 437, and "defines the freedom of
action (or, if you will, deference in the form of freedom from intrusion) that will be accorded to the
persons who are subject to its reach," Allen et al., supra note 3, at 867, then a shift in the burden of
proof on the issue of fairness amounts to a new standard of review.
128. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) ("[Ain
approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of
minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or
dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff"); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 703 (Del. 1983) ("[W]here corporate action has been approved by an informed vote of a majority
of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that
the transaction was unfair to the minority."); see also In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S'holders. Litig.,
663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995).
129. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(2) (West 1990) (requiring, in addition to disinterested
director approval, that a transaction be "just and reasonable"); Sammis v. Stafford, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
589, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("Where a disinterested majority approves the transactions and there
was full disclosure, section 310(a)(2) applies, and the burden of proof is on the person challenging the
transaction."); see also Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74-75 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1952). The Remillard case is the origin of the principle in California and was subsequently
codified. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310, legislative committee cmt. (1975) ("There is an additional
requirement that the transaction be just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is approved,
which is intended to codify a judicial decision indicating that the courts in any event will review the
transaction for fairness.").
130. But see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
131. Another drawback is that, even with a shift in the burden of proof, a fairness standard would
result in a dramatic increase in litigation expenses. See supra note 64; cf infra notes 298-309 and
accompanying text.
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is that the business judgment rule applies. 32 Such deference is inconsistent
with a concern about structural bias.
Moreover, many cases of burden shifting involve disinterested
shareholder approval.133 Shareholder action has little to do with structural
bias. In such cases, the shift is premised on "the potential for process
manipulation by the controlling stockholder, and the concern that the
controlling stockholder's continued presence might influence even a fully
informed shareholder vote."' 134 Nevertheless, the dynamic in such cases is
not entirely dissimilar to structural bias. An uncontrolled conflict of
interest that does not rise to the level of self-dealing is a common theme.
The minority shareholders may not be conflicted, but they cannot
effectively police the controlling shareholder either. Because it is difficult
to have confidence in shareholder approval, the invocation of the business
judgment rule is unwarranted. 35 Thus, although structural bias may not be
involved, the situation is similar enough that a common solution should be
feasible. In short, the shifting of the burden of proof on the issue of
fairness provides some additional support for the notion that courts do, in
fact, appreciate the concerns underlying structural bias.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT STRUCTURAL BIAS
Courts recognize the importance of protecting beneficiaries from the
conflicts of interest of their fiduciaries. Thus, they tend to describe the
standard of conduct for the duty of loyalty in the strongest of terms.'3 6 The
effective standard of review, however, is not nearly so strong. 137 Although
132. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
134. In re Wheelabrator Techs. S'holders. Litig., 663 A.2d. 1194, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1995); see also
Citron v. E.l. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990).
135. There must be some independent approval of an interested transaction. See Oberly v. Kirby,
592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) ("The key to upholding an interested transaction is the approval of
some neutral decision-making body.... [A] transaction will be sheltered from shareholder challenge if
approved by either a committee of independent directors, the shareholders, or the courts.").
136. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
137. It is not clear that the entire fairness test is quite as strict as judicial statements suggest. In the
first place, the courts have required more than merely a conflict of interest to invoke the test. There
must be some evidence of disloyalty, see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del.
1993) ("[S]elf-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor even for a director. To disqualify a director,
for [business judgment] rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of disloyalty."), such as self-
dealing. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("[T]he intrinsic fairness
standard ... will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing ...."). In
fact, the conflict of interest must be "material," and not merely "colorable." See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d
at 364 ("A trial court must have flexibility in determining whether an officer's or director's interest in
a challenged board-approved transaction is sufficiently material to find the director to have breached
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it may make sense to set the standard of review lower than the standard of
conduct, 138 the status quo leaves shareholders under-protected.
Under current law, enforcement of the duty of loyalty essentially
amounts to a prohibition against self-dealing. 139 "[A] classic self-dealing
transaction [is one] where a [fiduciary] stand[s] on both sides of a
transaction,"'' 40 or "when the [fiduciary] .. . causes the [company] to act in
such a way that the [fiduciary] receives something from the [company] to
the exclusion of, and detriment to, the... stockholders of the
[company]."' 4' Self-dealing is an inadequate concept to address conflicts
of interest for at least two reasons. First, it is not always easy for a plaintiff
to demonstrate that self-dealing is involved. In many situations, the
directors can argue plausibly that they are acting in the interests of
shareholders even as they pursue their own agenda. 42 Second, directors
themselves may be unaware that they are not acting in the interests of
shareholders. Bias may cloud their judgment. 143
his duty of loyalty and to have infected the board's decision."). Moreover, the entire fairness test does
not require that a director's conduct be perfect, only that it be fair. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
306-07 (1930) ("The essence of the test [of intrinsic fairness] is whether or not under all the
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain."); Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) ("A finding of perfection is not a sine qua non in
an entire fairness analysis.") (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)).
Finally, it is possible that director action could fail the more lenient business judgment rule and
nevertheless withstand scrutiny under the entire fairness test. Compare Cede & Co., 634 A.2d 345
(defendant directors grossly negligent and not entitled to protection of business judgment rule), with
Cinerama, 663 A.2d 1156 (defendants satisfy burden of proving entire fairness on remand). There is
nothing inherently illogical about such a result because a grossly negligent board could produce an
entirely fair result fortuitously. Yet, there is something deeply unsettling about the possibility, and it
casts doubt on the strictness of the entire fairness test. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in
Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993) (arguing that fairness test is inadequate standard of review
for fiduciary obligations).
138. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 18.
139. It has been said that the entire fairness test "will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is
accompanied by self-dealing ... " Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
Nevertheless, enforcement of the duty of loyalty is not limited strictly to self-dealing. See, e.g., Cede
& Co., 634 A.2d at 360 ("'The presumption [of the business judgment rule] initially attaches to a
director-approved transaction within a board's conferred or apparent authority in the absence of any
evidence of 'fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment."')
(quoting Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (1988)). However, courts often use self-dealing as
shorthand, and generally require that the disloyalty "rise to the level of self-dealing." See id. at 363.
140. Cede& Co., 634 A.2dat 362.
141. Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 720.
142. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-84 (Del.
1986) (discussing potential benefits and detriments of lock-up options and no-shop provisions);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (rejecting simple application of
business judgment rule in hostile takeover setting "[blecause of the omnipresent specter that a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders").
143. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (questioning "whether
inquiry as to independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against
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Moreover, directors face many situations that, strictly speaking, do not
involve self-dealing but in which they nevertheless may be conflicted.
This is the case whenever directors stand to gain some benefit that is
meaningful to them but which courts currently are unwilling to recognize
as compromising their impartiality, perhaps because the benefit to
directors is too intangible, indirect, or speculative. However, sometimes
the benefit is quite concrete, such as the preservation of their positions;
other times, the benefit is more indirect, such as the protection of a
colleague, or speculative, such as the increase of benefits or reduction of
accountability generally. In some such situations-e.g., hostile takeovers
and derivative litigation-the courts already have recognized that neither
the business judgment rule nor the entire fairness test is appropriate,1 44 but
in other situations-e.g., executive compensation decisions-they have
not.
Although structural bias is the root of the problem, the topic rarely has
been considered carefully. The failure to appreciate the true nature of
structural bias has led to an inadequate judicial response to breach of
fiduciary duty, at least at the intermediate level. This Part will consider
structural bias in depth. It will propose three very different paradigms for
understanding structural bias. First, structural bias can be understood as a
form of implicit conspiracy: directors may pursue their group interests
consciously, even in situations where there is no obvious personal benefit.
Second, structural bias may be understood as the effect of relationships:
directors may favor friends and colleagues over distant shareholders.
Third, structural bias may be understood as a psychological phenomenon:
a manifestation of ingroup bias, which may operate on an unconscious
level. The claim is not that each instance of structural bias fits neatly
within one of the three paradigms; rather, it is that each of these paradigms
may be applicable, to a greater or lesser degree, to any situation involving
structural bias.
After considering each of the paradigms in turn, this Part will turn to
the issue of whether and how structural bias might be overcome. The
argument is that it cannot be. A proper understanding of structural bias
serves to undermine confidence in the independence of all directors when
there is a conflict of interest. Because the business judgment rule
presupposes and demands such confidence, structural bias forces a
reconsideration of the issue of dealing with such cases. In the face of
abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse" in context of derivative litigation). This issue is considered in
more detail supra, at Part ll.B.
144. See supra Part lI.B.
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structural bias, the judicial practice of deferring to the judgment of
"disinterested" directors becomes indefensible. Thus, an appropriate
intermediate standard of review becomes indispensable.
A. As Implicit Conspiracy
One possible paradigm for structural bias contemplates an implicit
conspiracy among directors to pursue their group interests. According to
this implicit conspiracy theory, even independent directors may show
favoritism for other directors because of the indirect benefits of doing so.
The central claim of this theory is that all directors are interested
directors when conflicts are the issue. "Independent" directors may be
disinterested in the transaction in question, but they are not disinterested in
the corresponding decision. The transaction may not offer them anything
to the exclusion of shareholders, but the decision to favor other directors
will. At the most abstract level, directors may show favoritism for each
other out of solidarity or in return for the expectation of similar
treatment. 145 At the most concrete level, they may do so because it is
necessary to maintain their membership on the board.
146
The implicit conspiracy is more expansive than it may first appear.
This is because directors' group interests extend beyond those of directors
as such and include the group interests of management as well. It is easy to
see why this would be the case with inside directors: they are the
management. However, it is also true of outside directors because most
outside directors are either executive officers of other companies, or at
least former executive officers. 147 Because executive officers naturally
prefer pro-management boards, they may extend to each other the courtesy
of deference. Thus, the implicit conspiracy covers the interests of officers
as well as directors.
In a strong form of the argument, the implicit conspiracy theory can be
seen as nothing more than thinly-veiled self-dealing: directors might
pursue their own immediate interests. A high-profile example would be
145. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text.
147. "Outside directors tend to be corporate officers or retirees who share the same views and
values as the insiders." BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 227. In large public
companies these days, only a minority of directors are insiders. See SPENCER STUART, BOARD INDEX 6
(2003) (approximately 20%). However, the great majority of new outside directors continue to be
current or retired corporate executives. See id. at 7. In selecting outside directors, boards strongly
prefer senior executives in other companies. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CORP. DIRECTORS, 2003-2004
PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 16-17 (2003) (almost 85% of first-choice picks).
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the entrenchment motive. 148 By resisting hostile takeoers and proxy
fights, directors may be acting to preserve their positions on the board of
directors. This would be self-dealing because significant benefits, both
financial and other, flow from such membership.
149
In a more moderate form of the argument, the implicit conspiracy
theory can be seen as a form of enlightened self-interest. Although there
may be no specific personal benefit from the decision at hand, directors
might engage in favoritism because it is the type of behavior that would
benefit them in other circumstances. A high-profile example would be
executive compensation. By setting a liberal tone generally, directors can
increase the likelihood of a better compensation package for themselves in
their full-time positions. 1
50
In a weak form of the argument, the implicit conspiracy theory merely
posits a coalition of like-minded individuals. Directors might act together
because they share the same ideals, which just happen to align
conveniently with their interests. A high-profile example would be
derivative litigation. Directors naturally are averse to derivative litigation,
which directly affects them in their roles both as directors and as officers.
Thus, it is not surprising to find that they consistently reject demands and
otherwise seek dismissal of derivative actions. 151
In short, the claim of the implicit conspiracy theory is that structural
bias inherently carries a potential for self-dealing which is similar to that
already recognized by the courts. Even if disinterested directors are not on
both sides of the transaction, they are on both sides of the relevant issue.
When directors have such conflicted interests, it is difficult to have
confidence in their judgment and they cannot be afforded the deference of
the business judgment rule.
148. See generally supra Part II.B.2.
149. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-30 (2004); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in
the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 93-96 (1985).
150. Cf BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 149, at 71-72 (discussing escalation of executive
compensation).
151. See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 412 ("Special litigation committees, almost without
exception, have concluded that derivative suits which the committees looked into were not in the
corporation's best interests."); see also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 1, at 395, 399-
400.
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B. As Relationship-Friendship and Collegiality
A second possible paradigm for structural bias is based on the strength
of relationships and claims that directors may pursue the interests of their
friends and colleagues on the board over those of distant shareholders.
According to this relationship theory, disinterested directors are likely to
favor interested directors over shareholders out of friendship and
collegiality.
Courts have difficulty with the concept of friendship because of their
narrow understanding of what constitutes a conflict of interest. Conflicts
come in more forms than courts are willing to recognize, at least under the
duty of loyalty. In order to raise a cognizable duty of loyalty issue and
invoke the entire fairness test, shareholders generally must identify a direct
or indirect financial interest that could tempt directors. 15 Money,
however, is not the only value that motivates directors, for good or for ill.
For example, integrity often motivates directors to forsake their own
interests and fulfill their fiduciary duties to shareholders.1 53 Friendship, on
the other hand, may motivate directors to shirk their fiduciary duties for
the sake of their colleagues.
Courts do not feel comfortable with intangible values such as
friendship. Thus, they generally do not accept friendship as a ground for
challenging director independence.1 54  There is a very practical
consideration in this: in the business world, as in any other setting,
friendships are common.1 55 If shareholders were allowed to raise a duty of
152. Although courts may not require explicitly that the interest be financial in nature, the entire
discourse clearly reflects an assumption to that effect. See supra note 139; see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001) (discussing director interest in terms of direct and indirect "financial interest"); 2
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60, at 8-377 to -379 (2002) (defining "conflicting interest" primarily in
terms of direct or indirect "financial interest"); I RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.1.1, at GCL-IV-20 (4th ed., 2004-1 Supp.)
[hereinafter FOLK] ("Most basically, the duty of loyalty proscribes a fiduciary from any means of
misappropriation of assets entrusted to his management and supervision.").
Familial relations also generally are considered to be a sufficiently disqualifying interest. See, e.g.,
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) ("a majority of the board has a material financial
or familial interest"). However, they are usually linked with financial interest and are essentially seen
as a species of an indirect financial interest. Courts are willing to entertain the possibility that there are
non-financial bonds that may impact director independence, see infra note 154 and accompanying text,
but this recognition is more theoretical than real, see infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
153. Cf Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of the Duties of Directors and Officers in
Control Contests, 26 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 91, 127 (1994) (similar); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of
Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003) (discussing director motivations other than money).
154. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
155. "Business dealings seldom take place between complete strangers and it would be a strained
and artificial rule which required a director to be unacquainted or uninvolved with fellow directors in
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loyalty issue and invoke the entire fairness test merely by pointing to
conflicts arising from friendship, the presumption of the business
judgment rule would be watered down severely. This is not something
courts are willing to do.'
56
However, the influence of friendship should not be underestimated. To
pretend that financial interests are inherently stronger than the bonds of
friendship is both substantively indefensible and morally insulting. Surely
there are many things that one would not do for money that one might
nevertheless do for a friend. 157 Moreover, friends are often willing to give
each other the benefit of the doubt even when it might seem objectively
unreasonable to do so. 15 8 Thus, a director is likely to be conflicted when a
friend's interests are at stake.
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, friendship should be
considered material to a director's independence only if, "because of the
nature of [the] relationship... , the non-interested director would be more
willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the
interested director."' 5 9 The problem with this argument is that it assumes
that favoritism entails a significant degree of risk. When their actions are
to be reviewed under the business judgment rule, directors know that they
do not face any real risk from judicial scrutiny. 60 Moreover, the relevant
reputation for directors is the one among their peers, who face the same
order to be regarded as independent." In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1442
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
156. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004) ("[F]riendship must be accompanied
by substantially more in the nature of serious allegations that would lead to a reasonable doubt as to a
director's independence."); see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002)
("Recognizing the practical implications of the automatic requirement of an entire fairness review has
led our Supreme Court to limit such automatic requirement to [a] narrow class of cases... ").
157. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
785-86 (1994) (discussing incommensurability of friendship and money). But see id. at 812-13.
158. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 86 ("[D]iscovering a compliance risk is
unpleasant and hence aversive, especially if the employee is also a friend.... [P]eople tend to interpret
data in a way that avoids aversive inference, subconsciously giving the agent an excessive benefit of
the doubt."); Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1537
(2000) ("[l]n everyday life, we give many second chances and even more benefits of the doubt to
friends, family members, and associates for the sake of continuing and preserving the relationships.").
159. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1052, see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership & Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 315 (1983) ("[O]utside directors will monitor the
management that chooses them because outside directors have incentive to develop reputations as
experts in decision control.").
160. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. The risk seems slight indeed when the
additional difficulties of initiating and maintaining a derivative action are considered. See generally
GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 395-423.
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issues and are likely to be quite sympathetic. 161 In the end, directors are
left to grapple with two competing moral values--duty and friendship-
both of which claim the title of loyalty. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to have confidence in their judgment.
Collegiality, while perhaps not as powerful an influence as friendship,
should not be underestimated, either. The culture in corporate boardrooms
is one of cooperation, not adversity.1 62 "Individuals who are quarrelsome,
disagreeable, or rigid" are not likely to obtain or maintain membership on
a board of directors.1 63 In such an environment, it would not be easy to
question colleagues' integrity by raising loyalty issues. Thus, even
directors who are not friends may not be very critical of each other.
In short, the claim of the relationship theory is that structural bias
affects directors because of their friendship and collegiality. It does not
mean to suggest that directors are unable to act in the interests of
shareholders; only that they are likely to be ambivalent. When directors
are so conflicted, it is difficult to have confidence in their judgment, and
they cannot be afforded the deference of the business judgment rule.
C. As Psychological Phenomenon-Ingroup Bias
A third possible paradigm views structural bias as a complex
psychological phenomenon. According to this psychological phenomenon
theory, even disinterested directors will tend to favor other directors
because of psychological forces such as ingroup bias.
It is often assumed that structural bias entails conscious decisions by
directors to prefer management interests to those of shareholders.
164
Viewed as such, it becomes a question of integrity. Although few would
doubt that some directors might consciously disregard their duty some of
161. Cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 771 (2002) (arguing that reputation as experts in
decision control may not be most relevant factor in market for directors).
162. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 161, at 767-69 (2002); Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at
91-92.
163. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 91.
164. See, e.g., Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 535 (1989) ("The structural bias argument asks
us to believe that outside directors generally are more willing to risk reputation and future income than
they are to risk the social embarrassment of calling a colleague to account."); E. Norman Veasey, The
Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 405-06 (1997)
("Friendship, golf companionship, and social relationships are not factors that necessarily negate
independence .... To make a blanket argument otherwise would create a dubious presumption that the
director would sell his or her soul for friendship."); see also Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 283
(structural bias "may cause even the outside director to perceive his role ... as that of a buffer by
which to shelter and protect management .... ).
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the time, a theory that implicitly questions the integrity of all directors is
difficult for many to accept. In fact, however, structural bias extends much
further than conscious discrimination into the realm of semi-conscious,
and even unconscious, bias. It is this less-than-conscious aspect that makes
structural bias so dangerous and intractable. The claim is not that
disinterested directors are dishonest or self-serving; rather, it is that even
disinterested directors are not-indeed, cannot be-truly impartial.1
65
Under this psychological phenomenon theory, structural bias can be
understood as a manifestation of ingroup bias. Ingroup bias is "the
tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in evaluations and
behavior."' 66 Although the theories explaining ingroup bias may be the
subject of debate, 167 evidence of the existence of ingroup bias is
extensively documented in the psychological literature. 161 "Both
psychological research and real world experience support the conclusion
that ingroup bias is a remarkably prevalent and robust phenomenon."',
69
Although this favoritism is magnified as a person's attraction to and
identification with the ingroup increases, 170  studies consistently have
165. Cf supra note 55 and accompanying text.
166. Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior 7, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 13 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986).
"Ingroup bias" is sometimes used to encompass both a tendency to favor the ingroup and a willingness
to discriminate against the outgroup. See, eg., Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 575, 576 (2002). Though the literature is robust regarding the "ingroup-favoring" bias, see
infra note 168, the evidence is mixed regarding the circumstances under which a group will be willing
to impose negative outcomes on an outgroup. See, e.g., Thomas Buhl, Positive-Negative Asymmetry in
Social Discrimination: Meta-Analytic Evidence, 2 GROUP PROCESSES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS
51 (1999); Amrlie Mummendey et al., Categorization is Not Enough: Intergroup Discrimination in
Negative Outcome Allocation, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 141-42 (1992).
167. By far, the most prominent theories explaining ingroup bias are social identity theory and
self-categorization theory. See generally Michael A. Hogg, Intragroup Processes, Group Structure,
and Social Identity, in SOCIAL GROUPS & IDENTITIES: DEVELOPING THE LEGACY OF HENRI TAJFEL 65,
66-68 (W. Peter Robinson ed., 1996); Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 20-27 (1982); John C. Turner, Some Current Issues in Research on Social
Identity and Self-Categorization Theories, in SOCIAL IDENTITY: CONTEXT, COMMITMENT, CONTENT 6
(Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, & Bertjan Doosje eds., 1999). However, there is mixed empirical
support for some of the corollaries thought to stem from these theories. See, e.g., Rupert Brown, Social
Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges, 30 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 745 (2000); Mark Rubin & Miles Hewstone, Social Identity Theory's Self-Esteem
Hypothesis: A Review and Some Suggestions for Clarification, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 40 (1998). Other theories explaining ingroup bias have similarly received mixed support. For an
overview, see Hewstone et al., supra note 166, at 580-83.
168. See Brian Mullen, et al., Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An
Integration, 22 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 103, 117 (1992); Tajfel et al., supra note 166, at 13.
169. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 99.
170. See Andr6 Gagnon & Richard Y. Bourhis, Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm:
Social Identity or Self-Interest, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1289, 1299 (1996); Michael
A. Hogg, et al., Prototypical Similarity, Self-Categorization, and Depersonalized Attraction: A
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found that categorization itself is enough to generate ingroup bias.171
Structural bias may be easy to dismiss when viewed as the speculation of
corporate law academics without any empirical support, 172 but it is much
more serious when understood as part of a broader psychological
framework with substantial supporting evidence.
Professors Cox and Munsinger have undertaken the task of applying
the evidence to the issue of director independence in the context of
derivative litigation. 173  They sought to consider "the independent
directors' ability to perceive and represent the corporate interest in
evaluating a demand to the board or in serving on a special litigation
committee." 174 They concluded that "several psychological mechanisms
can be expected to generate subtle, but powerful, biases which result in the
independent directors' reaching a decision insulating colleagues on the
board from legal sanctions."' 175 Their work argues forcefully that the
independence of outside directors is limited.
Most salient is their discussion of ingroup bias. Cox and Munsinger
argue persuasively that directors are especially prone to ingroup bias
because of various factors that increase their attraction to, and identity
with, the group. For example, the position of director is a highly desirable
one. 176 In addition, directors tend to be relatively homogeneous and share
Perspective on Group Cohesiveness, 25 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 159, 172 (1995); Stephanie Perreault
& Richard Y. Bourhis, Ethnocentrism, Social Identification, and Discrimination, 25 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 92, 100 (1999). But see Steve Hinkle & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup
Comparisons and Social Identity: Some Links and Lacunae, in SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY:
CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES 48 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990).
171. In the classic studies, subjects were randomly assigned to groups based on irrelevant criteria
and then asked to distribute points independently and anonymously to ingroup and outgroup members;
subjects consistently favored the ingroup over the outgroup in point awards. See, e.g., Henri Tajfel et
al., Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, I EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971). A later
study showed that the pattern of favoritism persisted even when subjects knew that the group
assignments were completely arbitrary. See Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and
Similarity in Intergroup Behavior, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27 (1973). As of 1982, there were "at
least 30 studies which used minimal or near-minimal categorizations ... which all show in-group-
favoring bias." Tajfel, supra note 167, at 24. For other reviews confirming that categorization itself
typically generates ingroup bias, see Marilynn B. Brewer, In-group Bias and the Minimal Intergroup
Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 302 (1979); and John C. Turner,
The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behavior, in INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 66, 75-84
(John C. Turner & Howard Giles eds., 1981).
172. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 534-36 (dismissing structural bias as "pop-
psychology, the logic of which is irrefutable only because it is unprovable" and "a relatively silly, but
harmless, academic argument.").
173. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149.
174. Id. at 84.
175. Id. at 85.
176. Id. at 104 ("[l]ndividuals place great value on their selection to and membership on a
corporation's board ...."); see also id. at 102 ("Studies suggest that as the attractiveness of a group
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strong cultural bonds. 177 As board members, they have a fair amount of
familiarity and ongoing interaction with each other. 178 Finally, they often
find themselves in situations where there may be perceived competition
with out-groups. 179 Together, these factors strengthen the potential for
ingroup bias significantly.180 Policies that minimize the effect of these
aggravating factors, or perhaps eliminate some of them altogether, would
surely help alleviate the problem. However, no such policies could be
expected to eliminate ingroup bias entirely.' 81 Thus, even disinterested
outside directors cannot be considered truly independent.
Other psychological forces considered by Cox and Munsinger are also
relevant to the current discussion. Within-group conformity behavior, for
example, is another well-documented psychological phenomenon. 82 Cox
and Munsinger argue that "powerful psychological factors are at work
within the boardroom, creating a cohesive, loyal, conforming ingroup that
will support its members for positive and negative reasons, under low and
and its members increases, and as the individual places greater and greater value on the rewards
derived by identification with the group or continuing membership in the group, the degree of
intergroup discrimination also increases.") (footnote omitted).
177. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 105-06 ("Even though there is a perceived
greening' of today's boardroom in the era of the independent director, the boards of American
corporations continue to be distinguished by their homogeneity. Moreover, there is a great cultural gulf
between the directors and their 'adversary' in the derivative suit [i.e., shareholders].") (footnotes
omitted); see also id. at 105 ("[C]ultural, personal, ethnic, and even linguistic similarities are factors
that increase the members' mutual attraction for each other. The heightened mutual attraction among a
group's members causes each member to have a stronger drive toward ethnocentrism and intergroup
bias.") (footnotes omitted).
178. See id. at 103 ("The directors called upon to evaluate a derivative suit against their colleagues
are not, and generally have not been, isolated from the suit's defendants ... Even members of a special
litigation committee who were appointed after the derivative suit was initiated ... serve as directors on
the full board.") (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 99 ("Prior or ongoing interaction between
individuals ... has been repeatedly demonstrated to be a source for strong biases favoring a familiar
ingroup and correlatively disfavoring a threatening or unfamiliar outgroup.") (footnote omitted).
179. Directors as a group face many situations that can be perceived as involving competition with
out-groups, including hostile takeovers and derivative litigation. This adds to the group's cohesiveness
and the potential for ingroup bias. See id. at 101 ("[C]ompetition appears to clarify the distinctiveness
of one's membership in a group so that ingroup bias is more pronounced .... ).
180. See id. at 104 ("Not only does each of these biasing factors ... contribute its individual
influence to the overall strength of ingroup biasing, but when several complementary psychological
factors occur together within the same person, they tend to exert extra psychological force by their
coexistence. This enhanced effect is commonly referred to as synergism ... .
181. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
182. For an overview of early research, see Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social
Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
151 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). Other studies have
provided support for a general tendency to conform attitudes to ingroup norms. See, e.g., Daan Van
Knippenberg & Henk Wilke, Prototypicality ofArguments and Conformity to Ingroup Norms, 22 EUR.
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 (1992); Diane M. Mackie, Social Identification Effects in Group Polarization,
50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 720 (1986).
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high levels of motivation and group values."'1 83 Another example is choice
editing. "Editing is a well-documented approach decisionmakers utilize to
simplify and reduce to manageable proportions inherently complex
decisions." 184 Cox and Munsinger argue that directors engage in choice
editing through biased risk analyses and oversimplifications. 185 These
psychological forces cannot be considered an aspect of structural bias
because they affect all decision making-including when directors'
interests are aligned with those of the shareholders. 186 However, they are
significant because they serve to exacerbate the effect of ingroup bias.
187
Conformity behavior, for example, can limit the possibility for meaningful
dissent among directors. Choice editing can allow directors to justify their
preferred decisions.
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that courts are better at
making business decisions than are boards of directors. Judges
undoubtedly face cognitive biases of their own. Moreover, courts are not
business experts. 188  Furthermore, small groups (such as boards of
directors) arguably are better at making decisions than individuals (such as
judges). 189 However, when they are conflicted, even groups with expertise
are unreliable, and courts are called upon to take up the slack. The wisdom
183. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 99; see id. at 91-99 (discussing social needs and
director service); see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003) (reviewing social psychology literature on small group decision making and
applying it to Enron debacle).
184. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 85.
185. Seeid.at85-91.
186. This Article seeks to address only structural bias, not all forms of cognitive bias. Structural
bias is a form of cognitive bias that affects decision makers with conflicts of interest. The claim is that
it can be remedied by means of an unconflicted decision maker, such as a court. Other forms of
cognitive bias may affect all decision makers and thus may not be remediable. Still others may affect
groups more than individuals, or vice versa. Although this can raise important issues, the evidence on
such biases is far more ambiguous. Compare infra note 189 and accompanying text with supra notes
168-69 and accompanying text.
187. "[W]hen several complementary psychological factors occur together within the same
person, they tend to exert extra psychological force by their coexistence." Cox & Munsinger, supra
note 149, at 104; see also O'Connor, supra note 183, at 1240 ("Social psychology emphasizes that
when several factors come together, they can multiply group biases so that the effect is much greater
than simply adding the factors together.").
188. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
189. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002). However, the evidence on this front is not unambiguous. See
Norbert L. Kerr, et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV.
687, 693 (1996) ("[R]esearch conducted to date indicates that there is unlikely to be any simple, global
answer to the question, 'Is group judgment more or less biased than individual judgment."'); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (2003) ("Are groups able to
avoid the judgment errors made by individuals? The evidence is mixed."); Bainbridge, supra, at 19
("There is contested evidence as to whether groups outperform their best member .... ").
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of the business judgment rule is not being questioned; rather, the
importance of accountability is being emphasized.
In short, the claim of the psychological phenomenon theory is that
structural bias prejudices directors because of their membership on the
board of directors. It does not mean to suggest that directors are hopelessly
biased and incapable of acting in an objectively reasonable manner.
Psychological forces are not necessarily decisive with respect to any
individual choice, much less with respect to an entire class of decision
makers. 90 However, it does suggest that it is difficult to have confidence
in directors' judgment, and that they cannot be afforded the deference of
the business judgment rule.
D. Critique of Structural Bias
The theory of structural bias asserts that, in cases involving conflicts of
interest, directors are inherently prejudiced in favor of each other and of
management, and may, consciously or unconsciously, favor their own
interests over those of shareholders. Not everyone accepts the theory.
Critics have two fundamental concerns: first, they demand proof of the
existence of bias; second, they would prefer an alternative to any judicial
solution.
Critics often demand proof regarding the claims of structural bias.
After all, it is just a theory. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove the existence of structural bias in any given case. This is true
regardless of whether structural bias is seen as an implicit conspiracy, the
effect of relationships, or a psychological phenomenon. Critics may be
dismissive because the theory is conveniently impossible to disprove1t91
190. Professors Cox and Munsinger's caveat is worth reproducing here:
We are careful to observe that the studies examined do not conclude that directors are biased
or that their well-documented proclivity to shield colleagues from derivative suits is the
product of such bias. Indeed, this precise question remains unexplored in the social
psychology literature. Also, even given our description of the many biasing agents, these
studies do not tell us whether natural psychological bias is so strong that it cannot be
overcome by the advocacy of plaintiff's counsel or by the directors' knowledge that their
evaluations will be reviewed by a court. Minimally, however, these factors strongly suggest
there is bias in the boardroom favoring colleagues and disfavoring the derivative suit plaintiff.
Furthermore, the preceding description offers no support for current assumptions that
"outside" directors can be expected to act impartially, absent family or financial relationship
with the defendants or a direct involvement in the underlying transaction.
Cox & Munsinger, supra note 149, at 107-08.
191. See, e.g., Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 534 ("Were we less patient, we would be
inclined to dismiss such broad brush attribution of character traits and feelings to masses of strangers
as pop-psychology, the logic of which is irrefutable only because it is unprovable.").
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But dismissing structural bias for that reason would be imprudent. The
appropriate question is whether it makes sense to be concerned about the
issue.
Confidence in directors' judgment is a prerequisite to deference. 92
Such confidence is lacking when directors' interests conflict with those of
the shareholders.1 93 Unfortunately, the courts have held an overly narrow
understanding of what constitutes a conflict. 194 Structural bias forces a
reconsideration of the issue. Each of the three paradigms proposed above
demonstrates the difficulty of having confidence in directors' judgment
when they face conflicts of interest, even those that do not rise to the level
of self-dealing. Without such confidence, the business judgment rule is
inappropriate.
Courts, however, insist upon proof before accepting a structural bias
argument. 195 The burden of proof is misplaced. Circumstances implicating
structural bias should be enough to move the case out of the protection of
the business judgment rule. Surely it is possible, perhaps even likely, that
directors will do the right thing despite structural bias-just as it is
possible for a party on both sides of a transaction to behave honorably., 96
But to invoke the entire fairness test, the plaintiff only needs to show a
self-dealing transaction, not an actual abuse of trust by the directors. 197 It
192. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 200-16 and accompanying
text.
195. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
196. See I BLOCK ET AL., supra note 14, at 266-67.
As the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act explain:
[T]he essential character of interest conflict is often, unfortunately, misunderstood by the
public and the media (and sometimes misunderstood, too, by lawyers and judges). Interest
conflicts can and often do lead to baneful acts. The law regulates interest conflict transactions
because experience shows that people often do yield to the temptation to advance their self-
interests and, if they do, other people may be injured. That contingent fear is sufficient reason
to warrant caution and to apply special standards and procedures to interest conflict
transactions.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep firmly in mind that it is a contingent risk we are dealing with,
that an interest conflict is not in itself a crime or a tort or necessarily injurious to others. Contrary to
much popular usage, having a "conflict of interest" is not something one is "guilty of"; it is simply a
state of affairs. Indeed, in many situations, the corporation and the shareholders may secure major
benefits from a transaction despite the presence of a director's conflicting interest. Id. (quoting MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63, at 8-372, introductory cmt. (2002)).
197. The courts sometimes use language that suggest otherwise. For example, the Delaware
Supreme Court has stated that "self-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor even for a director. To
disqualify a director, for rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of disloyalty." Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993). However, that statement assumed "that the terms of
8 Del.C. § 144 are met." Id. A self-dealing transaction normally is adequate evidence of disloyalty,
without proof of actual wrong-doing. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997)
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falls upon the directors to justify their behavior by establishing the fairness
of the transaction. Similarly, to invoke the intermediate standards of
review under Unocal or Zapata, the plaintiff need only show the
appropriate class of circumstances, not a breach of fiduciary duty.' 98 The
same general dynamic should apply to all cases involving structural bias.
To be sure, the plaintiff should have the option of offering proof of lack
of independence or actual wrongdoing. However, if the plaintiff can
establish such a breach of the duty of loyalty as a matter of fact, then the
entire fairness test should be applied.' 99 The relevant question is whether
the directors should be afforded the deference of the business judgment
rule in the absence of such proof. The "realities of the situation" and the
"omnipresent specter" strongly suggest that they should not. An
intermediate standard of review is the appropriate solution.
Critics also argue that structural bias can be overcome in a way that
would eliminate the need for judicial scrutiny. The standard way of
dealing with conflicts of interest is to eliminate them by having issues
decided by unconflicted parties, such as disinterested and independent
directors. 20 0 However, legal notions of disinterestedness and independence
do not adequately address conflicts of interest that are less tangible in
nature.2 0' In order to be considered "disinterested," "directors can neither
appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal
financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a
benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders
generally., 202 Clearly the focus is on financial benefits. 20 3 In order to be
considered "independent," "a director's decision [must be] based on the
(citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)).
198. See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
199. See, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363 ("To disqualify a director, for [business judgment]
rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of disloyalty. Examples of such misconduct include, but
are not limited to, the motives of entrenchment .... ") (citations omitted). In Beam v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040, 1043 (Del. 2004), the issue was not about the appropriate standard of review, but about
demand futility. However, the issues are analogous. If demand is not futile, shareholders have to make
a demand of the board of directors. The board's decision is entitled to the business judgment rule. See
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218-19 (Del. 1996). However, if demand is futile, shareholders
are able to bring the derivative action on their own. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del.
1993).
200. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
201. For a recent discussion of these concepts by the Delaware Court of Chancery, see Orman v.
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22-25 (Del. Ch. 2002) (defining and distinguishing "interest" and
"independence").
202. Id. at 23 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
203. In fact, its focus on financial benefits is unduly narrow. Structural bias as implicit conspiracy
is concerned with financial benefits, but is not covered by an approach that only focuses on financial
benefits. See supra Part III.A.
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corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous
considerations or influences. 2 °4 On its face, this definition would seem to
be broad enough to extend beyond financial benefits. In fact, however, it
does not go very far at all. The inquiry is whether the director is
"controlled by ' 20 5 or "beholden to" another such that "[her] discretion
would be sterilized., 20 6 A concept as subtle as structural bias-whether as
implicit conspiracy, as relationship, or as psychological phenomenon-
generally is not covered.
Moreover, the question courts now ask is not whether all of the
directors qualify as disinterested and independent, but rather whether the
board of directors does. Thus, the plaintiff generally must establish that a
majority of the directors is interested or lacks independence. 0 7 Even then,
the board could avoid the entire fairness test by appointing a committee of
disinterested and independent directors to decide the issue.20 8 This is far
too deferential in light of the need for accountability.
Until recently, it was assumed that a board consisting of a majority of
outside directors could be trusted to make decisions in the interests of
204. Orman, 794 A.2d at 24 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816).
205. See Orman, 794 A.2d at 24 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16).
206. See id. (quoting Rales, 634 A.2d at 936).
[Independence] ... involves an inquiry into whether the director's decision resulted from that
director being controlled by another. A director can be controlled by another if in fact he is
dominated by that other party, whether through close personal or familial relationship or
through force of will. A director can also be controlled by another if the challenged director is
beholden to the allegedly controlling entity. A director may be considered beholden to (and
thus controlled by) another when the allegedly controlling entity has the unilateral power
(whether direct or indirect through control over other decision makers), to decide whether the
challenged director continues to receive a benefit, financial or otherwise, upon which the
challenged director is so dependent or is of such subjective material importance to him that
the threatened loss of that benefit might create a reason to question whether the controlled
director is able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged transaction objectively.
Id. at 25 n.50.
207. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 & n.8.
As a general matter, the business judgment rule presumption that a board acted loyally can be
rebutted by alleging facts which, if accepted as true, establish that the board was either
interested in the outcome of the transaction or lacked the independence to consider
objectively whether the transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its
shareholders. ... To rebut successfully business judgment presumptions in this manner,
thereby leading to the application of the entire fairness standard, a plaintiff must normally
plead facts demonstrating "that a majority of the director defendants have a financial interest
in the transaction or were dominated or controlled by a materially interested director."
Orman, 794 A.2d at 22 (footnotes omitted). But see id. ("I recognize situations can exist when the
material interest of a number of directors less than a majority may rebut the business judgment
presumption and lead to an entire fairness review.").
208. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See generally supra Part
I.B.1.
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shareholders. The recent financial scandals have exposed this fallacy.
Enron's collapse is particularly instructive: Enron's board of directors was
considered to be among the best in corporate America,2 °9 and yet it proved
to be a surprisingly ineffective monitor of management. 210 Surely it is
better to have decisions made by independent directors, under nearly any
definition, than by interested parties. However, it is inappropriate to
assume that such directors are truly unconflicted.21'
In response to recent events, the definition of independence has
undergone revision on many fronts. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002212
imposed stricter independence requirements for directors on audit
213
committees, and the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock
Market strengthened their own director independence requirements as
214
well. It is arguable that courts, too, are taking a second look at these
209. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the
Role of Congress, in Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 495, 504-05 (2004).
[B]y all appearances, Enron's board looked great. Of Enron's 14 directors, only two (Kenneth
Lay and Jeffrey Skilling) were insiders. The directors reflected a wide range of business,
finance, accounting, and government experience. The board had all the committees one would
hope to see .... Perhaps most important to the board's monitoring role, the Enron audit
committee had a model charter and was chaired by a former accounting professor who had
served as the Dean of the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
210. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, 107TH CONG., S. PRT. 107-70, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN
ENRON'S COLLAPSE (2002) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. The Senate Subcommittee found
that, although Enron's board had a "wealth of sophisticated business and investment experience and
considerable expertise in accounting, derivatives, and structured finance," id. at 8, it "failed to
safeguard Enron shareholders and contributed to the collapse of the seventh largest public company in
the United States, by allowing Enron to engage in high risk accounting, inappropriate conflict of
interest transactions, extensive undisclosed off-the-books activities, and excessive executive
compensation," id. at 11; see also WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY
THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 22-24 (Feb.
1, 2002). "[T]he Board of Directors failed, in our judgment, in its oversight duties." Id. at 22.
211. Even setting aside structural bias, notions of what qualifies as a financial conflict continually
evolve. For example, although Enron's board of directors mostly consisted of outsiders, see ENRON
CORP. PROXY STATEMENT 3-7 (2001), and seemed the model of good corporate governance at the
time, see supra note 209 and accompanying text, subsequent investigations found significant financial
ties that reduced directors' independence. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 210, at 51-53
(discussing financial ties that reduced board independence).
212. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
213. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-76; see also Exchange Act Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-
3 (2004). The Act's provisions dealing with auditor independence were far more extensive. See
§§ 201-209, 116 Stat. at 745, 771-75 (2002); see also Strengthening the Commission's Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence, Release No. 33-8183, 34-47,265, 35-27,642, IC-25,915, IA-2103,
68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, and 274 (2003)), available
at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/final/33-8183.htm.
214. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A; NASDAQ STOCK MARKET,
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concepts."' Such efforts clearly are worthwhile: the less conflicted the
decision maker, the more appropriate it is to have confidence in her
business judgment. However, the changes that have been made are not
revolutionary; they merely extend the reach of the restrictions along
existing lines. 21 6 The concepts of disinterestedness and independence
remain focused primarily on financial ties and, to that extent, remain
inadequate.
It is worth emphasizing that structural bias does not amount to an
"implicit rejection of the value of disinterested outside directors;,,2 17 nor
does it suggest that "there is no relevant distinction between inside and
outside directors., 21 8 The theory of structural bias merely recognizes the
limits of director independence. When a conflict arises, it may be possible
to find directors who are entirely disinterested from a financial perspective
(although the implicit conspiracy theory suggests otherwise), 2 9 but it is
virtually impossible for directors to be unconflicted in all meaningful
respects. The concept of structural bias instructs that less obvious conflicts
must be taken seriously, and an intermediate standard of review is
necessary to deal with them.
IV. REVIEW FOR SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS
The business judgment rule and the entire fairness test are
complementary doctrines. The key insight of the former is that directors
generally can be trusted; that is why its judicial review is so deferential.
The key insight of the latter is that directors cannot be trusted when they
are conflicted; that is why its judicial review is so exacting. The extreme
divergence between the two standards of review, however, means that
there are bound to be situations in which neither seems quite appropriate.
It was argued above that structural bias is the root of the problem: there are
many situations which do not involve self-dealing transactions and yet do
INC. MARKETPLACE RULES IM-4200, IM-4350-4.
215. See, e.g., Amy Borrus, Less Laissez-Faire in Delaware?, Bus. WK., Mar. 22, 2004, at 80
(citing In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003), and In re eBay, Inc.
S'holder Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004), as examples of
Delaware courts "put[ting] independence under a microscope").
216. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 149, at 25 ("Although these new requirements have
attracted a great deal of attention, ... they merely make mandatory a practice that most public
companies already have been following for some time. Thus it seems unlikely that these new
requirements, by themselves, will greatly change the relationship between executives and their
boards.").
217. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 91, at 535.
218. Id.
219. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
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involve serious conflicts of interest. In such situations, a balance must be
struck between the deference of the business judgment rule and the rigor
of the entire fairness test: judicial review must be meaningful, but not
excessive.
This Part will propose and defend an intermediate standard of review to
address the issue of structural bias. It will begin by arguing that a
moderate review of the substance of directors' decisions best bridges the
gap between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. It then
will argue that a reasonableness standard, properly qualified, is the
appropriate substantive standard. After sketching the outlines of an
appropriate reasonableness standard, it will address some of the
shortcomings of that standard and how they might be handled.
A. Lessons Learned
In order to devise an appropriate standard of review, one must first
assess the needs that the standard is intended to serve.22° When the
standard is an intermediate one, it must bridge the gap between the two
extreme standards. This section will review the lessons learned thus far in
order to determine the boundaries of the endeavor.
1. Need for Substantive Review
The business judgment rule focuses primarily on the decision making
process 221 while the entire fairness test carefully scrutinizes the substance
of the decision itself.22 2 An important question, then, is whether an
intermediate standard should focus on process or substance.
It would be possible for an intermediate standard of review to focus on
process. After all, the various standards of review all have a process
component. The business judgment rule subjects the directors' decision
making process to review for gross negligence. 223 The entire fairness test
demands that the process be entirely fair.224 An intermediate standard of
review presumably should strike a balance between the two. An obvious
220. See generally Allen et al., supra note 3, at 867-7 1.
221. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
224. Actually, the demands of the entire fairness test are slightly more nuanced. It is not easy to
articulate accurately either component of the entire fairness test because they are not two separate
tests; rather, they must combine to produce a result that is entirely fair overall. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
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candidate would be an ordinary negligence standard-the typical standard
for breach of duty in non-corporate settings.225
In fact, however, corporate standards of review generally have both a
process and a substance component. The business judgment rule, for
example, allows review of the substance of business decisions for
22irrationality or waste. 26 Although this is an extremely deferential standard,
substance is not completely beyond review. The entire fairness test
reviews the substance of directors' decisions for fairness.22 1 Courts have
recognized that the substance of a decision can be sufficiently fair that it
may be treated as the preponderant consideration under the entire fairness
test.228 Thus, it is easy to view the business judgment rule as primarily
concerning process and the entire fairness test as primarily concerning
substance. Nevertheless, both standards have the two components.
It stands to reason, then, that an intermediate standard of review also
should have both a process and a substance component. Because
negligence is a logical candidate for an intermediate standard of review for
process, it very well might make sense for courts to apply it in the
appropriate case. However, the issue of the appropriate standard for
process review will be considered later.229
In order to combat structural bias, an intermediate standard of review
must include meaningful review of the substance of directors' decisions.
Good procedures cannot guarantee good results; they can only increase the
likelihood of good results. Even so, requiring directors to follow a careful
decision making process is sensible because it is likely to lead to better
business judgments. However, if the decision maker's good faith or
loyalty is questionable, a careful process is not nearly so valuable; in the
absence of good faith or loyalty, it is meaningless. If substance is beyond
review, any amount of process can be overcome to reach the desired
result: the decision maker need only hear the evidence before rejecting it.
Minimal review of substance, such as that provided by the business
judgment rule, is not much more difficult to overcome.23 °
Lawyers can be very helpful in laying the groundwork for a finding of
adequate process. The case of Smith v. Van Gorkom231 serves as a useful
example. In that case, shareholders challenged a merger on the grounds
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) (1965).
226. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
230. Cf supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
231. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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that directors had breached their duty of care in approving the transaction.
The Delaware Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs. 232 In the course of
its opinion, the court admonished the directors for a number of procedural
shortcomings: the meeting at which the decision was made was too short;
there was insufficient advance notice; the directors had not read the
relevant documents; and there was no fairness opinion from an investment
bank.233 The court's intuition was sensible enough: with more notice,
enough time to read the documents and debate the merits of the merger,
and the advice of professionals, directors are likely to reach better
decisions. Even if the end result is the same, shareholders and the courts
would have more confidence in the decision. The problem is that the
lawyers for the directors in the next case will have read the Van Gorkom
opinion. They will know the pitfalls and will arrange to avoid them
without necessarily modifying the directors' underlying intentions or
motives. Thus, the directors will be provided the relevant documents in
advance-but that will not ensure that they actually will read them. They
will have a longer meeting-but that will mean little if the directors feel
perfectly capable of deciding the matter more quickly. They will even
secure a fairness opinion from investment bankers-but a fairness opinion
sought and paid for by management is not very reliable.234 In short,
process is manipulable. Lawyers can help directors appear more careful
without necessarily making any meaningful changes in behavior. Directors
232. Id. at 864.
233. See id. at 874-76. To be fair, the court's rationale was stated broadly and did not depend
entirely on the individual details listed above. However, even the court's own summary of its reasons
suggests the importance of those details:
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in forcing
the "sale" of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were
uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a
minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the "sale" of the Company upon two hours'
consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.
Id. at 874.
234. Investment banks have been known to provide highly questionable fairness opinions. See,
e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1272-73 (Del. 1989).
Notwithstanding the fact that on May 30 both ... had given opinions that the management
restructuring, with a value of $64.15, was fair, and on June 7 had advised the board that the
company had a maximum breakup value of $80 per share, [the two investment banking firms]
issued new opinions on August 25 that $80 was unfair and inadequate.
d.; see also William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We Should Do
Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 523-24 (1992) (listing further examples). This has led many
legal scholars to question the value and reliability of such opinions generally. See, e.g., Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They And What Can Be Done About It?,
1989 DuKE L.J. 27; Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 951 (1992).
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almost certainly will be interested in such appearances, if only to avoid
liability.
235
Even assuming good faith on the part of directors, process is likely to
be of limited usefulness if structural bias is the issue. This is true with
respect to any of the three paradigms: under the weakest form of implicit
conspiracy theory, directors are likely to share the same point of view;
236
under the relationship theory, directors are likely to trust their friends and
colleagues; 237 and under the psychological phenomenon theory, directors
are likely to favor the ingroup unconsciously.238 After any amount of
process, directors will have a tendency to come to the same conclusions. It
is this tendency that undermines confidence in directors' judgment and
demands recourse to a substantive review of their decisions.
The key insight of the entire fairness test is that directors cannot be
trusted when they face conflicts of interest. 239 With the entire fairness test,
the courts wisely recognized that they must step in and review not only the
decision making process, but also the substance of the business decision in
question. Although courts may be unqualified to do so, 240 conflicted
directors are even worse.241 This logic is as applicable to structural bias as
it is to self-dealing. The only difference is one of degree: just as structural
bias is not necessarily as acute a problem as self-dealing, so the
substantive scrutiny in an intermediate standard of review need not be as
strict as in the entire fairness test.
2. Need for Latitude
Situations involving structural bias often are very different than
situations involving self-dealing. Self-dealing transactions usually can be
avoided altogether. In fact, historically they were not permitted; eventually
they were allowed because they can be beneficial to the corporation.242 To
protect against abuse by the conflicted party, however, the courts review
such transactions for fairness. Nevertheless, self-dealing transactions
235. Directors often will not personally be liable for breaches of the duty of care because of
charter provisions adopted pursuant to statutory authorization. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (2001). However, even directors who cannot be held financially liable nevertheless will be
interested in avoiding the embarrassment that would follow a holding of carelessness.
236. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 158, 162 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 44, 54-55 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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remain optional, and could be restricted in any number of ways or
outlawed altogether.
Situations involving structural bias generally are not avoidable. Often,
they are initiated by third parties and require a response by the directors.
Takeovers and derivative litigation are examples. Sometimes the situation
is not initiated by third parties, as with executive compensation decisions.
Even then, however, the situation is not avoidable and absolutely demands
the business judgment of directors. In order to respond appropriately,
directors need the kind of discretion and freedom that is provided by the
business judgment rule.243 The problem is that there is a conflict of
interest, so the deference of the business judgment rule is inappropriate.
In situations involving self-dealing, strict scrutiny under the entire
fairness test makes sense. After all, the alternative would be a blanket
prohibition. A compromise that allows a transaction to proceed only if the
court is persuaded of the merits of the transaction is an improvement from
the directors' perspective. Directors can avoid the scrutiny simply by
avoiding the transaction that gives rise to it. In situations involving
structural bias, however, the entire fairness test makes less sense. Directors
do not have the option of avoiding such situations, nor can the courts or
the legislature issue a blanket prohibition. External circumstances simply
demand the exercise of the directors' business judgment. Court
involvement is much more of an interference, and therefore must be
carefully circumscribed. Applying the entire fairness test could prove
disastrous because of the possibility that no response could be defensible
as "entirely fair., 244 While it makes sense to have directors hesitate to
engage in self-dealing unless they can establish that the transaction is
entirely fair, it would be unwise to make directors too hesitant with respect
to situations involving structural bias. Thus, the courts must afford
directors significant latitude for the exercise of discretion.
Of course, too much deference is also problematic. In situations
involving structural bias, the business judgment rule is inappropriate
because directors are conflicted. It is not clear that the judgment of a
conflicted expert is better than the judgment of an impartial layman.
Courts must take this into account in setting the appropriate level of
scrutiny.
243. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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B. Substantive Reasonableness
The discussion thus far indicates that any standard addressing structural
bias must go beyond mere process and inquire into the substance of the
actions taken, while also affording directors significant latitude for the
exercise of discretion.245 Thus, what is needed is a moderate review of the
substance of the directors' decisions. A review for substantive
reasonableness, properly implemented, fits this role neatly.
1. Outlines of Reasonableness
In order to maintain a claim in a situation involving structural bias, the
plaintiff should have to establish that the directors' decision was
unreasonable. Reasonableness is a concept with which the corporate
lawyer is acquainted already. Thus, familiar concepts should help in
sketching the outlines of the appropriate intermediate standard.
To begin, reasonableness is a standard that is significantly more
demanding than the business judgment rule's rationality standard. 46 The
American Law Institute's explanation of the distinction is a helpful one:
It is recognized that the word "rational," which is widely used by
courts, has a close etymological tie to the word "reasonable" and
that, at times, the words have been used almost interchangeably. But
a sharp distinction is being drawn between the words here. The
phrase "rationally believes" is intended to permit a significantly
wider range of discretion than the term "reasonable," and to give a
director or officer a safe harbor from liability for business
judgments that might arguably fall outside the term "reasonable"
but are not so removed from the realm of reason when made that
liability should be incurred.247
245. See supra Part IV.A.
246. It has been said that the substantive review of the business judgment rule is limited to
decisions that are "so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially
inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith." In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 A,2d 770, 780-81
(Del. Ch. 1988), cited in Pames v. Bally Entm't. Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999); see also
Allen, supra note 3, at 868 ("[T]he business judgment review standard ('rationality') diverges from,
and [is] more lenient than, the normative standard of conduct ('reasonableness')."); Eisenberg, supra
note 18, at 442-43 ("[Tlhe prevalent formulation of the standard of review [for substance] under the
business judgment rule ... is that the decision must be rational. This rationality standard of review is
much easier to satisfy than a prudence or reasonability standard.").
247. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, § 4.01 cmt.; see also id.,
Comment to § 4.01 (c) cmt. f ("Sound public policy dictates that directors and officers be given greater
protection than courts and commentators using a 'reasonableness' test would afford. Indeed, some
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Almost any decision reached by a competent board of directors ought
to be considered rational: it is hard to imagine such a board coming to "a
decision that cannot be coherently explained., 248 It is not nearly so
problematic to suggest that a board decision is objectively unreasonable.
This is because, while most actors behave rationally most of the time,
many actors behave unreasonably at least some of the time.249 Thus,
review for substantive reasonableness would limit the opportunity of
conflicted directors to misbehave more meaningfully than the business
judgment rule.
However, a reasonableness standard does not require that decisions be
ideal; even the entire fairness test does not demand perfection. 250 Rather, a
reasonableness standard demands only that the decision be one that a
prudent and impartial decision maker could realistically-as opposed to
merely hypothetically--consider wise. Thus, the plaintiff should have to
establish that the decision reached by the board of directors was one that
could not be expected of a prudent and impartial decision maker.
The proposed standard would allow directors a considerable amount of
discretion. The intended latitude is captured suitably by a portion of the
Delaware Supreme Court's discussion of the "range of reasonableness"
under the Unocal test:251
courts and commentators, even when using a 'reasonableness' test, have expressly indicated that they
do not intend that business judgments be given the rigorous review that the word 'reasonable' may be
read to imply."). But cf William T. Allen, et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due
Care With Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny As a Standard of
Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449, 452 n.13 (2002) ("Admittedly, the distinction between
'reasonable' and 'rational' actions is often subtle and elusive to grasp. Linguistically, it is odd to think
of a board decision as unreasonable yet 'rational,' since both concepts rest in great part on whether the
conduct was logical in the circumstances.").
248. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 443. This is why the business judgment rule is so deferential.
See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
249. See Allen et al., supra note 247, at 452 ("[A]n irrational decision [is] one that is so blatantly
imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally informed person
could have made it. By contrast, even the best of us will occasionally make a lapse in judgment or a
factual error that a judge could later second-guess as 'unreasonable' .... "); Eisenberg, supra note 18,
at 443 ("To see how exceptional a rationality standard is, we need only think about the judgments we
make in everyday life. It is common to characterize a person's conduct as imprudent or unreasonable,
but it is very uncommon to characterize a person's conduct as irrational."); see also Neil MacCormick,
Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, 1580 (1999) ("Perfectly reasonable
people would doubtless be unreal paragons of virtue. There are few to be found. Ordinary people are
not; but most are reasonable some of the time and some are reasonable most of the time.").
250. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1930) ("The essence of the test [of intrinsic
fairness] is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's
length bargain."); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) ("A finding of
perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire fairness analysis.") (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)).
251. But see infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
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[A] court applying judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a
board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should
not second guess that choice even though it might have decided
otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board's
determination. Thus, courts ... will determine if the directors'
decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.252
Reasonableness is a relational concept. 253 Thus, the circumstances of
the board's decision must be considered. Factors such as uncertainty, time
pressure, and available options should factor into the analysis. Also
important would be the extent of the directors' independence:2 54 a close
call might be deemed reasonable if it were to come from a newly
appointed director who has had no contacts with the company or its
directors, and unreasonable if it were to come from the defendant's college
roommate. However, it cannot be forgotten that the very reason for the
intermediate standard of review is that all directors share in structural bias
to some extent.255
Review for substantive reasonableness satisfies the two criteria
specified above.256 First, it inquires into the substantive merits of the
directors' decision. Regardless of the process employed by the directors,
decisions that are unreasonable will not be upheld. Thus, biases, whether
conscious or unconscious, will not go unchecked. Second, it affords a
significant amount of latitude without being overly deferential. Plaintiffs
will prevail only if they can establish that the directors' decisions were
unreasonable, in the sense of being outside the range of reasonableness.
252. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385-86 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)); see also MacCormick,
supra note 249, at 1582 ("[O]n some questions, or in relation to some decisions, there may be more
than one reasonable answer or, at least, a range of answers that cannot be shown to be, or dismissed as,
unreasonable.").
An important part of the quote in the text has been omitted deliberately. See infra note 260 and
accompanying text.
253. See MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1577.
A value like "reasonable" may be very context-sensitive .... [T]here may be many factors
which in any given situation have to be considered and assessed in judging the reasonableness
of an act ... or a decision in its concrete context. For this reason and in this sense,
"reasonableness" taken out of context is ... a "legal category of indeterminate reference."
Id.
254. Independence is not a binary issue. A disinterested outsider is more independent than a
disinterested insider, and one disinterested outsider may be more independent than another.
255. See supra Part Il.
256. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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Thus, review for substantive reasonableness charts a middle course
between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test.
2. Hostile Takeover and Derivative Litigation Standards Distinguished
It is important to note that the proposed standard of substantive
reasonableness is not one that already has been adopted by the Delaware
courts.257 Despite the fact that the term "reasonable" is employed with
respect to the existing intermediate standards of review, the proposed
standard is significantly different.
Under the second prong of the Unocal test, which is known as the
proportionality test, the court purports to determine whether the actions
taken fall within a "range of reasonableness. 2 58 The concept was a
promising one, and some of the discussion was quoted above.2 59 However,
in a portion of the discussion omitted from the above quote, the court
stated clearly that, under the proportionality test, "Courts will not
substitute their business judgment for that of directors ... ,,260 This sort of
deference is very reminiscent of the business judgment rule, and is
inappropriate when structural bias is an issue. The Delaware Supreme
Court went on to dilute the standard further. In Unitrin, Inc. v. American
General Corp.,261 the court recharacterized the proportionality test by
suggesting that non-draconian defenses are to be deemed reasonable.262
This is an unfortunate non-sequitur: while draconian action may be
unreasonable per se,263 it does not follow that non-draconian action is
necessarily reasonable. Thus, the court reduced the proportionality test to
the limited role of screening out only the most extreme behavior.264
257. Cf In re PSE&G S'holders Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 312 (N.J. 2002) (adopting "a modified
business judgment rule" that inquires into the reasonableness of the board's decision).
258. See supra notes 105, 107 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
260. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del. 1994)); see also Unitrin, 651
A.2d at 1388 ("The ratio decidendi for the 'range of reasonableness' standard is a need of the board of
directors for latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders when
defending against perceived threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint.").
261. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
262. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
263. It is also not clear that draconian action is necessarily unreasonable. See Velasco, supra note
96, at 420 & n.245 (arguing that Unocal itself involved draconian defenses that were reasonable under
the circumstances); see also infra notes 316-22 and accompanying text.
264. The Unocal test arguably does not even screen out draconian defenses very well. See
Velasco, supra note 96, at 422 (arguing that poison pill, often upheld under Unocal, is draconian); see
also infra notes 335-47 and accompanying text.
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The standard proposed in this Article would have significantly more
bite. Aware of structural bias, the courts should not be overly concerned
with substituting their own business judgment for that of conflicted
directors. They should, with confidence, determine whether the decision in
question was unreasonable under the circumstances. The only deference
that courts should show would come from the breadth of the term
"reasonable"-which is significant, but not boundless. The extreme
deference that would normally be afforded to directors under the business
judgment rule should not apply.265
Despite the inevitable concerns, review for substantive reasonableness
would not amount to a substitution of a court's business judgment for that
of directors. In this respect, it differs significantly from the Zapata test.
266
Zapata provides that, after a review of the directors' independence and the
procedures employed, the courts are empowered to reject the directors'
decision and apply their own business judgment in reaching a different
decision if they conclude that the circumstances warrant. 267 This is justly
criticized on the grounds that courts do not have the appropriate skills to
make business judgments. 268
Under Zapata, courts are authorized to reject the independent directors'
decision in favor of a superior one.269 Review for substantive
reasonableness is very different. Rather than make their own business
judgments, courts merely review the directors' decisions and reject those
that are shown to be unreasonable. It is not a substitution of a superior
decision, only the rejection of a demonstrably poor one. This is the type of
exercise with respect to which courts are competent. It is the same exercise
as in the entire fairness test, where directors are required to defend their
actions and courts are required to decide whether they have done So.270
The difference between the entire fairness test and review for substantive
reasonableness is the burden imposed on directors: in the former, directors
must establish that their actions were entirely fair, while in the latter,
directors must only defend their decisions as not unreasonable.
The judicial standards for derivative litigation must be distinguished
from the proposed standard in another important respect as well. In
271Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court announced a
265. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Part I1.B.1.
267. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
269. See supra text accompanying note 121.
270. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
271. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). This case is discussed at supra notes 76-79 and accompanying
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"reasonable doubt" standard to determine whether demand should be
considered futile.27 The standard of reasonableness in Aronson is entirely
unlike that in the proposed standard. Although the Aronson court stated
that "the Court of Chancery must make two inquiries, one into the
independence and disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the
substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board's approval
thereof,' 273 the second inquiry does not amount to a review for substantive
reasonableness.
In the case of Grimes v. Donald,274 the court reaffirmed the Aronson
"reasonable doubt" standard275  and elaborated on its meaning:
"Reasonable doubt can be said to mean that there is reason to doubt."
276
This is not particularly helpful. However, the court continued: "Stated
obversely, the concept of reasonable doubt is akin to the concept that the
stockholder has a 'reasonable belief' that the board lacks independence or
that the transaction was not protected by the business judgment rule. ' 277
This is hardly an obvious interpretation of "reasonable doubt": to doubt a
fact is not the same as to believe the opposite fact. This standard sets a
very high threshold for the plaintiff who, it seems, must justify as
reasonable not merely skepticism, but an affirmative belief.
In the case of Beam v. Stewart,278 the Delaware Supreme Court
addressed the issue of "the quantum of doubt about a director's
independence that is 'reasonable' in order to excuse a presuit demand.,
279
The court framed the issue in terms of the strong presumption of the
business judgment rule and held that "[t]he court must determine whether
a plaintiff has alleged particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt of a
director's independence to rebut the presumption at the pleading stage. 28°
This burden is difficult to meet because the presumption that must be
rebutted is powerful.28' Moreover, in the course of their analyses, both the
Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery italicized the term
reasonable, apparently in an effort to highlight the fact that not all doubts
text.
272. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
273. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
274. 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996).
275. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1217 ("[T]he term is apt and achieves the proper balance.").
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1217 n.17.
278. 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). This case is discussed at supra notes 80-89 and accompanying
text.
279. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1048.
280. Id. at 1049 (emphasis added).
281. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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282
are sufficient to rebut the presumption. The ultimate holding in the case
confirmed the demanding nature of the standard.283
The proposed standard of substantive reasonableness is nothing like
Delaware's reasonable doubt standard. In the first place, the presumption
of the business judgment rule would not be applied. Moreover, the two
standards evince a very different understanding of the breadth of the term
"reasonableness." To those familiar with criminal law, the term
"reasonable doubt" suggests a very low standard.284 A small doubt will
suffice, although not a fanciful one.2 85 Delaware's reasonable doubt
standard bears no relation to that standard;286 only a doubt with a solid
foundation seems to qualify. The criminal law standard is far more
consistent with an ordinary interpretation of reasonableness in that it
allows the doubter considerable latitude, while Delaware's standard does
not.
Ultimately, the Delaware reasonable doubt standard should be
scrapped. As has been argued, the proposed standard of substantive
282. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051 ("[Courts] must review the complaint ... to determine whether it
states with particularity facts indicating that a relationship ... is so close that the director's
independence may reasonably be doubted."); id. at 1050 (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 979
(Del. Ch. 2003)) ("Some professional or personal friendships ... may raise a reasonable doubt whether
a director can appropriately consider demand .... Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise to this
level and the Court cannot make a reasonable inference that a particular friendship does so without
specific factual allegations to support such a conclusion.").
283. The court found that the facts did not create a reasonable doubt about directors'
independence and so demand was not futile. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
284. See generally Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). See also Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.
39, 41 (1990) ("[Tihe words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a
higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard."). Actually,
criminal law is more accustomed to speaking of the standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" as a very
high standard. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) ("a subjective state of near
certitude"), which is the corollary of a very low standard for reasonable doubt.
285. Compare Victor, 511 U.S. at 20 (describing reasonable doubt as "a doubt that would cause a
reasonable person to hesitate to act"), with id. at 17 ("A fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt.").
286. Judge Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed
his frustration with the Aronson standard as follows:
The reference to "reasonable doubt" summons up the standard applied in criminal law. It is a
demanding standard, meaning at least a 90% likelihood that the defendant is guilty. If
"reasonable doubt" in the Aronson formula means the same thing as "reasonable doubt" in
criminal law, then demand is excused whenever there is a 10% chance that the original
transaction is not protected by the business judgment rule. Why should demand be excused on
such a slight showing? Surely not because courts want shareholders to file suit whenever
there is an 11% likelihood that the business judgment rule will not protect a transaction.
Aronson did not say, and later cases have not supplied the deficit. If "reasonable doubt" in
corporate law means something different from "reasonable doubt" in criminal law, however,
what is the difference?, and why use the same term for two different things?
Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
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reasonableness should be applied in all cases involving structural bias. As
will be argued, that includes all decisions relating to derivative litigation,
whatever the setting.287 Thus, the proposed standard will supplant not only
the Zapata test, but also the Aronson test.288 There will be no need for the
reasonable doubt standard.
C. Shortcomings
Critics are likely to raise at least three arguments against the proposed
standard, all of which are rooted in the indeterminate nature of the concept
of reasonableness. The first is that a reasonableness standard is too
amorphous and does not provide much guidance. The second is that a
reasonableness standard is too malleable and capable of collapsing into the
business judgment rule. The third is that implementing a reasonableness
standard would be too costly for society because of the increase in
litigation expenses that it may occasion. Each of these arguments will be
considered in turn.
Some critics may complain that a reasonableness standard is too
amorphous and does not provide much guidance. While reasonableness is
an objective standard, it can "be applied only as mediated through the
subjectivity of the judge."289 However, the same could be said for virtually
any standard, including "fairness. ' '290 Courts are required to apply
indeterminate standards all the time. While directors might prefer more
certainty, so would any other fiduciary or potential litigant-but the
business judgment rule is not available to provide special treatment. 29'
In any event, the proposed standard is not so indeterminate. Because
the range of reasonableness affords the directors significant latitude, the
proposed standard should neither be too difficult for the courts to apply
nor involve the courts in business affairs too heavily. It is more likely that
courts would err on the side of less intrusion. Too little accountability for
directors would not be warranted. However, as long as the standard, as
applied, does not approach the deference of the business judgment rule's
287. See infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
288. See infra notes 372-76 and accompanying text.
289. See MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1576.
290. See Mitchell, supra note 137, at 444 ("The attempt to identify and articulate the content of
the fairness test is, predictably, frustrating. Courts and commentators long have decried this ephemeral
nature of the standard, but efforts to make the test more determinate ... themselves have dissolved
into indeterminacy...").
291. It is only the business judgment rule that gives directors a greater claim to deference than
other fiduciaries such as doctors, attorneys, or auditors. Cf supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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rationality standard, there would be some benefit to an intermediate
standard.292
Other critics may complain that the standard is too malleable and
capable of collapsing into the business judgment rule. Unocal, for
example, sounded promising at first and later proved to be relatively
ineffectual.293 Adopting a test that sounds a lot like the Unocal test could
easily lead to a similar result. However, the court in Unocal laid the seeds
of the standard's destruction from the beginning.294 By tying the test so
closely to the business judgment rule, the court doomed Unocal to be of
limited significance. 295 The standard proposed in this Article is born of the
need for a truly intermediate standard of review and is firmly ensconced
between the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. In fact, the
deference of the business judgment rule, which was the downfall of the
Unocal standard, is explicitly rejected because of the directors' conflicting
interests. 296 In that sense, the proposed standard resembles the entire
fairness test. Thus, it should not be as easy for the proposed standard to
drift towards the business judgment rule.297
The third and most significant critique of the reasonableness standard is
that its adoption would be too costly for society because of an associated
increase in litigation expenses. 298 It cannot be denied that replacing the
business judgment rule with an intermediate standard of review would be
likely to cause an increase in litigation expenses, at least at the margin.
The number of lawsuits filed would increase because litigants (or
litigators) who do not foresee a reasonable opportunity for success under
the business judgment rule may come to a different conclusion under a
review for substantive reasonableness. However, the proposed standard
should not have a dramatic effect on the legal landscape or corresponding
292. Cf MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1586-87 ("Even though different people can come to
different evaluations in ... questions of balance, and a variety of evaluations could be accepted as
falling within the range of reasonable opinions ... the range has some limits. Some opinions are so
eccentric or idiosyncratic that they are not accepted as valid judgments at all.").
293. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., supra notes 106, 260 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[Tlhe
business judgment rule, including the standards by which director conduct is judged, is applicable in
the context of a takeover."); id. at 955 ("[Directors] satisfy that burden 'by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation .... ') (citation omitted); id. at 957 ("If the board of directors is disinterested,
has acted in good faith and with due care, its decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion will be
upheld as a proper exercise of business judgment.").
296. See supra text accompanying note 265.
297. Of course, a determined court could easily make this happen. But a determined court likely
would never adopt the proposed standard in the first place.
298. Cf supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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litigation volume and expense. The proposed standard would extend the
reach of judicial review modestly beyond the business judgment rule,
which currently covers only the most extreme circumstances. Under the
proposed standard, the vast majority of business decisions should be
upheld without difficulty.
Nevertheless, critics will maintain that, despite the intention, a
significant increase in litigation expenses would be the inevitable result.
This is because reasonableness seems to be a question of fact: as such, it
generally could not be decided on the pleadings and often would require a
trial. Thus, the cost of defending against lawsuits would increase
dramatically because many cases that would have been dismissed on the
pleadings under the business judgment rule would survive motions for
summary judgment under the proposed standard. The expense and
disruption involved with discovery and trial are considerable. Because
situations involving structural bias are far more common than situations in
which judicial interference is ultimately justified,299 critics may argue that
adopting the proposed standard would not benefit shareholders or society.
This concern is a valid one, but does not carry the day. The business
judgment rule permits dismissal of many cases, which allows for
tremendous savings in litigation expenses. The entire fairness test, on the
other hand, generally does not permit dismissal and does require
significant expenditures on litigation.300 The increase in litigation costs is
great, but justified based on the relative estimates of the merits of the
underlying claims, the need for accountability, and the benefits that can be
expected from litigation. Similarly, an intermediate standard would be
worthwhile if the benefits of litigation justify the increased cost.
Because the proposed standard is intended to have a relatively modest
effect on plaintiffs' chances for success on the merits, it ought to minimize
wasteful litigation expenses by preserving the ability of the courts to grant
dismissals and summary judgments in most cases.30 1 An ordinary
negligence standard for process review would be problematic. Negligence
is a question of fact that cannot easily be resolved without a trial, and
almost certainly not on the pleadings. Discovery would become routine,
and trials would become common. The effect on both litigation volume
299. See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 64,
301. Judicial review must balance the competing values of authority and accountability. See supra
notes 1-3 and accompanying text. Just as "losses tolerated by judicial abstention must be outweighed
by benefits elsewhere in the system," Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 110, so too
must losses tolerated by judicial intervention be outweighed by benefits elsewhere in the system.
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and expense could be dramatic. By contrast, the gross negligence standard
allows the courts to cut off wasteful litigation early while allowing the
closer cases to proceed. Thus, a gross negligence standard for process
review seems more appropriate.
302
As for substance review, the range of reasonableness is more analogous
to gross negligence than ordinary negligence. There should be a
presumption that a business decision is reasonable, although the
presumption would be weaker than under the business judgment rule. With
such a presumption, however, the issue of reasonableness under the
proposed standard can, and should, be decided as a question of law, at
least as a threshold matter. 30 3 Treating "reasonableness" as a question of
law as a threshold matter would be compatible with existing corporate law
practices. The courts treat the presumption of the business judgment rule
as a matter of law.3°4 This is also how the courts handle the "reasonable
doubt" standard in Aronson.30 5 This treatment makes sense for the
proposed standard as well, given the intended breadth of the range of
reasonableness. This would allow courts to decide the issue on the
pleadings in many cases. Only when the circumstances warrant-when the
pleadings are sufficiently promising-would a case be permitted to
proceed, forcing the company to incur the expense of discovery and trial.
Any increase in litigation expenses also would be minimized by the
procedural hurdles of derivative litigation, especially the requirement of
particularized allegations. As will be argued, these procedural hurdles
have the effect of reducing litigation volume and expense significantly.30 6
Because most cases involving structural bias must be pursued by means of
derivative litigation, these procedural hurdles will help keep down
litigation expenses resulting from the proposed standard.
302. It may be that "gross negligence," as applied by the courts is a bit too deferential. However,
cases such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), suggest otherwise. See Allen et al.,
supra note 3, at 872-74 (arguing that the Van Gorkom court actually applied ordinary negligence
standard).
Gross negligence is not the only alternative to ordinary negligence. A reasonableness standard
could be employed for both the substance and process components of review, as is the case with the
fairness standard. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
303. Although the ultimate issue could be decided as a question of fact in close cases, the court
would be able to decide, as a matter of law, whether the pleadings are sufficient to raise a legitimate
issue under the proposed standard.
304. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 271-83 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 284-87 and accompanying
text (disagreeing with court's substantive interpretation of reasonableness). Reasonableness is also
decided as a matter of law in certain other contexts, such as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Omelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
306. See infra notes 350-51, 359-69 and accompanying text.
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In short, the additional cost to society will not be nearly as great as may
be feared. Although the cost of litigation is a serious issue, it should not be
the controlling factor. Meritorious claims should not be cut off in the
interests of judicial economy.30 7 Savings in litigation costs come at the
expense of accountability. Extreme deference may make sense when
directors are unconflicted,30 8 but not when self-dealing or structural bias is
an issue. In such cases, the cost-benefit analysis changes radically: the
value of accountability takes on greater significance vis A vis the value of
authority. 3
09
V. APPLICATION
In Part IV, a new intermediate standard of review for dealing with
cases involving structural bias was proposed and defended. It was argued
that courts should review directors' decisions for substantive
reasonableness in order to provide a meaningful check on directorial bias.
This Part will attempt to apply that standard in a few important situations.
First, it will consider how the standard would work in the context of a
hostile takeover and resulting defensive strategies employed by the target
company's board of directors. The proposed standard will be contrasted
with the enhanced scrutiny provided by Unocal. This Part then will
consider how the standard would apply in the context of derivative
litigation and a board's decision to terminate such litigation. How the test
manages derivative litigation is particularly important because most
substantive breaches of fiduciary duty are enforced by means of derivative
litigation. Next, this Part will consider how the standard would work in the
context of a particular substantive issue that is a common subject of
derivative litigation: executive compensation. The ability to make a
difference on the merits of a substantive issue is, after all, what gives
meaning to the proposal. Finally, this Part will consider a very important
issue with respect to structural bias claims: the applicability of charter
provisions that limit directors' personal liability for breach of fiduciary
duty. This issue raises the difficult question of whether structural bias
should be seen as a duty of care issue or a duty of loyalty issue. The goal
307. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) ("[I]f we failed to balance all
the interests involved, we would in the name of practicality and judicial economy foreclose a judicial
decision on the merits. At this point, we are not convinced that is necessary or desirable.").
308. See supra note 18.
309. The issue is the same as with self-dealing and the entire fairness test, albeit on a smaller
scale. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
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of this Part is to demonstrate that the proposed standard is not nearly as
radical as it may seem at first.31°
A. Hostile Takeovers
The basic standard of review for takeover defenses is set forth in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.31 '-there must be reasonable
grounds to believe there is a threat, and the response must be reasonable in
relation to the threat.312 At first glance, it may appear that there is not
much of a difference between the Unocal standard and the standard
proposed here. However, there is a great difference in the way the standard
would be applied.
One way in which the proposed standard would differ from Unocal is
that it would not necessarily require a threat. However, this is not a great
point of divergence for two reasons. First, the existence of a threat would
certainly factor into the circumstances under which the action in question
must be deemed reasonable.1 3 Second, Unocal has been interpreted to
perceive a threat under virtually any circumstance: even when there is no
actual threat, the court will recognize the potential for a hostile takeover as
a threat. 314 It is the second prong that does the work under Unocal, and
potential takeovers are circumstances that could be considered under the
proposed standard. Thus, the two tests can accommodate threats equally
well.
Unocal's second prong-the proportionality, or "range of
reasonableness," test-is another matter. As has been argued, Unocal is a
very deferential standard, and seems to prohibit only those defenses which
would be considered draconian because they are either coercive or
310. An important caveat must be given at this point: the following attempts to apply the review
for substantive reasonableness are not intended to be definitive. Reasonableness is an evaluative norm,
and different people can come to different conclusions. See MacCormick, supra note 249, at 1581-82
("In any question that involves weighing much evidence or many interests and values and coming to a
conclusion on what may seem a relatively fine balance, it does not surprise us to find others reaching a
conclusion different from our own .... Such a difference of judgment is no mere difference of taste
.... "). Qualifications-such as the "range of reasonableness" formulation, see supra notes 251-55
and accompanying text, may help reduce variability among judges, but cannot eliminate it entirely.
What follows, then, is the author's good faith effort at applying a standard of substantive
reasonableness. This admission should not denigrate the value of an intermediate standard of review.
See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
311. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
312. See id at 955; see also supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) ("[H]ere we have
a defensive mechanism adopted to ward off possible future advances .... "); see also Velasco, supra
note 96, at 416-19.
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preclusive. 31 5 The proposed standard would have a greater reach. It would
recognize that there are many defenses that may not be draconian but that
would nevertheless be unreasonable. However, it also would recognize
that some draconian defenses might nevertheless be reasonable.
The defensive measures employed in Unocal itself serve as a good
example. In that case, Mesa Petroleum had made a two-tiered, front-
loaded tender offer for the shares of Unocal.3 16 The Unocal board
responded to the coercive offer with a selective self-tender.1 7 The court
upheld the defense as reasonable under the circumstances, 3 8 and the
proposed standard should produce the same result. However, at least as
originally proposed, the defense in Unocal was arguably draconian. The
selective self-tender was preclusive because it was made contingent upon
the success of Mesa Petroleum's initial tender offer. 3 19 Mesa Petroleum
would be unwilling to go forward in the face of the selective self-tender;
as a result, there would be no selective self-tender, either. Thus, Unocal's
defense would have precluded any transaction from going forward. The
defense was also coercive: shareholders would be forced to accept its
terms, even if opposed, because not doing so would make them worse
off.320 It was essentially a two-tiered, back-loaded tender offer. After
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,321 such a draconian defense
would not be upheld under Unocal.322 Under the proposed standard,
however, it could be deemed reasonable because of the coercive nature of
Mesa Petroleum's offer: it would be a case of fighting fire with fire.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.32 3 presents a situation in
which the court upheld a defensive response that would not be upheld
under the proposed standard. In that case, Time entered into a merger
agreement with Warner.3 24 Prior to the consummation of the transaction,
Paramount stepped in with a higher offer for Time.325 Time refused to
negotiate with Paramount and instead restructured its transaction with
315. See supra notes 109-10, 258-65 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
318. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985).
319. This requirement was later partially waived. See id. at 951.
320. Shareholders might be opposed to the superior terms because the offer was, in fact,
preclusive. They would nevertheless tender because failure to do so would result in the same dilution
that Mesa Petroleum was facing.
321. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
322. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
323. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
324. Id. at 1143-46.
325. Id. at 1147.
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Warner so as to frustrate Paramount's efforts.32 6 The court characterized
this response as merely an implementation of a pre-existing strategic plan,
and considered the associated defenses reasonable in relation to this
limited goal.327 In its efforts to avoid "substituting its judgment as to what
is a 'better' deal for that of [the] corporation's board of directors,, 328 the
court failed to appreciate how radical the restructuring of the transaction
really was. Time was not merely defending its long-term strategic plan.
Rather, it gave up on its proposed merger of equals in favor of an outright
acquisition of Warner. This change in plans would have serious
operational consequences for the company.32 The plans were changed in
order to avoid a shareholder vote that directors knew would not have been
obtainable because of the superior Paramount offer.33 °
The board's conduct should not have been upheld because it was
draconian: it was coercive in that it eliminated the need for shareholder
approval in order to cram the transaction down the shareholders'
throats; 331 it was preclusive in that it would prevent the combined
company from being acquired for the foreseeable future. 332 In any event,
without the business judgment rule-like deference afforded by Unocal,333
the board's conduct would have been deemed unreasonable under the
proposed standard. Going to such lengths to deprive the shareholders of a
326. Id. at 1146-48.
327. Id. at 1154-55 ("Here, on the record facts, the Chancellor found that Time's responsive
action to Paramount's tender offer ... had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction
in an altered form. Thus, the response was reasonably related to the threat.") (footnote omitted).
328. Id. at 1153.
329. Id. at 1148 (In the restructured transaction, "Time would assume 7-10 billion dollars worth
of debt, thus eliminating one of the principal transaction-related benefits of the original merger
agreement."). Compare id. at 1145-47 (discussing advantages of original transaction) with id. at 1148-
49 (describing restructured transaction).
330. The market valued the Time-Warner transaction at $126 per share of Time, while Paramount
offered $175 per share initially, and $200 per share eventually. Id. at 1147-49.
331. Time had sought other ways of avoiding a shareholder vote before restructuring the merger
as an acquisition. See, e.g., id. at 1148 ("Time sought permission from the New York Stock Exchange
to alter its rules and allow the Time-Warner merger to proceed without stockholder approval."); see
also supra note 327.
332. Compare Time, 571 A.2d at 1154 ("Paramount argues that ... Time's response was
unreasonable in precluding Time's shareholders from accepting the tender offer or receiving a control
premium in the immediately foreseeable future."), with id. at 1155 ("[T]he revised agreement ... did
not preclude Paramount from making an offer for the combined Time-Warner company ....").
Although the Time-Warner deal was not technically preclusive, it is hard to imagine any deal that is.
See Velasco, supra note 96, at 421 n.25 1. The fact is that the size and debt burden of the combined
Time-Warner would make the company acquisition-proof for years to come.
333. See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
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vote on a proposed merger may not be utterly irrational, but it is
unreasonable.334
Judicial review of the poison pill defense could benefit from the
proposed standard as well. 335 As the author has argued elsewhere, the
poison pill should be considered draconian in that it is both coercive and
preclusive.336 The courts disagree: they do not consider the poison pill to
be unreasonable under Unocal.337 Thus, it might seem unlikely that the
courts would consider the poison pill unreasonable under the proposed
standard, either. However, without the deference afforded by Unocal, the
courts should be able to see the poison pill for what it is: part of a "just say
no" strategy to avoid hostile takeovers of any kind.338
Shareholders essentially have two rights: the right to vote and the right
to sell their shares. The Delaware courts have recognized the "central
importance of the [shareholder] franchise to the scheme of corporate
governance. 339 Unfortunately, they have not recognized the fundamental
importance of shareholder exit. 340 However, the logic is equally
applicable. To paraphrase the Delaware Court of Chancery:
A board's decision to act to prevent the shareholders from [selling
their shares] does not involve the exercise of the corporation's
power over its property, or with respect to its rights and obligations;
rather, it involves allocation, between shareholders as a class and
the board, of effective power with respect to [property rights in the
company's shares].34'
334. Such conduct also is problematic under Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651
(Del. Ch. 1988). Because the board intentionally interfered with a shareholder vote, it should have to
demonstrate a compelling justification for its conduct. See supra note I11.
335. "The poison pill is the ultimate defense against a hostile takeover." Velasco, supra note 96, at
381. For a brief description of the poison pill, see id. at 383-84. For a more detailed description, see
Julian Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 EMORY L.J. 849, 856-68 (2003).
336. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 419-22.
337. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-57 (Del. 1985) (flip-over pill); see
also Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 249-50 (Del. 2001) (reaffirming Moran); Unitrin,
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (flip-in pill); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del. 1986) (back-end pill).
338. See Velasco, supra note 96, at 384; Velasco, supra note 335, at 850.
339. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659; see supra note 111.
340. Cf Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("If stockholders are
presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed competent to decide
when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for deliberation has been afforded them?"); Ronald
J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 501
(2001) (arguing against Delaware court's "preference that control contests be resolved through an
election, rather than a market").
341. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660.
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Shareholders should be able to sell their shares freely, whether on the
market or in a tender offer. The company should be permitted to interfere
only in the interests of shareholders-for example, when they are
confronted with a coercive offer. However, when shareholders face a non-
coercive offer, such as an all-cash, all-shares offer, director interference is
unjustifiable.342 A board's decision to block such an offer may be rational,
in that it could allow directors to negotiate a better price for
shareholders,343 but it would not be reasonable because it allows directors
to intrude upon shareholder prerogatives.
Some might disagree that the poison pill is so powerful, at least
standing alone, because the hostile bidder can eliminate the poison pill by
means of a successful proxy contest. Surely, however, certain variants can
be preclusive-such as the dead hand poison pill.344 Moreover, even a
garden-variety poison pill can be quite potent when combined with other
defenses, such as a staggered board of directors.345 Such preclusive
defenses should not be considered reasonable, even under Unocal.
346
Under the proposed standard, even an ordinary poison pill defense should
342. "The term 'all-cash, all-shafes offer' generally refers to a tender offer for any and all shares
of the target company's stock, with consideration to be paid in cash. There is often a promise to cash
out remaining shareholders at the same price." Velasco, supra note 96, at 388 n.44. "[A]n all-cash, all-
shares offer does not pose any real threat." Id. at 419.
343. See William B. Chandler I11, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and
Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1093-96 (1999).
344. "In substance, the 'dead hand' provision operates to prevent any directors .... except those
who were in office as of the date of the [poison pill]'s adoption ... or their designated successors,
from redeeming the [poison pill] until they expire." Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1184
(Del. Ch. 1998). The validity of the dead hand provision was called into doubt by the Delaware Court
of Chancery in Carmody. See id. at 1182. A less powerful relative, the "delayed redemption provision"
or "no hand" pill, was struck down by the Delaware Supreme Court in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.
v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). However, some other courts have upheld such provisions. See,
e.g., AMP, Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. 98-4405, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15617 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8,
1998); Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
But see Velasco, supra note 335, at 903 ("The antidote strategy ... can even be successful in
states where dead-hand and no-hand provisions are legal .... ").
345. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence & Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002). But see Velasco, supra note 335, at 902
(The antidote strategy "should be able to overcome the combined effect of a poison pill together with a
staggered board.").
346. The cases of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986), and Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), provide specially-
enhanced versions of enhanced scrutiny. See supra note 11l. It already has been argued that those
cases could be seen as mere extensions of Unocal. See supra note 11l. Given business judgment rule-
like deference, however, the author is skeptical that the courts would reach the same result under
Unocal. The author is far more confident that Revlon and Blasius would be decided similarly under the
proposed standard because it does not provide such extreme deference.
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be considered unreasonable if it is used to prevent shareholders from
selling their shares.347
B. Derivative Litigation
When shareholders wish to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty,
they generally must do so by means of a derivative action. This is because
it is usually the company that is harmed by the directors' breach;
shareholders are harmed only indirectly, through their ownership
interest. 348 Because directors' decisions with respect to derivative litigation
are among the key situations involving structural bias, there is an
important link between the proposed standard and enforcement of all
fiduciary duties.
Courts are ambivalent about derivative litigation. On the one hand, they
sympathize with directors who insist that much of it is wasteful; on the
other hand, they recognize the need to allow shareholders to pursue
meritorious claims when conflicted directors refuse to do so.349 The result
347. The poison pill may have a legitimate role as a temporary defensive measure, but not as part
of a "just say no" defense.
[If] the threat is defined as one involving the possibility that stockholders might make an
erroneous investment or voting decision, the appropriate response would seem to be one that
would remedy that problem by providing the stockholders with adequate information. The
corporate board... may legitimately need more time to ensure that it can get its message out
to the market place.
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 325 (Del. Ch. 2000).
348. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).
The derivative suit has been generally described as "one of the most interesting and ingenious
of accountability mechanisms for large formal organizations." It enables a stockholder to
bring suit on behalf of the corporation for harm done to the corporation. Because a derivative
suit is being brought on behalf of the corporation, the recovery, if any, must go to the
corporation. A stockholder who is directly injured, however, does retain the right to bring an
individual action for injuries affecting his or her legal rights as a stockholder. Such a claim is
distinct from an injury caused to the corporation alone. In such individual suits, the recovery
or other relief flows directly to the stockholders, not to the corporation.
Id. at 1036. The Delaware Supreme Court has recently "set forth ... the law to be applied henceforth
in determining whether a stockholder's claim is derivative or direct;" id. at 1033. "The issue must turn
solely on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing
stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy
(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?" Id.
349. The courts have engaged in this sort of balancing explicitly:
The jurisprudence of Aronson and its progeny is designed to create a balanced environment
which will: (1) on the one hand, deter costly, baseless suits by creating a screening
mechanism to eliminate claims where there is only a suspicion expressed solely in conclusory
terms; and (2) on the other hand, permit suit by a stockholder who is able to articulate
particularized facts showing that there is a reasonable doubt either that (a) a majority of the
board is independent for purposes of responding to the demand, or (b) the underlying
transaction is protected by the business judgment rule.
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is a body of law that could be characterized as schizophrenic. For example,
derivative litigation is frustrated by requirements such as the
contemporaneous ownership rule350 and the demand requirement,351 but
facilitated by the reimbursement of litigation expenses 352 and the ability to
argue demand futility.
353
Despite their ambivalence, courts have recognized the need for
meaningful review of such matters. They have struggled to find the
appropriate balance between directorial authority and accountability by
seeking ways to block frivolous litigation while allowing meritorious
claims. 354 To do this properly, however, courts must deal adequately with
structural bias. Directors' decisions with respect to derivative litigation
cannot be trusted fully. However, neither can every shareholder be
permitted to control the company's fate. The courts are wise in seeking
structural safeguards, such as the establishment of board committees that
are as independent as possible and the encouragement of solid decision-
making processes. Such safeguards increase, at least to some extent, the
confidence that can be had in directors' judgment. However, because of
structural bias, and the limits of independence355 and process,356 these
safeguards must be followed by meaningful judicial review.
Meaningful judicial review is expensive.357 However, reliance upon
unaccountable directors who are inherently conflicted is not a satisfactory
alternative. Moreover, the cost of judicial review need not be great if
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217 (Del. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem is relatively simple. If, on the one hand,
corporations can consistently wrest bona fide derivative actions away from well-meaning
derivative plaintiffs through the use of the committee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose
much, if not all, of its generally-recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate means of
policing boards of directors. If, on the other hand, corporations are unable to rid themselves of
meritless or harmful litigation and strike suits, the derivative action, created to benefit the
corporation, will produce the opposite, unintended result.... It thus appears desirable to us to
find a balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring corporate causes of action
cannot be unfairly trampled on by the board of directors, but the corporation can rid itself of
detrimental litigation.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87 (Del. 1981) (citations omitted); see also Levine v.
Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984).
350. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2001).
351. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
352. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 333 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("This Court consistently has
held that, in ... derivative actions, plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and
expenses where their efforts achieve a benefit for the corporation or its shareholders.").
353. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (Del. 1984).
354. See supra note 349.
355. See supra notes 200-19 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
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courts are permitted to decide the easy cases as a matter of law.358 Finally,
there are a number of procedural requirements, such as the
contemporaneous ownership rule and the demand requirement, that have
the effect of minimizing litigation volume and expense.359
One such requirement that bears special emphasis is the Delaware
requirement of particularized allegations. As part of the demand
requirement, the Delaware Chancery Court Rules require that "the
complaint shall ... allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain
the action or for not making the effort. 36°
A quick read might suggest that particularized allegations are necessary
only with respect to demand issues. However, a more careful reading of
the rule in context reveals that the requirement actually reaches the merits
of the underlying claims.
In Delaware, a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative action faces a
difficult decision. The plaintiff must either argue demand futility, in which
case particularized allegations are necessary, or make a demand, in which
case the argument of demand futility is waived and the business judgment
rule is invoked. 361 Although it may be difficult to make particularized
allegations, it is a better option than facing the business judgment rule on
the directors' response to the demand.
The test for demand futility is a two-part test set forth in Aronson v.
Lewis.362 The first prong, the inquiry into whether "the directors are
disinterested and independent,, 363 deals with the duty of loyalty, which is
what one would expect of a "demand futility" argument. However, the
second prong, the inquiry into whether "the challenged transaction was
358. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
359. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004) ("[l]f an
action is derivative, the plaintiffs are then required to comply with the requirements of Court of
Chancery Rule 23.1, that the stockholder: (a) retain ownership of the shares throughout the litigation;
(b) make presuit demand on the board; and (c) obtain court approval of any settlement .. "); see also
id. ("The decision whether a suit is direct or derivative may be outcome-determinative.").
360. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
361. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218-19 (Del. 1996).
If a demand is made, the stockholder has spent one-but only one-"arrow" in the "quiver."
The spent 'arrow' is the right to claim that demand is excused. The stockholder does not, by
making demand, waive the right to claim that demand has been wrongfully refused. ... If a
demand is made and rejected, the board rejecting the demand is entitled to the presumption of
the business judgment rule ....
Id.
362. 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984); see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
363. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
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otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment, '' 364 extends
to the duty of care. It provides that plaintiffs can establish demand futility
by "allegling] particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that the
actions of the defendants were protected by the business judgment rule. 365
Because of the flexibility of the Aronson test, it makes sense for
plaintiffs to raise all of their fiduciary duty claims under the mantle of
demand futility rather than to make a demand. Although the "reasonable
doubt" standard may not be very generous, 366 it surely is better than facing
the business judgment rule directly. As a result, the requirement of
particularized allegations affects almost all derivative litigation. Thus it is
fair to say, as a general matter, that "pleadings [in derivative suits] must
comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ
substantially from the permissive notice pleadings ... .,,36' These stringent
requirements are made more difficult by the fact that the plaintiff will not
yet have the benefit of discovery.368 The aggregate effect is a reduction in
both the volume and expense of derivative litigation. The benefits of the
particularized allegations requirement should apply to the proposed
standard as well.
369
However, the proposed standard would work some fairly significant
changes in the way questions regarding derivative litigation would be
handled. Delaware has an elaborate system in place in order to determine
when the business judgment rule should apply.37° Under the proposed
standard, the business judgment rule never would apply because of
structural bias. The question would always be one of substantive
reasonableness. This would simplify matters significantly because a
plaintiffs choice between making a demand and alleging demand futility
364. Id.
365. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000).
366. See supra notes 271-86 and accompanying text.
367. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 254.
368. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 & n.10 (Del. 1993) ("derivative plaintiffs ... are
not entitled to discovery to assist their compliance with Rule 23.1"); see also Eisner, 746 A.2d at 254-
55 (discussing the limited discovery rights of stockholders when making specific allegations under
Rule 23.1).
369. As will be argued, all issues of demand will be reviewed for substantive reasonableness, such
that there will not be a pressing need to argue demand futility. Thus, it might seem that a plaintiff
could escape the requirement of particularized allegations by making a demand: particularized
allegations would be required only for the demand issue and not the underlying merits. However, the
court would be deciding whether the directors' response to the demand was reasonable. Without
particularized allegations suggesting otherwise, the rejection of a shoddy demand will be difficult to
characterize as unreasonable. See infra notes 370-83 and accompanying text.
370. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (waiver of demand futility); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (standards for demand futility); see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (demand excused).
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would not be so consequential. If shareholders were to make a demand, or
the directors otherwise were to decide on whether to proceed with the
derivative action, the directors' decision would be subject to review for
substantive reasonableness. If the shareholder plaintiffs were to argue
demand futility and the directors did not have the opportunity to make a
decision on the matter, the plaintiffs would have to argue that a decision
not to proceed with litigation would be unreasonable. Finally, if demand
were excused or wrongfully refused and the board subsequently
established a special litigation committee to dismiss the action, the
decision of the committee also would be subject to review for substantive
reasonableness.
371
The proposed standard eliminates the need for both the Zapata and
Aronson tests. Zapata's reliance on the court's business judgment372 would
be replaced by the review for substantive reasonableness. Aronson's two-
part test would be unnecessary because plaintiffs would have the benefit of
the intermediate standard of review:373 they would never need to establish
irrationality or waste (although they would be free to argue that the
directors were, in fact, interested or not independent).374 Moreover,
Aronson's "reasonable doubt" standard would be too awkward when
combined with the "range of reasonableness" standard. 375 However,
Aronson's underlying interpretation of the particularized allegations
requirement should stand. Thus, the Aronson framework could be replaced
by a simpler one: that the plaintiff must allege particularized facts creating
376a strong inference of unreasonableness.
The proposed standard also would have the benefit of encouraging
shareholders to make a demand. Shareholders would not feel unable to do
so because, even if they were to lose the ability to claim demand futility,
they would retain the benefits of review for substantive reasonableness
due to structural bias. In fact, under the proposed standard it should be
easier to prevail after a demand has been refused than it would be in the
371. But see infra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
373. However, the proposed standard could be incorporated into the Aronson framework:
plaintiffs would be permitted to make the typical arguments, challenging the directors' independence
or business judgment, as well as a reasonableness argument.
374. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. In light of the availability of special litigation
committees, it would be the rare case indeed where plaintiffs could make a showing sufficient to
invoke the entire fairness test.
375. Although it would be quite awkward, Aronson's "reasonable doubt" standard could be
retained despite the adoption of the proposed standard: plaintiff would have to allege facts with
particularity creating a reasonable doubt about whether the directors' decision was reasonable.
376. Cf supra note 365 and accompanying text.
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absence of a litigation decision by directors, as might be the case in a
demand futility claim. To establish demand futility without a record, the
plaintiffs would have to prove that a decision not to proceed would not-
which is to say, could not-be reasonable; the courts would have to give
directors the benefit of hypothetical reasoning.377 However, once there is a
record complete with directors' reasons, as always would be the case after
a demand had been made, the plaintiffs would need to show only that the
actual decision was unreasonable.
Moreover, directors would be handicapped in subsequently establishing
a special litigation committee to dismiss the case. Once it has been
established that it would be unreasonable not to pursue the case-whether
because of demand futility or wrongful refusal-it would be difficult
(although not impossible) to argue subsequently that the case should be
dismissed.378 In a court's review of such a decision, "some tribute must be
paid to the fact that the lawsuit was properly initiated., 379 It would be
especially difficult to justify a dismissal as reasonable "after years of
vigorous litigation for reasons unconnected with the merits of the
lawsuit', 380 To the extent that the proposed standard encourages demand
or discourages wasteful efforts by special litigation committees, 381 it also
would reduce the expenses incurred in litigating demand futility. Although
litigation expenses might increase overall,382 this would be another
mitigating factor.383
A good example of a case that likely would have been decided
differently under the proposed standard is the case of Brehm v. Eisner.
384
At first, the case may seem to be a poor candidate. The court described the
complaint as "a pistache of prolix invective ... permeated with conclusory
allegations, 385 that "does not comply with ... fundamental pleading
mandates" of particularized allegations.386 This characterization was
377. See infra note 406.
378. This is because a derivative lawsuit would only be permitted to proceed-whether demand
had been refused or considered futile-after a determination that not proceeding would be
unreasonable. The special litigation committee's decision to dismiss the case would have to be based
on new facts or arguments in order to be considered reasonable.
379. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
380. Id.
381. Not all efforts by special litigation committees to dismiss properly initiated derivative
lawsuits would be wasteful. However, since the standard of review would be unchanged-i.e.,
substantive reasonableness-such efforts would be wasteful in many cases.
382. See supra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
383. See also supra notes 303-06, 357-69 and accompanying text.
384. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
385. Id. at 249.
386. Id. at 254.
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justified by the subsequent amended complaint, which presents a very
different set of the facts.387 However, despite the "inartfully drafted"
complaint, the court was able to "ferret out" sufficient allegations to admit
that "both as to the processes of the two boards and the waste test, this is a
close case., 388 If the case was a close one under the business judgment
rule, it seems fairly obvious that it could have been decided differently
under an intermediate standard of review.
The Eisner court was willing to dismiss the case on the facts as alleged.
Given the extreme nature of those facts, this is a troubling precedent. As it
turns out, there was no harm done because the plaintiffs were able to do a
little more legwork, discover a different set of facts, and produce a
superior complaint. However, had the plaintiffs been unable to do so,
either because of a lack of discovery or because the facts actually were as
originally alleged, their meritorious claim would have been dismissed for
the sake of judicial economy. This would have been unfortunate.
In essence, the original complaint alleged that the directors of The Walt
Disney Company breached their fiduciary duties in approving an
employment agreement with Michael S. Ovitz as president and in later
granting him a "non-fault" termination of that agreement. 389 The structure
of the employment agreement was criticized on the grounds that "the
contract gave Ovitz an incentive to find a way to exit the Company via a
non-fault termination as soon as possible because doing so would permit
him to earn more than he could by fulfilling his contract., 390 The grant of a
387. Compare id. at 249-53 (facts as originally pleaded), with In re The Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278-85 (Del. Ch. 2003) (facts as pleaded in amended complaint).
388. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 249.
This is potentially a very troubling case on the merits. On the one hand, it appears from the
Complaint that: (a) the compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly
lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to Ovitz' value to the Company; and (b) the processes of
the boards of directors in dealing with the approval and termination of the Ovitz Employment
Agreement were casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory. On the other hand, the Complaint is so
inartfully drafted that it was properly dismissed under our pleading standards for derivative
suits. From what we can ferret out of this deficient pleading, the processes of the Old Board
and the New Board were hardly paradigms of good corporate governance practices.
Moreover, the sheer size of the payout to Ovitz, as alleged, pushes the envelope of judicial
respect for the business judgment of directors in making compensation decisions. Therefore,
both as to the processes of the two Boards and the waste test, this is a close case.
Id.
389. See id. at 248-49. In addition, the choice of Ovitz was criticized because of his lack of
qualifications, see id. at 249 ("At the time, Ovitz was an important talent broker in Hollywood ....
[H]e lacked experience managing a diversified public company."), and it was alleged that he was
selected because of his long-standing friendship with the chairman and CEO, Michael Eisner. See id.
These allegations were not well supported.
390. Id. at 251. The court summarized the terms of the employment agreement as follows:
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non-fault termination was criticized on the grounds that it was wasteful 391
and that the company could have sought a termination for cause.392 The
facts were sufficiently egregious that even the basic allegations would
have been sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under the proposed
standard.
The court defended the structure of the employment agreement on the
ground that the directors were statutorily protected in relying on an
expert. 393 This was so even though "'nobody'-not Crystal [the expert]
Ovitz' Employment Agreement had an initial term of five years and required that Ovitz
"devote his full time and best efforts exclusively to the Company," with exceptions for
volunteer work, service on the board of another company, and managing his passive
investments. In return, Disney agreed to give Ovitz a base salary of $1 million per year, a
discretionary bonus, and two sets of stock options (the "A" options and the "B" options) that
collectively would enable Ovitz to purchase 5 million shares of Disney common stock.
The "A" options were scheduled to vest in three annual increments of 1 million shares
each, beginning on September 30, 1998 (i.e., at the end of the third full year of employment)
and continuing for the following two years (through September 2000). The agreement
specifically provided that the "A" options would vest immediately if Disney granted Ovitz a
non-fault termination of the Employment Agreement. The "B" options, consisting of 2
million shares, differed in two important respects. Although scheduled to vest annually
starting in September 2001 (i.e., the year after the last "A" option would vest), the "B"
options were conditioned on Ovitz and Disney first having agreed to extend his employment
beyond the five-year term of the Employment Agreement. Furthermore, Ovitz would forfeit
the right to qualify for the "B" options if his initial employment term of five years ended
prematurely for any reason, even if from a non-fault termination.
The Employment Agreement provided for three ways by which Ovitz' employment
might end. He might serve his five years and Disney might decide against offering him a new
contract. If so, Disney would owe Ovitz a $10 million termination payment. Before the end of
the initial term, Disney could terminate Ovitz for "good cause" only if Ovitz committed gross
negligence or malfeasance, or if Ovitz resigned voluntarily. Disney would owe Ovitz no
additional compensation if it terminated him for "good cause." Termination without cause
(non-fault termination) would entitle Ovitz to the present value of his remaining salary
payments through September 30, 2000, a $10 million severance payment, an additional $7.5
million for each fiscal year remaining under the agreement, and the immediate vesting of the
first 3 million stock options (the "A" Options).
Id. at 250 (footnotes omitted).
391. The court agreed that "the non-fault termination left Ovitz with what essentially was a very
lucrative severance agreement," but noted that "in the end the payout to Ovitz did not exceed the 1995
contractual benefits." Id. at 252.
392. Id. at 253 ("The allegation of waste is based on the inference most favorable to plaintiffs that
Disney owed Ovitz nothing, either because he had resigned (de facto) or because he was unarguably
subject to firing for cause.").
393. See id. at 261. Section 14 1(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides as follows:
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee designated by the board
of directors, shall, in the performance of such member's duties, be fully protected in relying
in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports
or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's officers or employees,
or committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member
reasonably believes are within such other person's professional or expert competence and
who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.
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and not the directors-[calculated 'the economic exposure of the
corporation to the payout scenarios of the Ovitz contract'], although all the
necessary information presumably was at hand to do SO.''394 While this
might be acceptable behavior under the business judgment rule, 5 it would
not fall within the range of reasonableness.
Directors may be entitled to rely in good faith on "information,
opinions, reports or statements' 396 of experts, but they should not be
permitted to delegate the ultimate decision to experts. The directors, not
the experts, are the ones who must exercise business judgment in deciding
on such fundamental questions as the nature and amount of executive
compensation.397 Thus, they should not be protected in relying on experts
without first coming to a rudimentary understanding of the agreement.
The employment agreement was not terribly complicated. Even a basic
understanding would have revealed the problem described in the
complaint. The contract provided that Ovitz would receive a salary of $1
million per year, plus discretionary bonuses and stock options. He also
would receive a $10 million bonus if his contract were not renewed.
However, if Ovitz were to obtain a non-fault termination, he would receive
the $1 million per year salary payments, plus $7.5 million per year, as well
as $10 million in severance pay, and most, but not all, of the options.398
Even excluding the value of stock options, which could be tremendous but
are inherently volatile,3 99 the cash payments under the employment
agreement totaled $15 million, plus discretionary bonuses, if Ovitz
completed his term of employment, and approximately $52.5 million if
Ovitz was granted a non-fault termination on the first day.400 It would not
take a qualified expert to appreciate the deficiencies of such an
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). As the Eisner court pointed out, however, "[t]his protection
... is not without limitation, as in a case of corporate waste." Eisner, 746 A.2d at 261 n.51.
394. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 260; see id. at 259.
395. Id. at 260-61.
396. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).
397. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors .... ").
398. See supra note 390. Actually, he would receive only "the present value of his remaining
salary payments," Eisner, 746 A.2d at 250, which would make the amount somewhat less than $1
million per year.
399. Most of the value of Ovitz's severance package came from the stock options. In fairness, the
Chancery Court "concluded that the vesting schedule of the options actually was a disincentive for
Ovitz to leave Disney," Eisner, 746 A.2d at 263, because Ovitz would be giving up a significant
number of options. However, the mere possibility of obtaining such options would not necessarily
make up for the certainty of reduced payments and five years of labor.
400. In addition, Ovitz would be able to pursue other employment or investment activities for five
years. This is a significant benefit to an early termination.
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arrangement. A decision to approve such a contract may or may not be
rational, but it would not be reasonable.
The court defended the board's subsequent decision to grant a non-fault
termination on the basis of the uncertainty and expense of litigating the
issue of fault:
All [that the Complaint] shows is that the Board had arguable
grounds to fire Ovitz for cause. But what is alleged is only an
argument-perhaps a good one-that Ovitz' conduct constituted
gross negligence or malfeasance. First, given the facts as alleged,
Disney would have had to persuade a trier of fact and law of this
argument in any litigated dispute with Ovitz. Second, that process
of persuasion could involve expensive litigation, distraction of
executive time and company resources, lost opportunity costs, more
bad publicity and an outcome that was uncertain at best and, at
worst, could have resulted in damages against the Company.4 °1
This type of argument is commonly used by boards of directors in refusing
a demand and by special litigation committees in seeking dismissal.40 2 It is
therefore a very important issue in derivative litigation.
A cost/benefit analysis is an important consideration in the decision of
whether to proceed with any lawsuit. Litigation is expensive and risky. A
decision to sue entails more than just a determination of the merits of the
claim:403 even a risky case may be worth pursuing because of the potential
reward, and even an easy case may not be worth pursuing because of the
404
related expenses. However, the claim that the costs outweigh the
benefits is ubiquitous among directors deciding on whether to pursue
derivative litigation. Surely the argument is valid in many cases, perhaps
even in most cases. But it is implausible that it should be valid in nearly all
401. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 265.
402. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 997 (N.Y. 1979) (The special litigation
committee concluded "that if the action were allowed to proceed the time and talents of the
corporation's senior management would be wasted on lengthy pretrial and trial proceedings, that
litigation costs would be inordinately high in view of the unlikelihood of success, and that the
continuing publicity could be damaging to the corporation's business.").
403. The court's suggestion that plaintiffs had to "set forth particularized facts that he resigned or
unarguably breached his Employment Agreement," Eisner, 746 A.2d at 264, was a bit simplistic.
Lawsuits may be worth pursuing even if the outcome is not perfectly clear.
404. Ultimately, it boils down to a very sophisticated calculation of expected values. A simplistic
example follows. Assume two lawsuits have similar litigation-related expenses of SI million each. The
first lawsuit offers a 10% chance of a $20 million verdict, while the second lawsuit offers a 99%
chance of a $1 million payout. The first case would be worth pursuing because it has an expected value
of $1 million ($20 million x 10% - $1 million), while the second would not be worth pursuing because
it has a slightly negative expected value ($1 million x 99% - $1 million).
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cases. 40 5 Although litigation is expensive, the potential award in many
cases is quite large.
The cost/benefit argument is legitimate as to form. As to the merits, it
is the type of decision that courts would normally leave to the business
judgment of directors. However, because of structural bias, that would be
inappropriate. On matters of derivative litigation, courts cannot defer to
directors' expertise. Rather, they must consider the merits of the
competing arguments to decide whether the directors' decision was
unreasonable. In many cases, the directors' decision will be the obviously
correct one; in some cases, the decision will be a difficult one, but not
unreasonable. Sometimes, however, it will be objectively unreasonable not
to pursue a claim.
Whether a given decision is reasonable may depend on the reasons
given.406 When the potential award is sufficiently great, a casual claim or
conclusory assertion by the directors should not be sufficient to carry the
day. A more serious analysis would allow the court to evaluate the
decision on the merits-not to decide whether it was correct, but only to
decide whether it was unreasonable. If the directors' analysis is realistic,
their decision is likely to be upheld as reasonable.40 7 On the other hand, if
their decision is based on unrealistic assumptions, it could lead the court to
conclude that the decision was unreasonable.40 8
In Eisner, over $140 million was at stake. As long as the case was not
frivolous-and it was clear that the court thought it had some merit4 9 -it
would be difficult to believe that the case should be dismissed on
cost/benefit grounds. Although such a decision might be upheld under the
business judgment rule, it should not be upheld under the proposed
standard-at least not without sufficient justification.41 0
405. If the courts believe that the costs of derivative litigation outweigh the benefits, they should
consider eliminating the derivative action altogether.
406. In theory, the court may have to engage in a hypothetical analysis in cases alleging demand
futility because no decision will have been made. See supra text accompanying note 377. In practice,
directors likely would be permitted to present an analysis to the court.
407. Nevertheless, it is possible that conflicted directors could come to an objectively
unreasonable decision. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
408. As a simplistic example, directors may conclude that a lawsuit is not worthwhile based on the
assumptions of a 10% chance of success, a $10 million dollar award, and $2 million in attorneys fees
(expected value: -$1 million). However, if the court were to believe that the chance of success were
more like 50%, the likely award closer to $20 million, and the likely attorneys fees only $1 million
(expected value: $9 million), it could conclude that the directors' decision was objectively
unreasonable.
409. The court considered the argument to be "perhaps a good one." Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 265 (Del. 2000). Overall, the court considered the complaint to present "a close case." Id. at 249.
410. When the stakes are high enough, it is not reasonable to assume that the costs of litigation
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Thus, review for substantive reasonableness could have made a
difference in the Eisner case, both on the issue of the initial approval of
the employment agreement and on the subsequent grant of a non-fault
termination. The Delaware Supreme Court was uncomfortable with its
decision but felt compelled because of the deference of the business
judgment rule.41' The proposed standard would have permitted the court to
come to a more reasonable conclusion.
C. Executive Compensation
If the shareholder-plaintiffs make it past the procedural hurdles of
derivative litigation, they will have the opportunity to challenge the
substantive merit of the directors' decisions. This section will consider
how review for substantive reasonableness might operate in an important
and controversial setting: executive compensation decisions. It will
attempt to apply the proposed standard in three notorious cases. This
should help to illustrate the impact of a review for substantive
reasonableness.
First, however, it must be asked why the business judgment rule would
not apply to executive compensation decisions in the face of state laws
such as section 144(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.412 That
statute provides as follows:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 [one] or
more of its directors or officers ... shall be void or voidable solely
for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at
or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which
authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because of any such
director's or officer's votes are counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are
known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the
outweigh the benefits, so directors should have to justify such a conclusion. In fairness, Eisner was a
demand futility case. Thus, even if the proposed standard had been applied, the court may not have had
the benefit of the directors' analysis and may have resorted to hypothetical reasoning to decide
whether a decision not to pursue the case could be reasonable. See supra text accompanying note 377.
However, even hypothetical reasoning has its limits. A $140 million claim is a difficult hurdle to
overcome.
411. See Eisner, 746 A.2d at 249.
412. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).
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affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even
though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract
or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the
shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the
time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors,
a committee or the shareholders. 3
Executive compensation decisions would seem to fall within the
protection of such statutes. Thus, justification must be given for subjecting
such decisions to an intermediate standard of review.
One possible reason would be to argue that, because of structural bias,
no directors should qualify as "disinterested directors." Although there is
some truth in the claim, it is the type of argument that would be better
directed in support of an amendment of the statute rather than an
eviscerating interpretation of it.
More promising is the statutory language itself. The Delaware Supreme
Court has interpreted section 144 as "merely remov[ing] an 'interested
director' cloud ... and provid[ing] against invalidation of an agreement
'solely' because such a director or officer is involved," but not as
"sanction[ing] unfairness ...or remov[ing] the transaction from judicial
scrutiny.', 414 Thus, such contracts and transactions are not immune from
review, but generally are given the protection of the business judgment
rule.41 5 However, the decision to apply the business judgment rule instead
of the entire fairness test or an intermediate standard of review is a
deliberate one by the courts, not one that necessarily was required by
statute.416 Moreover, even when the business judgment rule is applied, the
contract or transaction is considered voidable if the plaintiff can establish
either gross negligence or waste.41 7 In light of structural bias, the standard
413. Id.
414. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976).
415. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
416. See, e.g., Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 221 (applying entire fairness test despite statutory language in
case in case involving shareholder approval). See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 337-41.
417. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("[A]pproval by fully-informed
disinterested directors . . . or disinterested stockholders ... permits the invocation of the business
judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the
party attacking the transaction.").
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should be changed to unreasonableness. Thus, the contract or transaction
in question would not be voidable solely because of the conflict, but
because, in addition, the plaintiff has established that the contract or
transaction was unreasonable.41 8
The first notorious example of executive compensation deals with the
post-retirement benefits that were to be received by Jack Welch, former
Chairman and CEO of General Electric Co. By all accounts, Mr. Welch
was an exceptional manager.419 Under his leadership, the company
flourished.420 His compensation packages were large-salary and bonus of
over $16 million in 2000 and 2001, in addition to millions of stock options
and other benefits4 2 '-but few were heard to complain. That is, until the
details of his post-employment benefits were exposed in his divorce
proceedings.422 In addition to a lucrative consulting arrangement, Mr.
Welch was to receive, "for the remainder of his life, continued access to
Company facilities and services comparable to those provided to him prior
to his retirement, including access to Company aircraft, cars, office,
apartments, and financial planning services. 423 The aggregate value of
these benefits was over $2 million per year.424 The resulting outrage was
severe, and Mr. Welch's previously golden reputation suffered
significantly.
425
418. In any event, even if an unreasonable executive compensation agreement were not voidable,
the directors could still be liable for breach of fiduciary duty in approving such an agreement. In a
derivative action against the directors, the proposed standard would apply. Thus, it remains important
to consider the application of the proposed standard to executive compensation decisions.
419. See Jeffrey E. Garten, Jack Welch: A Role Model for Today's CEO?, Bus. WK., Sept. 10,
2001, at 32 ("Already [Jack Welch] has been hailed as one of the great business leaders of the past
half-century-and deservedly so."); Jack Welch: A CEO Who Can't Be Cloned, Bus. WK., Sept. 17,
2001, at 130 ("It is a testament to the success of the man that no other business manager anywhere
rivals him in terms of peer respect.").
420. See Garten, supra note 419, at 32 ("From 1982 through 2000, GE's average annual total
return to shareholders was 25%, compared with 17% for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index.");
CNN/Money, SEC Probes Welch Deal (Sept. 16, 2002), available at http://money.cnn.com/
2002/09/16/news/companies/welchwsj/ ("GE's market capitalization stood at $402.4 billion when
Welch retired a year ago, about a 5,000 percent increase in the stock's value, including dividends,
while he was at the helm.").
421. See GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. PROXY STATEMENT 20-21 (2002).
422. Although the details were fleshed out in his wife's divorce filings, the terms of Welch's
retention agreement were made public shortly after the agreement was executed. See Employment and
Post-Retirement Consulting Agreement, Dec. 20, 1996, in GENERAL ELECTRIC Co. ANNUAL REPORT
ON FORM 10-K, Exhibit 10(w) (1996) [hereinafter Welch Agreement].
423. See Welch Agreement, supra note 422, at 5.
424. See Jack Welch, My Dilemma-And How I Resolved It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2002, at A 14
("I will pay the costs for my use of all other facilities and services provided by GE such as planes and
the company apartment. I estimate that I will be paying between $2 million and $2.5 million a year for
these services.").
425. See Anthony Bianco, The Fall of an Icon, BUS. WK., Sept. 23, 2002, at 46 ("After a year of
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In fact, however, Welch's post-retirement benefits easily would
withstand scrutiny under the proposed standard. Although $2 million a
year may seem like a great deal of money to the author or to the average
reader, it is not particularly great by comparison to Mr. Welch's overall
compensation; his pension alone entitles him to over $7 million
annually.426 Thus, if the remainder of his compensation were reasonable-
a characterization that few have bothered to challenge-then it would be
difficult to hold the incremental post-retirement benefits unreasonable.
The reasonableness of Mr. Welch's post-retirement benefits becomes
clearer when the circumstances of the award are considered. They were
not a gift bestowed upon Mr. Welch on his retirement for a job well done.
427Such an award arguably would be a waste of corporate assets. Rather,
Mr. Welch's benefits were negotiated as part of a retention agreement. Mr.
Welch was approaching retirement age when he suffered a heart attack and
underwent quintuple bypass surgery.428 The board wanted to ensure that he
would remain with the company long enough to groom a successor.
According to Mr. Welch, the board offered him $100 million; he turned
the offer down and requested a package of benefits that almost certainly
would be worth significantly less. 429 The real issue, then, is whether such a
large retention bonus would have been reasonable. In his rare case, it
probably would have been.430 If so, it should not matter that he preferred to
take the bonus in kind over the course of his retirement rather than in cash
or stock immediately.
The second notorious example is the compensation received by
Richard Grasso, former Chairman and CEO of the New York Stock
Exchange. Although the New York Stock Exchange is a not-for-profit
unrelenting corporate scandal, tolerance of CEO self-aggrandizement is so low that even Welch, once
crowned the 'Manager of the Century,' has become a target of resentment and revisionism.").
426. See Plaintiff's Financial Affidavit at 1, John F. Welch, Jr. v. Jane B. Welch, at I (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2002) ("Gross Monthly Pension: $618,687").
427. See, e.g., Adams v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221, 226 (Ala. 1963) (holding decision to pay pension
to widows of recently-deceased officers ultra vires for lack of consideration).
428. JOHN F. WELCH, JR., JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 325-28 (John A. Byrne ed., 2001).
429. See Life After GE? And How, Bus. WK., Mar. 8, 2004, at 76 ("The board came to me ... and
they said: 'We'd like to give you $100 million in restricted stock to stay 'til you're 65 and make the
succession work.' I said: 'I don't need $100 million. I'm too cheap to spend it anyway .... But what I
would like to do is keep the plane and the apartment, which cost about $1.7 million a year."); Welch,
supra note 424, at A14 ("[T]he board ... suggested an employment contract, which offered me a
special one-time payment of tens of millions of dollars to remain as CEO until ... [age] 65. 1 instead
agreed to take the post-retirement benefits ... instead of cash compensation ... that would have been
much more expensive for the company.").
430. Cf infra note 456 and accompanying text.
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entity rather than as a business corporation,431 the following discussion
nevertheless will apply the proposed standard as if the same principles
applied. Like Mr. Welch, Mr. Grasso undeniably was an exceptional
manager.432 Under his leadership, the New York Stock Exchange
flourished 433 at a time when it might have been expected to whither away
in the face of increasing competition from more modem rivals.
434
Problems for Mr. Grasso began when it was announced that, in connection
with the extension of his employment contract, he would be receiving a
cash payment in an amount of $139.5 million.435
Of course, Mr. Grasso had not received an annual salary of $139.5
million; nor was that amount a retention bonus. It was an aggregate
amount that represented his earnings over a number of years pursuant to
complicated benefit plans and deferral programs.436 His salary had been
capped at $1.4 million for a number of years.437 However, his incentive
compensation and capital accumulation plan awards were significantly
greater-as high as $16 million and $8 million, respectively, in 2001.4
The appropriate question, then, is not whether a $140 million payout was
reasonable, but rather whether an aggregate annual compensation in the
431. See infra note 441 and accompanying text.
432. See Gary Weiss, The $140,000,000 Man: What Dick Grasso's Excessive Payout Reveals
About How He Runs the New York Stock Exchange, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 84, 86 ("Grasso is an
undeniably talented manager. ... Even his sharpest critics agree that Grasso has almost single-
handedly built up the exchange's public image-which, along with an intense detail-oriented
approach, has helped maintain the NYSE's superb market-share numbers.").
433. See id. at 84-87. "Grasso's allies credit him with ... maintaining a prosperous exchange,
with 1,549 of its 2,800 companies joining on his watch, and a consistent 80% market share of the
trading of NYSE stocks." Id. at 87. "In addition, seat prices have tripled in price since he became
chairman in 1994." Id. at 86.
434. See Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Who Decides How Much is Too Much?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24,
2003, at A21 ("Mr. Grasso's tenure happened to coincide with a universal panic that the NYSE
franchise, funnel for $9 trillion a year in trading volume, was in danger of slipping away.").
435. See Kate Kelly, NYSE Chief Will Collect $139.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at Cl.
It also was announced that he would be entitled to receive an additional $48 million over the course of
the next few years. See Kate Kelly, Grasso Takes More Heat on Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2004, at
Cl.
436. See Kelly, NYSE Chief, supra note 435, at Cl.
[Mr. Grasso] is withdrawing $139.5 million in savings he has acquired during his career of
more than three decades at the NYSE. That payout is a combination of $40 million in a
savings account, a previously accrued retirement benefit of $51.6 million, and a previously
earned balance of $47.9 million that is the result of prior incentive awards.
Id.
437. See Carol J. Loumis, Dick Grasso's Pay: The Sequel, FORTUNE, Feb. 9, 2004, at 22, 24.
438. Letter from Carl McCall to William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission 7 (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/donaldsonletter.pdf [hereinafter
McCall Letter].
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eight-figure range (over $30 million in 2001 alone!439), together with other
benefits,44° was reasonable.
If the New York Stock Exchange were a typical business, it likely
would have been reasonable for the board to pay Mr. Grasso such large
amounts. After all, Mr. Grasso's leadership was extraordinary. However,
there are a number of factors that complicate the analysis.
In the first place, the New York Stock Exchange is not a typical
business. In fact, it is a not-for-profit corporation. Under the New York
Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, an officer's compensation must be
"reasonable" and "commensurate with [the] services performed."'441
Whether the management of a not-for-profit organization should receive
compensation that equals or even exceeds the private market is a difficult
question. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer believes that it should
not, and has sued Mr. Grasso for reimbursement on behalf of the New
44York Stock Exchange. 42 If, however, the New York Stock Exchange's
desire to "attract and retain superior 'world class' executives" 443 is
reasonable, then the payment of competitive compensation should also be
considered reasonable. And if Mr. Grasso's performance were exceptional,
it should not be surprising that his compensation also would be
exceptional.
However, an additional complicating factor is the fact that the New
York Stock Exchange also is a self-regulatory organization under the
federal securities laws.444 That made Mr. Grasso a regulator. His
compensation was not only far greater than that of public regulators, such
as the Chairman of the SEC,445 but also far greater than other private
regulators, 46 such as the heads of the Public Company Accounting
439. See id. (total compensation of $25,550,000 plus "Special Payment" of $5,000,000).
440. For example, Mr. Grasso was also entitled to participate in various retirement plans that were
also quite generous. See id. at 5-7; see also Shawn Tully, See Dick Squirm, FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 2003,
at 77, 80 ("In 2001 ... Grasso made some $30 million in salary, bonus, and long-term comp, not
including a hefty contribution to his retirement account.") (emphasis added).
441. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW§202(a)(12) (McKinney 1997).
442. See Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Spitzer Files Suit Seeking Millions of Grasso Money, WALL
ST. J., May 25, 2004, at Al.
443. See McCall Letter, supra note 438, at 2.
444. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(2000).
445. "Mr. Donaldson receives a salary of $142,500 as S.E.C. Chairman, and no bonus." Landon
Thomas Jr., S.E.C. Chairman Wants Details of Compensation Paid to Grasso, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
2003, at Cl.
446. Although most quasi-regulators have not received nearly as much as Mr. Grasso, there is at
least one exception:
By the standards of the New York Stock Exchange, James J. McNulty, the president and
chief executive of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, does not have an outsized salary. It was
slightly less than $1.9 million last year.
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Oversight Board447 or the National Association of Securities Dealers.448
For Mr. Grasso to be paid so much more than other regulators is more than
just unseemly; it raises serious questions about whether he might be
tempted to ignore his regulatory duties in favor of business matters. After
all, the business of regulation is not a profit center that would justify
increased compensation. In light of the special nature of the New York
Stock Exchange, Mr. Grasso's compensation arguably should be deemed
unreasonable.
Finally, the most disturbing factors are those alleged by Mr. Spitzer in
his complaint. Mr. Spitzer claims that Mr. Grasso's employment
agreements were "the product of a process that permitted Grasso
improperly to influence both the amounts awarded to him and the
members of the New York Stock Exchange Compensation Committee and
Board of Directors who were required to approve those awards., 449 If this
heightened structural bias concern can be shown to have undermined the
independence of the directors, then the entire fairness test should apply.
450
Even if not, however, the circumstances should be factored into the
451determination of reasonableness. Mr. Spitzer also alleges that theagreements were "approved by the NYSE Board of Directors based upon
But when his stock options are added, his total potential compensation is many times larger.
At yesterday's closing price of $70.25, his exercisable options on the shares of Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Holdings, which recently went public, were worth $69 million. Add the
options he holds that cannot be exercised yet and the total value climbs to $86 million.
Jonathan Fuerbringer, As More Markets Go Public, Salaries Are Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2003, at Cl.
447. "Mr. McDonough will be paid handsomely in his new post, earning an annual salary of
$556,000. That may be modest compared with the pay packages of many top accounting executives,
but it's one of Washington's biggest salaries." Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, 'Tough' Cop
for Accounting Beat, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at C 1.
448. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, NASD Filing Discloses Salary and Bonus of Chief N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2003, at C7 ("Robert Glauber, the chairman and chief executive of NASD, was paid a salary
and bonus totaling $2.1 million in 2002 .... In addition, Mr. Glauber received a payment award
toward his executive retirement fund of $6.67 million. He also had deferred compensation of $283,663
and expenses and other allowances totaling $375,669."); see also Peter A. McKay, Deals & Deal
Makers NYSE: Rivals Disclose Their Top Officers' Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at C5 (reporting
that Salvatore Sodano, Chairman and CEO of the American Stock Exchange, received "$5 million,
including salary, bonus, pension, other benefits and deferred compensation" in 2002).
449. Complaint at 1, Spitzer v. Grasso (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/nys/nygrasso52404cmp.pdf (last visited Mar. 2005); see Kelly &
Craig, supra note 442, at A l ("The complaint accuses Mr. Grasso... of leaving some board members
with the impression that if they opposed his pay packages, it would be at their peril .... It also alleges
that Mr. Grasso took actions that benefited firms run by executives determining his compensation
.... .).
450. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
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materially incomplete, inaccurate and misleading information.
Disclosure to the board for decision-making purposes is a very serious
matter. If the facts are as alleged by Mr. Spitzer,453 then Mr. Grasso's
compensation must be deemed unreasonable.
The third notorious example is one with which the reader is already
familiar: Michael Ovitz's termination payment from The Walt Disney
Company. Unlike Mr. Welch and Mr. Grasso, Mr. Ovitz did not prove to
be an exceptional manager for Disney. However, he did receive a similar
compensation package. The structure of Mr. Ovitz's compensation
package and the circumstances of his award of a non-fault termination
already have been discussed at length. 54 In the author's view, they should
be sufficient to support a holding of unreasonableness.
An additional basis for a holding of unreasonableness, however, would
be the sheer size of the termination payment under the circumstances. Mr.
Ovitz was awarded $140 million after fourteen months of lackluster
service.455 Although the size of Mr. Ovitz's termination payment was
similar to that of Mr. Welch's retention bonus offer, the two payments
could not be more different: such a large payment may be justified to
retain an exceptional manager, but not to remove an inferior one.4 56 Courts
may be tempted to give directors the benefit of the doubt under the
business judgment rule, but there is not much doubt when the termination
payment is so large. Moreover, such deference to the directors' business
judgment on compensation matters is not warranted because of structural
bias. The question under the proposed standard is whether the termination
payment falls within the range of reasonableness. The answer is that it
clearly does not.
The circumstances surrounding the ultimate decision do not change the
result. The directors entered into an agreement that allowed for the
possibility of such an unreasonable payment 457 and then voluntarily agreed
452. See Complaint at 1, Spitzer v. Grasso (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/up/docs/nys/nygrasso52404cmp.pdf (last visited Mar. 2005).
453. The author finds it difficult to believe that the board of directors was misled, and the claim
has been forcefully denied by Ken Langone, former chairman of the NYSE compensation committee
and co-defendant in the lawsuit. See Ken Langone, Let's Bring on the Jury, Mr. Spitzer, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 2004, at A12 ("It is absurd to suggest that the brightest minds and keenest thinkers on Wall
Street were befuddled by the complexity of Richard Grasso's compensation package-especially one
composed just like their own.").
454. See supra notes 384-410.
455. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 252-53 (Del. 2000).
456. See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
457. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
2004]
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
to a non-fault termination. 458 While it may be possible that a good
employment contract would lead to an unforeseeably large and unfortunate
payment, this was not such a case. The result was entirely foreseeable.
Directors cannot be permitted to justify such an unreasonable termination
payment decision by reference to previous poor compensation decisions.
A comparison of the three examples illustrates how the three standards
of review diverge. Welch's post-termination benefits surely would survive
under either the business judgment rule or a review for substantive
reasonableness; in fact, they probably even would survive under the entire
fairness test, given his value to the company. Grasso's compensation may
not be entirely fair, but surely Would be considered rational. Whether it
should be considered reasonable is a more difficult question, but given the
special circumstances of the New York Stock Exchange, it arguably
should not. Ovitz's termination payment is an easier case. Clearly it could
not be considered entirely fair; it also should not be deemed reasonable.
Even the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that it barely survived under
the business judgment rule. 59
Of course, a review for substantive reasonableness will not be a
complete solution to the problem of excessive executive compensation.
Because the proposed standard allows directors considerable discretion, it
would not be suited for a direct challenge to compensation levels across
the board. However, it would enable more aggressive enforcement against
the outliers. This, in turn, could serve an important systemic function. At
the very least, it should cause directors to hesitate before embarking on an
overly-generous path. Increased accountability should serve to slow down
the rate of increase in executive compensation, as well: directors likely
would be less willing to engage in ratcheting behavior if they face the
threat of meaningful review than they would if they knew that almost any
compensation package would be protected by the business judgment rule.
Moreover, when an extreme compensation package is challenged, the
process employed to approve it is likely to be criticized. Because the
process tends to be similar across companies, this may force all boards to
reconsider their practices and significant change may result.460 Thus, the
impact of catching a few additional cases of abuse should not be
underestimated.
458. See supra notes 389-392 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
460. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 149.
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D. Director Exculpation Statutes
One final issue that ought to be addressed is whether charter provisions
that limit or eliminate liability for breach of fiduciary duty should apply in
situations involving structural bias.461 The answer to that question depends
on whether structural bias is considered a duty of care issue or a duty of
loyalty issue. As either a practical or a doctrinal matter, there is no easy
answer.
"[S]tarting in late 1984 the market for directors' and officers' (D&O)
liability insurance changed dramatically: premiums skyrocketed,
deductibles increased, and coverage was reduced. There are reports of
directors resigning because their firms had lost insurance coverage and of
individuals declining invitations to serve on boards in increasing
numbers. 462 In response to the crisis, many states adopted "director
exculpation statute[s],,, 463 which serve to limit director liability for breach
of fiduciary duties. Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law is a typical example; it provides that a company's certificate of
incorporation may contain:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages
for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such
provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i)
For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or
its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii)
under § 174 of this title [unlawful distributions]; or (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit....
461. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); cf MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 2.02(b)(4) (2002).
462. Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1-2 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
463. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Del. 1999).
464. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). The Model Business Corporation Act has a
similar provision:
[The articles of incorporation may set forth] ... a provision eliminating or limiting the
liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any action
taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for (A) the amount of a
financial benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction
of harm on the corporation or the shareholders; (C) a violation of section 8.33 [unlawful
distributions]; or (D) an intentional violation of criminal law ....
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2002).
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The general effect of such laws is to allow corporations to limit or
eliminate the liability of directors for breach of the duty of care, but not for
breach of the duty of loyalty.465 Thus, director liability for breach of
fiduciary duty in cases involving structural bias depends on the
characterization of that breach.
It may seem obvious that structural bias is a duty of loyalty issue. After
all, the problem is one of conflicts of interest. However, the issue is not so
simple. In cases involving structural bias, the business judgment rule is
replaced by an intermediate standard of review because confidence in
directors' judgment is compromised by conflicts of interest.466 There is no
proven breach of the duty of loyalty; if there were, the entire fairness test
would apply.467 Thus, although structural bias may seem to involve the
duty of loyalty, it does not necessarily involve a breach of the duty of
loyalty.
As previously discussed, the existing understanding of the duty of
loyalty is fairly narrow.468 When state legislatures enacted the statutory
provisions, they presumably intended to exclude only what was
understood to be covered-e.g., self-dealing. Establishing the
unreasonableness of a board decision in a structural bias situation does not
amount to a proven breach of the duty of loyalty. 469 Thus, structural bias
cases should not be excluded from the scope of the statutory protection.
It may seem odd to consider unreasonable action a breach of the duty
of care. However, as a technical matter, the designation does not matter.
Liability for breach of fiduciary duty may be limited unless it is a breach
of the duty of loyalty.470 Thus, whether it is called a duty of care issue or
some other fiduciary duty-perhaps a duty of reasonableness-the result
is the same: liability may be limited.
As a policy matter, the question is whether shareholders ought to be
able to relieve directors of personal liability for unreasonable decisions in
situations involving structural bias. There is little reason to believe that
465. See, e.g., S. 533, 133d Gen. Assembly 2, 65 Del. Laws ch. 289, §§ 1-2 (1986), reprinted in I
FOLK, supra note 152, § 102.15, at GCL-1-27 n.56; cf MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 2.i., at 2-
10 (2002) ("[t]erms such as 'duty of loyalty,' [and] 'good faith,"' rejected as imprecise).
Such laws also generally forbid limitation of liability for breach of the duty of good faith. The
significance of the duty of good faith as a separate doctrine is unclear. See supra note 2.
466. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 200-16 and
accompanying text.
469. A finding of unreasonableness does not imply a breach of the duty of good faith, either.
470. Of course, liability also may not be limited in the other circumstances listed, including breach
of the duty of good faith. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
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they should not. As previously discussed, situations involving structural
bias demand the business judgment of directors.471 Such business
judgment can be faulty.472 "[S]hareholders should be permitted-except
when important societal values are at stake-to decide how to allocate the
economic risk of the directors' conduct between the corporation and the
directors., 473 While disloyal actions or actions taken in bad faith may rise
to the level of seriousness that would make even voluntary exculpation
inappropriate, structural bias-without more---does not.
If charter provisions allow directors to escape personal liability despite
structural bias, one may wonder about the value of an intermediate
standard of review that may serve to increase litigation costs without
providing any shareholder benefit. There are at least two responses to this
concern. First, not all directors will be relieved of liability. In many states,
including Delaware, director exculpation provisions are optional: only
directors of companies whose shareholders have adopted a charter
provision eliminating their liability will be fully protected.474 Thus, in
many cases, directors will face personal liability.
Second, and more importantly, a finding of breach of fiduciary duty
also would open the door to appropriate equitable relief. This is because
the statutory provisions "do[] not operate to defeat the validity of a
plaintiffs claim on the merits, [but only] to defeat the plaintiffs ability to
recover monetary damages. ''475 They "have no effect on the availability of
equitable remedies, such as injunction or rescission." 47 6 Thus, in most
cases, the improper conduct can be prevented or undone.477
In addition, there are other benefits to a finding of a breach of fiduciary
duty under the proposed standard. For example, there is a powerful
471. See supra Part IV.A.2.
472. But see In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("If
the shareholders thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a director
produces in the good faith exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have elected
other directors.").
473. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 2.i., at 2-9 (2002).
474. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
475. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001).
476. S. 533, 133d Gen. Assembly 2, 65 Del. Laws ch. 289, §§ 1-2 (1986), reprinted in I FOLK,
supra note 152, § 102.15, at GCL-1-27 n.56; see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 2.i., at 2-9
(2002) (Section 2.02(b)(4) "follows the path of virtually all the states that have adopted charter option
statutes and is applicable only to money damages and not to equitable relief.").
477. In many cases, the typical equitable remedies of injunction and rescission should be
sufficient to prevent or undo the harm resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty. An aggressive
remedy that might be helpful in other cases would be to find an unreasonable contract to be invalid and
unenforceable, even as against non-fiduciaries. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50-51 (Del. 1994).
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expressive effect.478 Under the business judgment rule, courts are limited
in their ability to develop the standard of conduct under the duty of care.
Because the standards of review are mere rationality and gross negligence,
courts spend far more time justifying shoddy behavior than demanding
excellence.479 With an enhanced standard of reasonableness, the law may
be developed in a more meaningful way. Directors will have a better
understanding of what the law expects of them. Even without the fear of
personal liability, directors' conduct should improve because of their
desire to avoid the embarrassment of a judicial pronouncement of their
unreasonableness.48 °
In short, personal liability for directors is only one of many practical
reasons to support an intermediate standard of review. Even the
elimination of such liability would not render judicial review meaningless.
Thus, it should not undermine the purpose of an intermediate standard of
review to consider structural bias a duty of care issue rather than a duty of
loyalty issue, and to permit corporations to limit or even eliminate the
liability of directors for unreasonable decisions.
CONCLUSION
Structural bias presents a challenge to corporate law. On the one hand,
the deference of the business judgment rule is inappropriate because of
directors' conflicting interests; on the other hand, the rigor of the entire
fairness test is inappropriate because of the lack of evidence of self-
dealing. An intermediate standard of review that could bridge the gap
between these two doctrines is necessary. A moderate review of the
substantive merits of directors' decisions is the solution.
The standard proposed in this Article-review for substantive
reasonableness-is both practical and intellectually satisfying. It draws on
the insights of the twin pillars of enforcement of fiduciary duties in
corporate law while overcoming their respective weaknesses. Although the
proposed standard may lead to an increase in litigation expense, the effect
478. For discussions of the expressive effect of law, see generally Lawrence Lessig, Social
Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 338 (1997); and Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
479. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) ("[T]he law of corporate fiduciary
duties and remedies for violation of those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal
corporate governance practices.").
480. Moreover, once certain behavior is deemed unreasonable, similar behavior in the future may
be deemed a breach of the duty of good faith. If so, directors would not be shielded from personal
liability.
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should not be nearly as dramatic as might be feared. The return on the
investment is a better balance between the competing values of directorial
authority and accountability.
Nothing in this Article is intended to undermine either the business
judgment rule or the entire fairness test. Both doctrines are sensible and
well-suited for their primary function. However, neither is adequate for
dealing with structural bias. In proposing and defending an intermediate
standard of review, the author has sought to deal with subtle and
complicated issues of conflicted interests while preserving the essential
role of the two core doctrines of corporate law.

